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THE UN-OFFICIAL PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS IN PAKISTAN: THE INTERFACE WITH STATE BUREAUCRACY AND CITIZENS

Shehryar Khan

A thesis submitted by for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Bath

Department of Social and Policy Sciences

March 2012

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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this thesis to:

My loving and affectionate mother, Mrs Shaheen Saifullah

My beloved wife, Zeneb

&

My loving and caring children, Ayla, Annum and Waris

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Abstract

It is widely recognised, both locally and internationally, that poor or bad governance is a major impediment to the effective performance of public sector institutions in Pakistan. A careful analysis of the literature suggests that good governance is a *sine qua non* for achieving human development in the country.

From the standpoint of providing an empirical understanding of the above assessment of the role of governance, the literature and current scholarship analyse problems of governance in Pakistan with reference to normative literature on good governance and public administration. This normative literature predominantly reflects principles and conceptions drawn from Western political systems. As an ideal type, these systems reflect liberal-pluralistic societies in which there is a clear separation between the executive and the legislature. Moreover, they highlight the significance of technical expertise, managerial competencies and effective public sector institutions. The literature compares the experience of countries like Pakistan to this ideal construct, and therefore encourages a 'subtractivist' and normative approach in its assessment of governance. In so doing, it points to practices of corruption, political interference, lack of accountability, and patron–client forms of behaviour as explanations of Pakistan's poor or bad governance trajectory.

My thesis offers a very different perspective on governance in Pakistan. It adopts an interactionist-epistemological stance in order to develop a framework which focuses on the actual behaviour of state bureaucracy. Using ethnographic data collected from three distinct case studies, the thesis demonstrates the significance of informal social norms: in particular, clientelism, personal relationships and moral attachments. These social norms deeply affect the actual behaviour of public officials. In the implementation of policies and development interventions, public officials both deploy and are exposed to these informal social norms. This can result in behaviour or decisions which run counter to official or expected norms. In this thesis, I argue that the challenges of governance in Pakistan are firmly situated in the historical account of the state's formation and in the deeper structures of

society. This characterisation better captures state–society relationships and allows for the development of a more realistic insight into real governance trajectories in the country. In Pakistan, the operations of public administration are complex and require a close examination of porous public–private boundaries. These boundaries constantly shape administrative practices as well as stakeholder interactions and negotiations. This is the actual landscape of governance in which citizens have to negotiate access to public and collective services.

List of Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADO	Assistant District Officer
ATO	Assistant <i>Tehsil</i> Officer
CAP	Community Attitudes and Practices
CO	Chief Officer
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DCO	District Coordinating Officer
DDO	Deputy District Officer
DEO	District Education Officer
DHO	District Health Officer
EDO	Executive District Officer
EFA	Education For All
EFR	Environmental Fiscal Reforms
ESR	Education Structural Reforms
FPSC	Federal Public Service Commission
ICS	Indian Civil Service
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KFW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
LGO	Local Government Ordinance
MOE	Ministry of Environment
MPA	Member of Provincial Assembly
MNA	Member of National Assembly
NPA	National Plan of Action
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

NUDP	National Urban Development Project
PAL	Participatory Action Learning
PCS	Provincial Civil Service
PHED	Public Health Engineering Department
PLG	Provisional Local Government
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PTC	Parent Teacher Commission
TC	Town Committee
TMA	<i>Tehsil</i> Municipal Administration
TMO	<i>Tehsil</i> Municipal Officer
UC	Union Council
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WAPDA	Water and Power Development Authority
WB	World Bank

Glossary of Terms

Abbasi	a common name by which the tribe Dhoond is addressed. People living in most parts of Abbottabad district prefer the name Abbasi to Dhoond
Awan	name of tribe
Amirs	nobles
Attab	a curse
Choak	junction
Choakidar	guard
Darbar	a Mughal term, the darbar was the centre of social activities, where aristocracy and influential people would meet
Dhoond	name of tribe
Hajj	pilgrimage to Mecca, obligatory for every Muslim at least once in his/her lifetime
Jadoon	name of tribe
Jagir	Fief
Jamhoory	Democratic
Jis Ki Lathi Us Ki Behance	"Might is power"
Khans	people who are traditionally well-off due to their historical roots, social capital and inheritance of land from their forefathers
Khallils	sub-clans of a tribe such as Jadoons
Pakhtoon/Pathan	an ethno-linguistic group of people primarily living in the province of Khyber PakhtoonKhwa
Panchayat	constitution of a forum known as a council, consisting of five members
Mohala	Street
Nazim	Mayor

<i>Naib Nazim</i>	Deputy Mayor
<i>Sardar</i>	name of tribe
<i>Shaheed</i>	Martyred
<i>Tribe/Biradari</i>	a tribe is organised according to kinship ties and family lineage. Sometimes <i>biradari</i> and tribe do appear to have the same connotation in the Pakistani genealogical perspective. Tribe and <i>biradari</i> share common characteristics for multiple reasons, such as social standing, common culture and language.
<i>Zamendar</i>	landlord

Introduction

In this thesis, I discuss how official business¹ is actually performed in three different institutional contexts. There are two primary reasons for focusing upon the 'actual' situation. The first reason relates to my previous experience of working with state officials in improving their official practices through capacity-building workshops. What was of significant importance in these workshops was that, despite my delivering innumerable training sessions, capacity remained weak and the officials performed their jobs as usual. On one hand, there was a tendency in these workshops to underemphasise how state bureaucracy performed official business in practice; and on the other hand, there was emphasis on technical and managerial solutions, designed to align official practices with official norms and service-delivery processes. Moreover, written documents obstructed a realistic understanding of how state officials discharged their administrative tasks in the everyday functioning of state.

Secondly, through informal meetings and from my own personal experience, I have noted that before a civil servant takes up the formal administrative business of the day, he has various informal meetings and transactions, often with people known to him. He attends to such tasks as discharging his personal (i.e. not officially sanctioned) obligations to people, receiving friends and slacking with colleagues. The office of a civil servant represents a *darbar*² for holding personal and informal discussions, and demonstrating the existence of a system of informal governance by granting favours to close family members, influential individuals and people with whom he/she has close ties. Moreover, the structure of the known official meetings would in practice often be characterised by informal performance of official tasks, and the taking of decisions that are at odds with rule-bound norms. To public

¹ The term 'official business' is used in the context of administrative/bureaucratic business and should not be confused with private business. Moreover, I use the term 'bureaucratic' as a type of functioning which does not bear any semblance to the term 'bureaucracy'.

² The term *darbar* connotes the legacy of Mughals: the *darbar* was the centre of social activities, where aristocracy and influential people would meet.

officials, personal acquaintances, social relationships and family ties are ranked above the bureaucratic universe that is based on formal rules and procedures. An unknown person would be treated by deploying delaying tactics and referring to little-known stocks of official norms.³ These were my primary concerns, since most of my time resources and efforts were spent on understanding why the actual practices of state officials do not correspond to expected official behaviour, and how certain citizens get access to public and collective services more expediently than others.

The term 'official business' requires a brief introduction. Official business means performing official tasks to achieve development, policy outcomes, state ambitions and plans directed at meeting the welfare needs of the citizens. It incorporates certain requirements such as goals, interventions, priorities, official rules and regulations. These requirements involve structures, institutions, organisations and state actors with public authority. The exercise of public authority in the state is largely a subset of bureaucratic administrative structures and political ambitions, under which the state becomes the main policy maker and the bureaucratic polity a major stakeholder in the implementation of policy and development interventions (Christopher, 2002; Parkin, 2002 cited in Willott 2009). Moreover, state bureaucracy acts according to rules. There is a high conformity to official laws and regulations, and an official performs in a system which functions "either in the form of its Weberian ideal-type or European experience" (Willott 2009, p.3). The title of this thesis indicates the anti-thesis of this description of official business, as it assumes that official business is constitutive of well-performing public sector institutions, clearly defined development goals and a performance-oriented organisational culture of state bureaucracy. In essence, the dispensation of official business is based on the normatively established principles of good governance.

³ This particular treatment cannot be universally applied. State officials perform several functions—such as budgeting, monitoring and other officially designated tasks—in a routine and expected manner.

There is a well-established and exhaustive literature on Pakistan's institutional performance, indicating the problems of governance and their impact on public sector institutions. The profusion of knowledge on Pakistan's institutional performance adopts customary approaches which are more formalistic and less exploratory. First, the existing approaches engage with normative discourses and generalised forms of explanations of dysfunctional public sector performance in Pakistan that are associated with the doctrine of good governance. This assumes Weberian notions of bureaucracy, meritocracy, impartiality and rationality. Second, the existing literature archetypically evaluates, judges and examines problems of governance with reference to the formal model of governance, and cites patron–client relations, a culture of impunity, corruption, lack of accountability and structural problems in local government as key explanations of ineffective public sector performance. The ubiquitous nature and the universal application of the formalistic analysis are in fact based on the paradigmatic models of Western countries. These explanations and analyses are deficient in many ways when applied in the context of Pakistan. I deal with these models in more detail in the thesis. From the outset, I emphasise that this literature is based on 'subtractivist'⁴ approaches/models which compares bureaucratic behaviour with ideal-type behaviour.

This thesis moves away from the normative analysis and engages with how official business is performed in the state of Pakistan by examining the actual practices of the state bureaucracy through an 'interface' approach. The interface approach adopts an actor-oriented analysis to understand the social embeddednesses of these practices in society, and not within the normative concepts of good governance. In pursuing this approach, the research also seeks to engage critically with the forms of explanation offered by other scholars in the field and thereby assess their validity. The approach is exploratory and non-normative, and challenges the existing normative

⁴ The term 'subtractivist' is not recognised in the standard literature. The term comes from Graham Brown, who was one of the assessors during my progression from MPhil to PhD. Brown uses the label 'subtractivist' to refer to theoretical frameworks which evaluate official behaviour in Pakistan by taking ideal-type bureaucratic behaviour as the normative point of comparative reference.

explanations of state performance in Pakistan on the presumption of Western-liberal states and Weberian bureaucracy.

My research is based on the examination of three case studies⁵ pertaining to the delivery of public and collective services which involve state bureaucracy and citizens. While the delivery of social services is an important function of the state, the existing corpus of literature has paid inadequate attention to the complex relationships and interactions between civil servants and service users. Moreover, issues of accountability, patron–client relationships, and corruption within the administration and public services constitutes a central place in the current and future debates about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ governance in Pakistan.

The subtitle of the thesis draws attention to my research stance, which draws on an interactionist epistemology in order to assess actual practices and informal behaviour. Initially, the application of my actor-oriented approach was a problem for me as well as for the state officials. My initial interactions with an official of the Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA) created a methodological impasse in terms of looking for a social interface between officials and citizens. In the office of the official, we both discussed how interactions take place between officials and citizens and expressed our desire to know what transpires from these interactions. Whereas the actual intent and substance of these interactions are seldom discussed, the official was telling me the official versions, and the entire discussion was focused on the official processes of service delivery to local communities and how state officials deal with citizens according to official rules. During these interactions, a citizen known to the official frequently visited the officer. This citizen watched my anxiety and frustration building for almost a week. Eventually, it turned out that the citizen was from an urban locality called Nawansher. After discussing my research with him in layman’s language he seemed to understand my research aim. The citizen told me “that what you are looking for is to visit Nawansher and not this office. You will not get anything from these officials”. I soon began to

⁵ In providing justification and rationale for selecting three distinct case studies, I have used Harry Blair’s framework of the “long and short route to accountability”.

realise that my interface required social interactions in an environment where I could observe events and talk to people and officials. I faced the same situation in the case of education when I held discussions with male and female officials, who revealed a variety of conflicting stories. Interpretations of these stories required observation of events and discovery of actors' perspectives in different locales.

Over a period of eight months, I tried to get as many narratives as possible across three case studies namely education, water supply and refuse management. Inductive and deductive approaches were used to decipher events, verbiage and complex social realities in different sites and contexts. Both approaches have helped in trying to look at social events and perspectives both objectively and subjectively. The objective reality conveys facts which need to be complemented by subjective understanding of people's life experiences. This entailed combining traditional ethnography with other research methods.

I was facilitated by state officials in securing access to policy documents and getting information on planned interventions both verbally and by visiting sites. The research conducted in three different institutional contexts required persistence and entailed my constant engagement with state officials, citizens and non-state actors. My research contacts were initially state officials who shared with me important/classified documents and narrated to me their own experiences. Besides the fact that I am from Pakistan, this research would not have been possible without knowing the right people. On many occasions it was sheer luck that certain events were observed, and on other occasions my existing contacts introduced me to local citizens in different locations and the entire research process unfolded as a consequence of co-incidental and facilitated encounters/interactions. During field observations, I also used exploratory interviews to get an understanding of the institutional problems, and the process of the implementation of planned development interventions and policies. I tried to remain neutral, but at times I had to confront certain situations in order to know more about social and political events. I constantly reflected upon the intricate details and representations of events in my daily

write-ups of my notes. I would constantly engage with the raw data in order to attain a comprehensive grasp of uncontaminated events and the perceptions of people captured through structured and unstructured observations.

This thesis directly contributes to understanding how and under what circumstances the expected official behaviour of state officials is not in line with established rules and service-delivery processes. In addition, my extensive travelling and interactions enabled me to observe and document many discrepancies between official policy and the targets of development interventions. In this thesis, I argue that unofficial practices and informal social norms are embedded in society, that their social, administrative and cultural contexts are multiple, and that they are the primary determinants of understanding the problems of governance. Finally, all this is reproduced in different institutional settings and historical contexts.

Structure of the thesis

This thesis consists of seven chapters. In chapter one, I introduce models of public administration and good governance arguments propounded by Western scholars and the World Bank. The purpose of engaging with the central tenets of public administration is to show the previous and later trends in evaluating and analysing public sector performance and policy. The objective of introducing governance, despite the fact that it overlaps with public administration in its trappings and proclamations, is to underscore the dominant thinking behind the agenda of good governance considered as pragmatic and essential to addressing governance problems in the country. The overarching goal of this chapter is to situate these arguments in the context of Pakistan. As one reads through the literature on the issues of governance debated by scholars in Pakistan, it becomes evident that they have heavily relied upon the normative conceptions of good governance. This chapter tries to incorporate the Western-led literature, which Pakistan has bought into, and the literature on Pakistan about the prevailing problems of governance and how they are currently analysed.

The second chapter contextualises the first chapter within the pre-colonial era and the post-colonial state of Pakistan. The goal of this chapter is to elaborate on three specific historical strands. The first of these concerns the pre-colonial history of the sub-continent. This traces the roots of imperial penetration into state and society, and the implantation of an imperial bureaucracy and colonial administration. The second engages with the post-colonial state. It studies the structure of the state, its character and the role of bureaucracy, and further provides a chronology of civilian- military regimes, and *inter alia* their ambitions, policies and reforms. The third deals with a critical assessment of public administration under civilian and military regimes, and briefly introduces the current modus operandi and the dominant practices of implementing development projects to improve public sector performance in the country.

Chapter three outlines my analytical framework and explains the reasons for developing an alternative approach to good governance and public administration arguments. This chapter critiques concepts of formal governance such as rationality and impartiality. I have argued that these concepts provide inadequate explanatory frameworks for understanding blurred public-private boundaries, the operating culture of state bureaucracy, their interactions with service users, how public authority is undermined, and how informal social norms influence official behaviour. This chapter describes political clientelism as a useful explanatory concept, as it engages with sub-disciplines that involve clientelistic networks—relationships, patronage and moral attachments. They systematically help in studying the actual functioning of administration and practices that deviate from established official norms and service delivery processes. This chapter relies heavily on the anthropological literature on South Asian and African states.

The fourth chapter describes my research methodology and my epistemology, and sets out the process of the research in terms of how it evolved and the experience underpinned by my interface approach. This enables the reader to grasp the perspectives and the experiences of the people with whom I interacted, and the processes of interpretation of their practices and language.

I also briefly introduce the history of the research sites. This chapter provides an insight into and prepares the reader to gain some understanding of the complex phenomena in question. However, it is far from exhaustive, as my explorations can only cover certain aspects which I considered were possible to study. This chapter examines different administrative structures made up of diverse actors. It further demonstrates that events and my transcription of them often took place in difficult and awkward situations.

Chapter five introduces the case studies. These are associated with the provision of public and collective services in both rural and urban communities. The provision of collective services is studied from different perspectives.⁶ Moreover, the particular nature of case studies goes beyond state-directed services, and includes non-state entities. This chapter illustrates how state and non-state entities implement policies and development interventions, and describes the processes which establish linkages between state officials and citizens in a decentralised, spatial and social context. In addition, I also discuss the rationale for selecting three distinct case studies.

Chapters six and seven are empirical chapters based on the examination of case studies. The three case studies provide distinct and interesting arenas to examine state bureaucracy and their interactions with citizens. In writing these chapters, I have made an earnest effort to maintain consistency with my theoretical chapter and the data collected in the field. I have ventured beyond the generalised observations, social practices, informal behaviour, local citizens' limitations and their expectations, which presented multifaceted problems in the provision of collective services. I have concentrated on the interactions between officials and citizens; social and political relationships; the internal reasoning of state officials regarding their incapacity to deal with powerful personalities; and the explanations associated with bureaucratic practices in terms of how public and collective services are actually being provided through the state administrative structures. These observations are made in both chapters. Hence, the focus of chapter six is at the local level and

⁶ For example, the provision of water supply can be seen from a technical point of view as it depends on a water distribution system and the processes of formal access.

involves the social and political dynamics of access, and how a local political figure mediates between state and society in managing access. The primary focus of chapter six is on the politics of access, which reflects political influence and its manifestation around associations. In chapter six, I investigate the significance of social relationships and kinship ties in an urban locality. In so doing, I pay attention to how they influence official norms/administrative practices of public officials on one hand, and, on the other, side-track the stated goals and objectives of an external intervention. In chapter seven, the level of observation and examination is raised beyond the local level. There are similarities between chapters seven and six, but the scope and context is different. Chapter seven engages with clientelism and its manifestation in different forms. What differentiates chapter seven from six is the implementation of policy in terms of the actual functioning of district education at different levels. Chapter seven highlights political networks, the emergence of different sets of social and political relationships, and the observations of how front-line officials deal with citizens' interests and complaints.

The concluding chapter presents a comprehensive analysis of the general themes and elaborates how the research objectives were achieved. The conclusion summarises the main findings of the thesis and discusses different aspects of the research. It seeks to highlight 'subtractivist' approaches as deficient in their analyses of problems of governance in Pakistan. I further engage with the problems of 'subtractivist' approaches. The research implications in this concluding chapter elaborate a way forward to improving the management practices in the country.

Chapter One

Problems of Governance

1. Introduction

This chapter engages with classical and recent debates on public administration and good governance. It has two main goals. First, I briefly consider three models of public administration, which are: Public Administration, New Public Management and New Public Governance. These models are regarded and used as the dominant models in terms of their usefulness in evaluating and assessing public policy implementation and public service delivery. Moreover, these models can be viewed as overlapping paradigms and their features illustrate the conceptions of good governance. In recent times, the good governance framework has become the primary criterion when assessing public sector institutional performance, and offers a range of definitions and perspectives on state bureaucracy and society. Second, I discuss the perspectives and research conducted by different authors in Pakistan, highlighting the problems of governance⁷ and their root causes. The debates and approaches of certain authors are heavily tilted towards and inspired by the normative models of good governance employed to improve official behaviour and administrative practices. Some authors (Shafqat, 1999; Hijazi, 1999; Javaid, 2010; Mallick, 2001; Candland, 1997) have identified lack of incentives, political interference, bureaucratic indifference and problems of access for ordinary citizens to public and collective services, as key contributors to dysfunctional public sector performance. My aim is to highlight literature which covers several dimensions of bureaucratic dysfunction in Pakistan. Some of this literature (Shafqat, 1999; Quershi, 1999; Khan, 2001; Husain, 2006; Khawaja and Khawaja 2007) highlights bureaucratic dysfunction—which includes practices of

⁷ The terms 'governance' and 'good governance' are used interchangeably—see clarification in chapter three.

mismanagement, corruption, accountability, non-observance of official norms, etc., as key governance issues.

2. Public administration

As argued by Lane (2001), there are different definitions of the public sector and it is hard to describe what the expression 'public sector' stands for. 'Public sector' suggests a public administration which comprises the institutions of the government, corresponding bureaucracy and the exercise of public authority. Public administration is about the public sector and the way it operates and performs the operations of the state through effective institutions.⁸ Studies in public administration have highlighted the performance of the public sector in relation to three different approaches and regimes: traditional Public Administration (PA), New Public Management (NPM) and New Public Governance (NPG).

2.1. Public Administration:

The traditional model of PA denotes a centralised system of hierarchical structures answerable to politicians, serving the public through effective bureaucracies assigned with formal functions, rules and regulations (Lane, 2002; Osborne, 2010). Both administrative and judicial authority is established in a formalised sense with a clear separation of powers between the executive and the legislature. The state also appoints civil servants who perform important functions such as advising ministers in crafting and implementing state policies (Christopher 2002). The state assumes control of its territories through regional authorities and other state agencies. The power of the state is distributed across all regions and there is a high degree of compliance with state directives, laws, constitution and other statutes. The structure of the state agencies is hierarchical, centralised and highly formalised. The state has an elected Government and elections are held on a universal suffrage basis (Ibid. 2002). Voters from all segments of society have freedom to participate freely in the election of politicians, and have equal rights and opportunities

⁸ North (1990, p.3) defines institutions as "the rules of the game in a society, or more formally ... the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction".

regardless of their class and status. The traditional PA was meant to improve the well-being of people by ensuring the social and economic needs of the citizens in a democratically elected government through the concepts of equality and fairness (Osborne, 2010; Clapham, 1982).

2.2. New Public Management (NPM)

The emergence of NPM during the 1970s was a reorientation of public administration by introducing attributes of private sector management techniques and practices into the public sector. A need was felt to open 'the black box'⁹ by disaggregating state organisations into decentralised units and restructuring public sector delivery processes on the basis of inputs, outputs and performance evaluation (Osborne 2010, p.3). NPM reforms were primarily concerned with removing the obstacles to efficiency and changing the ways in which public bureaucracies performed. Principles of private sector management were introduced in the developing countries by the IMF and the World Bank, laying stress on output-oriented results and performance during training within the governments and ministries in order to achieve tangible results (Kjaer 2004).

2.3. New Public Governance (NPG)

In the 21st Century, the emergence of NPG has been presented as a new "conceptual tool to meet the challenges of public policy implementation and delivery of public services" (Osborne 2010, p.6). NPG advocates two forms of plurality in the implementation of public service delivery. The first relates to a plural state associated with a diverse set of interdependent factors contributing to the delivery of public services. The second pertains to a pluralist state which is concerned with the institutional as well as with the external environment. Both forms of plurality, according to Osborne (2010, p.9), focus upon inter-organisational relationships, and governance processes

⁹ As noted by Schofield (2001), and Hill and Hope (2003), public administration in terms of policy implementation came under criticism to explore the complex processes and management of outputs of the policy process. Moreover, policy élites are depicted as 'villain(s)' when they manoeuvre policy goals towards their own ends (cited in Osborne 2010, p.5).

stressing service effectiveness and outcomes which depend upon the interactions of public sector organisations and inter-organisational networks in negotiating policy, accountability and resource allocation. NPG has not been introduced as a new paradigm to supersede its predecessors PA and NPM. Rather, all three models contribute to our understanding of public sector performance in terms of the implementation of policies and the delivery of public and collective services. The primary focus of public administration is on the functioning of public institutions from both managerial and administrative perspectives. Moreover, public administration and the constituent elements and characteristics of the three models are closely associated with the principles of good governance.

3. Good Governance

According to Leftwich (1994), the phrase 'good governance' was first used in 1989 by the World Bank and defined as "the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs". There has since been a shift in the World Bank's definition as a result of conditions attached to foreign aid, which lay emphasis on reform of public sector institutions. The World Bank's 1992 definition treats good governance with reference to public administration and public sector management, which means that for an effective public sector, "efficiency, accountability, transparency, predictability and impartiality in decision making are the pre-requisites" (Leftwich 1994, p.372). The word 'governance' does not convey one particular definition; rather, it covers a range of meanings. The concept of good governance has not been restricted to the managerial and administrative dimensions, but over the past few years political analysts have also included politics and interconnections with the structures and authority of political regimes (Doornbos 2002). Doornbos further argues that good governance falls into two broad streams. One is associated with state–society relationships, and the other is related to policy. The first stream is oriented towards the institutions of the state and how they interact with society. The second stream is the primary concern of donors and informs their interventions in state and political structures, the guiding principle of which is to integrate the developing world with global Western systems based on neo-

institutionalism. I agree with authors (Doornbos 2002, p.93 and Leftwich 1994, p.368) who claim that good governance is used to justify Western aid which is aimed at inculcating the attributes of modern liberal democratic states—such as political freedom, equality, etc.—in a non-western political context.

The broader meanings and conceptualisation of governance among various authors (Kjaer, 2004; Johnson, 1997; Leftwich, 1994) and international organisations such as the World Bank share certain common ingredients and attributes which deal with concepts including politics, rights, power and interests. Kjaer (2004, p.6) describes some of these concepts in terms of the way authority is exercised, and defines governance as “the relationship between the rulers and the ruled” and “how interests are articulated and rights exercised”. Whereas Leftwich (1994) suggests that good governance has social, political and administrative dimensions. Writing from an administrative point of view, Smith (2007, p. 6) argues that good governance requires “accountable and transparent public administration; and effective public management, including a capacity to design good policies as well as to implement them”. Whilst Doornbos (2002, p.94) suggests that good governance is a contested concept and that the attachment of various meanings and debates points to a lack of agreement among authors and researchers on its core meaning and sphere of application. Governance is not restricted to the traditional public sphere of the state, but also includes Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and their role in the delivery of public services.

4. Problems of governance in Pakistan

In the early decades of state formation, the key issues for public administration in Pakistan were tackling the centralised decision-making process, the over-reliance on state bureaucracies, and the neglect of the needs and preferences of the citizens in administering development (Inayatullah 1964). During the 1960s, the bureaucracy was criticised in the media and by the people as being insufficiently responsive to the needs of the people. Bureaucratic behaviour was deplored by the citizens for being

removed from issues of social concern, and for its lack of accountability and responsibility (Shafqat 1999, p.996). The role of bureaucracy in steering the administration was reassessed in the 1990s by the World Bank as being corrupt, unaccountable and inefficient. Citizens generally had a very negative image of the bureaucracy, reinforced by reports of gross human rights violations involving the state. The changing role of government, how governance was performed and the behaviour of civil bureaucracy were certain key challenges which needed to be addressed in order to restore trust among communities and international organisations. Building on these arguments, Shafqat (1999, p.1002) argues that an efficient, non-corrupt and accountable bureaucracy is a *sine qua non* for achieving efficient public sector institutions and good governance in Pakistan. By tracing the genealogy, structure and the impact of civil service reforms of the military and civilian governments in the country, Shafqat asserts that the civil service reforms in Pakistan were conceived by civil and military regimes¹⁰ to advance their political interests by interfering with the formal functioning of bureaucracy. As a consequence, the reforms not only fell just short of changing the behaviour of civil bureaucracy, but also contributed to the erosion of trust and confidence among the civilian bureaucracy.

During the period of democratic governments (1988-1999), and particularly after 1988, politicians frequently promoted bureaucrats into policy and service delivery roles irrespective of the criteria of merit and competency. Shafqat's (1999, p.1009) central argument is that governance will not improve if political leaders disregard the importance of "merit driven and non-partisan civil service". Shafqat further argues that in promoting behaviour changes, merit should be the essential criterion in the recruitment of bureaucrats, and also stresses the importance of non-political relations between civil bureaucracy and political leadership. This means that bureaucrats establish political contacts with politicians to acquire personal favours such as preferential treatment, as opposed to adhering to the principles of neutrality and transparency. To restore the image and confidence of new entrants joining the

¹⁰ These reforms are discussed in the next chapter.

civil service, reforms are needed to redefine the role of bureaucracy in terms of achieving honesty, integrity and dedication in serving the public.

Needs for such reforms are often justified with reference to the crisis of governance in the state of Pakistan, a crisis which has multiple dimensions including lack of professionalism, politicisation of bureaucracy, non-transparency in making decisions and lack of citizen access to information on state policies. Other factors include strict observance of official rules, strong democratic institutions, a professional and competent civil service and an elimination of the politics of patronage. Shafqat suggests certain measures aimed at reinforcing the attributes of good governance and these are: performance evaluation, monitoring of official behaviour of junior officials by senior officials, access to information and accountability of civil servants, devolution of power from the upper tiers of the government to district level, and incentives to performance. In addition, the bureaucrat must promote the interests of the public, and his actions must be guided by fairness and justice.

Hijazi (1999) argues that one of the major reasons behind the weak performance of civil servants is the incompatibility of their job structure with organisational goals. The civil servants lack the motivation to work in the public sector. They do not find their work environment conducive to their professional growth for reasons such as lack of incentives, stagnation in promotions and conflicts of interest. Moreover, nepotism, promotion criteria and lengthy bureaucratic procedures in getting promotion create disincentives for civil servants to remain in service. As pointed out by Hijazi (1999, p.905), the performance of civil servants could be improved if the focus is placed on the “motivational aspect of good governance”. Hijazi’s main emphasis is to improve the motivation of state employees by suggesting a methodology of Government by Objective (GBO). The GBO approach resembles the log-frame¹¹ approach by developing specific targets and goals mutually agreed among officials in the organisation. To achieve this, Hijazi (1999) deploys

¹¹ Log-frame approach is based on inputs, outputs and outcomes as a project is conceived and implemented. This approach enables the administrators in the organisation to track progress against project deliverables and timelines.

motivational theories to achieve good governance. Meeting human needs through rewards and achieving organisational goals through task-centred approaches are stressed as the missing elements in improving the motivation of civil servants.

Analysing the impediments to human development and the problems of governance in particular, Candland (1997, pp.265-266) identifies three primary factors responsible for dysfunctional public sector performance in Pakistan. I discuss the first two factors only, since they are directly related to the problem of dysfunctionality.¹² The first is related to the discriminatory policies of the state which neglect the needs of girls and women in the society. The second is the nature of political government, being non-democratic and unaccountable, with a weak civil society and corrupt administrators. In the context of administering and delivering social services, Candland (1997, p.270) argues that the over-centralisation of political authority in the hands of powerful élites has adversely affected education, health and provision of water and sanitation services to the local communities. In education and health sectors, the officials are appointed by the politicians and these appointments neglect merit as well as the fitness of the person to undertake a highly skilled job. High levels of absenteeism among teachers are observed in schools, and, despite lack of attendance, teachers continue to draw their salaries from the state. Moreover, parents' concerns are ignored by state officials who use their personal networks to avoid pressure from the local citizens to improve service delivery. These issues are further explored by Candland in evaluating the impact of Social Action Program (SAP).

The Social Action Program (SAP), instigated by the Pakistan's People's Party (PPP) in 1992, was a major initiative of a democratic government to improve the quality of social services across four sectors, namely health, education, water supply and sanitation. The SAP was, however, deemed a complete failure, and the diagnosis of this failure suggested administrative and political causes. Candland noted that the programme was completely politicised, with

¹² The third factor is irrelevant because it deals with fiscal constraints, debt burden and external financing of development projects in the state.

local politicians directly involved in the provision of education, health and other services. Local politicians occupied positions on advisory committees known as “social action boards” at the national level, and “district development advisory committees” at the district level. These local politicians exploited their positions and diverted state resources to their political supporters, depleting what was reserved for education and other services. Moreover, Candland (1999, p.272) notes, state bureaucracy prevented the active participation of local community-based organisations in monitoring the use of public resources. Candland argues that this happened in two primary ways. First, state officials lacked direct interaction with citizens and used their official authority to discourage any efforts made by local citizens, media and oversight bodies during the implementation of the programme. Second, in framing the SAP the government had created “fictitious” and inactive oversight bodies, such as community organisations.

The creation of community organisations was an essential and an innovative component of the programme to monitor government human development initiatives and expenditures. In the absence of truly representative and functional community organisations, the programme suffered from political and bureaucratic interference. Hence, the programme did not achieve its desired goals and perceived concepts of empowerment and participation in the delivery of social services to the communities who needed them most.

Mallick’s (2001) assessment of education and health sectors identifies poor personnel management systems and official practices as the most critical problems of governance in the public sector. The poor management system relates to the overall administrative structure and the organisation of the staff. The focus of Mallick’s assessment is rather on the identification of discrepancies between official rules and the actual practices of state officials deployed at the level of service delivery. During discussions held with state officials in both sectors, Mallick (2001, p.5) observes a dysfunctional system, the causes of which *inter alia* were: lack of motivation among the staff, absenteeism, frequency of posting of staff, “weak supervision, monitoring and feedback” and loop-holes in performance evaluation and accountability

processes. The frequent transfer of officials is viewed by public officials as an infringement of official policy, which is for them to serve in a particular post for a minimum period of three years before they can be transferred elsewhere. Such frequent transfers have an impact on service delivery when each time a new official resumes responsibility he/she has to start from scratch, causing major frustrations and loss of trust in decision making. Mallick (2001, p.8) further mentions a deficient system of performance evaluation known as a seniority-based system, which encourages the promotion of officials based on seniority rather than on good performance. Performance evaluation according to Mallick is a confidential process which means that a junior official cannot challenge or review their performance evaluation as conducted by a senior official. Moreover, assessment of official performance depends upon the length of service in a particular organisation and not upon competency and utilisation of professional expertise based on targets and outputs.

In a study conducted at the micro-level in the city of Multan, a district in the province of Punjab, good governance is acknowledged as a necessary condition to alleviate urban poverty (Imran *et al.* 2006). The study examines urban poverty with reference to World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) normative definitions of good governance. The study presents two types of analysis: quantitative and descriptive. The study reveals that urban poverty is related to bad governance, which is linked to the problems of how public and collective services are being managed by the district officials in the city. The poor people in the city are living in deplorable conditions. Contaminated water, lack of sanitation and the non-disposal of solid waste are the major concerns among the poor. The study cites bad governance as one of the root causes of poverty in the city. In addition, the study highlights the differences in power relations between the poor and the officials. The poor are unable to officially complain about the degradation of water supply, sanitation and other facilities. The public officials talk about these issues with the local citizens, but power imbalances, and the unresponsive behaviour of the officials, leads to the complaints of the poor being treated as low priority.

In 1999, Sarfarz Qureshi, President of Pakistan Society of Development Economists, stated in his presidential address that economic growth and poverty reduction would remain an elusive goal in Pakistan unless the problems of governance are dealt with through institutional reforms. Qureshi (1999, p.328) emphasises two particular features of good governance. The first considers the exercise of authority, alluding to the state and bureaucracy to effectively manage state resources to achieve development. The second feature focuses upon the capacity of state officials to conceive and implement policies, as well as to perform their official functions in line with official rules. Within this overall context, Qureshi presents three interrelated factors of poor governance in Pakistan. The first is related to the non-observance of formal institutional rules due to the lack of capacity among state officials and their misuse of power. The second factor is the weakening of public sector institutions resulting from political interference and patronage. The third factor is the lack of accountability of public officials in the provision of public services. These inter-linked factors directly contribute to informality in public dealings and deviations from formal institutional rules.

A number of authors have pointed out the prevalence of different forms of corruption affecting the professional ethics of civil servants and the relations between bureaucracies and people. There are different perspectives and contexts in which the phenomenon of corruption or corrupt practices are described and defined in Pakistan. It must be noted that most of these authors use the notion of corruption in relation to the normative principles of good governance. Using statistical data, Javaid (2010, p.126) argues that corruption is caused by lack of accountability, low incentives to performance, use of discretionary power and lack of transparency. Javaid further argues that corruption is endemic in all the institutions of the state and that it has a deep impact on the lives of citizens seeking to get access to public services. In addition, corruption is inconsistent with the concept of a representative government: politicians bribe voters and sell party tickets openly, which provides opportunities for brokers to act as intermediaries. In this way the election process becomes non-transparent. Corruption is also correlated with poor governance, since the different state sectors, politicians and officials

either directly or indirectly are involved in acts of bribery, red-tapism, siphoning off state resources and extending preferential treatment in official appointments (Javaid 2010). An early study (Khattak et al. 1999, cited by Javaid 2010) conceives corruption as the social norm in Pakistan. In the study, nepotism, bribery and a system of patronage are identified as the key drivers of corruption. The study also argues that despite anti-corruption laws, formal state regulations and accountability procedures, these stringent measures could not have been strictly invoked because of political interests and the misuse of official authority.

Corruption is perceived by Qureshi (1999) as the major cause of inequality among citizens. Qureshi (1999, p.329) argues that corruption undermines the rights and entitlements of citizens and leads to a draining of state resources when state officials take bribes in rendering social services. Among other factors, corruption affects economic growth when official decision-making processes are circumvented through private interests and has negative effects on the political-administrative functions of the state. In Qureshi's view, corruption is the biggest obstacle to promoting good governance in the country.

Khan (2001) examines the impact of World Bank policies to eradicate two types of corruption in Pakistan—bureaucratic and political corruption. The study discusses both types of corruption in terms of bureaucratic structures in the country, low incentives to performance and the political structure. The study indicates that bureaucratic corruption cannot be isolated from political corruption. The bureaucratic structure has been shown as problematic when there is a mismatch between formal functions and the capacities required to perform those functions. Khan (2001, p.3) further argues that the incidence of corruption in the structure of bureaucracy is likely to be high in two situations. Firstly, when the structure of state is dominated by a large number of officials, those working on lower grades are made redundant. The lower officials deliberately create barriers for the service users so that they can use their influence and local knowledge of how services are provided. Secondly, when formal state functions are not clearly defined, bureaucrats try to negotiate the

provision of social services by demanding a price to render a service, leading to high transaction costs for the service users. Moreover, when the state performs its functions in a discriminatory fashion, citizens acquire desired services through bribes.

Khan also investigates the nature of corruption in state structures through the concepts of monitoring, accountability and patron–client relationships. Corruption in these contexts leads, in different ways, to the undermining of the performance of public bureaucracies and the effective functioning of public sector institutions. When internal monitoring is weak, it gives rise to the use of discretion which in turn enables state officials to engage in corruption. Khan (2001) finds divergent views amongst officials and politicians on monitoring the official tasks of civil servants. From the perspective of state officials, bureaucratic performance is severely damaged by political interference in their official responsibilities. On the other hand, political leaders argue that bureaucrats use discretionary powers and are involved in corruption. Moreover, the state operates in a clientelistic manner when state officials are not held accountable by the political leaders. In certain cases, co-option of bureaucracy by political leaders leads to misappropriation of state resources and adopting monopolistic measures in restricting access to public goods in favour of clients of the politicians. Khan's study demonstrates bureaucratic and political corruption as the primary factors of bad governance in the country. Based on interviews with political leaders and state officials, Khan's main conclusions are: patron–client relationships, lack of accountability and a dysfunctional public structure in Pakistan are major impediments in achieving effective public sector performance.

Husain (1999) argues that the functioning of public sector institutions in Pakistan is related to the effectiveness of institutions and how 'institutions of restraint' can be strengthened to address the problems of governance. Husain (1999, p.512) describes three main functions of public sector institutions—“policy making, service delivery and oversight and accountability”. The author focuses upon the third element, 'oversight and accountability', by adopting

Kaufman's six clusters¹³ of governance indicators grouped under three broad categories: a) "the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced"; b) "the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies"; and c) "the respect of citizens and the state for institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them". Husain's main arguments in relation to ineffective public sector institutions are based on Kaufman's governance indicators and suggest that the public sector institutions are dysfunctional and the state institutions are weak. In Pakistan, there are formal and informal "institutions of restraint" and these are state-centred and civil society-centred. In the state-centred institutions, Husain's main concern is the misuse of official authority. In the civil society-centred institutions, there is an implicit understanding in Husain's argument that NGOs in Pakistan lack credibility and must undergo self-evaluation to become effective and credible oversight bodies. Husain (1999) identifies decentralisation and devolution at local tiers of the government as the solution to many problems such as non-involvement of local communities in decision making, lack of trust and misconceptions among citizens, and weakening of official norms.

The performance of civil bureaucracy in the past few years has declined, according to Husain (2006, p.5), because of corruption, lack of motivation and abuse of official authority. Bureaucrats also develop close ties with politicians to ensure that they get preferential treatment in return for their loyalty. This has resulted in a political patronage which has shifted accountability of bureaucracy from citizens towards these regimes. Husain (2006, p.7) aptly captures the fact that despite many accountability laws, committees and commissions, public sector institutions continue to suffer and "instances of rampant corruption, malpractices, nepotism and favouritism and waste and inefficiency have become a common folklore in the administrative culture of the country". Middle and low-level officials are engaged in informal means to extract monetary benefits from citizens trying to establish private business. This is because of bureaucratic itineraries and delays in processing cases.

¹³ The six clusters are: voice and accountability, political instability, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rules of law and corruption (Husain 2006, p.517).

Public sector performance in Pakistan between 2001 and 2006 is analysed by Khawaja and Khawaja (2007) using four indicators of performance, namely accountability, participation, predictability and transparency. These indicators are applied to the reforms introduced by the military government in 2001. However, the authors argue less empirically and more theoretically that the reforms have made an insignificant improvement in public sector performance. The authors further argue that the state institutions are in a state of decay. There is widespread corruption at different levels of the state which affects people. Khawaja and Khawaja (2006, p.60) argue that civil servants are not trusted by the people and the image of the civil service is tarnished due to corruption, lack of accountability and incompetency. The authors allude to patron–client relationships by referring to political élites who alter the rules and appoint people/clients in the public sector. It has been further argued that the state is dominated by civil bureaucracy, military¹⁴ and powerful politicians who undermine democracy and the emergence of a vibrant civil society. In a decentralised context, Khawaja and Khawaja (2007) assert that the bureaucracy frustrates the efforts of the local people to participate in development as officials implement development interventions without consulting the citizens. Resource allocation, planning and budgeting is the sole prerogative of the élite and not of the ordinary citizen. This means that political institutions in Pakistan are represented by powerful personalities who are least accountable to the people, as they are under no obligation to explain what they are doing.

¹⁴ The role of military in the internal governance of the state is discussed in the next chapter.

5. Conclusion

Public administration and good governance arguments are key points of reference in the evaluation of official behaviour and public sector performance. The normative definition of good governance encapsulates two intertwined dimensions—political and technical. The technical dimension assumes an effective Weberian bureaucracy to implement state policies, in the sense of a highly efficient public administration. The political dimension refers normatively to a political government in which the balance of power and the relationship between the state and its institutions are complementary and universal. The political dimension further implies a democratically elected government and a respect for rule of law, and a political system in which the citizens have equal rights and opportunities to pursue their livelihoods as enshrined in public law. International organisations implicitly or explicitly advocate these arguments as increasingly important for development and anti-poverty initiatives. The normative conceptions of governance and development administration make judgements about official performance in relation to structures, inputs and outcomes in Weberian terms.

The problems of governance in Pakistan are assessed by different authors such as Candland and Mallick, who conclude that the public sector in Pakistan is dysfunctional. Bureaucratic dysfunction and ineffective public sector performance is widely recognised as the basis of bad governance in the country. The reasons for dysfunctionality according to both Quershi and Javaid are corruption, non-accountability, transparency and politically-based appointments. While most of the authors agree on these issues, concepts such as participation, non-democratic government and weak civil society have been discussed to highlight the issues of access to public and collective services. The arguments of Khan and Husain are important as they examine institutions through the lenses of bureaucratic structures and informal institutions. Political patronage and the political affiliations of civil servants remain central to describing demotivation among state officials. Khawaja and Khawaja's central argument relates to the intrusion of political personalities into official policy and into the formal rules of the state institutions. The issue

of official performance is associated with weak monitoring, evaluation criteria and the politicisation of state bureaucracy.

The observations, analysis and propositions must not be restricted to state bureaucracy, but must also highlight the British legacy, its impact on the post-independent state, and the perverse affects of aid conditionalities and structural adjustment strategies adopted by the donors. Therefore, multiple explanations must be taken into account, including the designs and ambitions of the British regime, the implantation of an unknown and modern bureaucracy, the erosion of the traditional culture, the history of post-colonial state, its structure, the political institutions and the role of civil bureaucracy in the internal governance of the state. Chapter two addresses these issues.

Chapter Two

Historical Account of State Formation

1. Introduction

The state of Pakistan and its political system have undergone many changes since independence in 1947. To understand these changes, it is vital to engage with historical accounts in order to examine the ruptures that British imperialism caused in the previously existing state structures, the bureaucracy, and society more widely. Concerning the period before the arrival of English and French traders in India, a brief account of the Mughal Empire rule will allow the reader to understand the decline of Mughal rule, the events leading to the advent of the East India Company, and the subsequent establishment of formal control of India by the British. These events are crucial in understanding the historical formation of the post-independence state, its political culture and the role played by the state bureaucracy. To examine these fundamental questions in the case of Pakistan, it is also vital to engage, albeit briefly, with accounts of pre-colonial history and how a colonial bureaucracy was implanted for the exercise of authority in pursuit of domination. Thus, the role of the state bureaucracy in the post-independence state, its alliance with the military, and its ambitions, can all be better understood by historical contextualisation.

The post-independence history of Pakistan shows how the state bureaucracy and military have been able to shift the political situation in the country towards authoritarian rule, and makes manifest their ambitions to destabilise civilian governments. Moreover, the weak political structure of the state and polity has not been able to counter the dominance of the bureaucracy in political and civil affairs. A detailed account of political events and conflicts of interest between political parties reveals the weakening of political institutions, and shows how the military was able to create the conditions for the civilian bureaucracy to continuously intrude in the internal governance of the state. In particular, this historical overview of the bureaucracy shows how it assumed

different roles through successive interventions in state politics and institutions. The successive civil and military regimes have advanced their own agendas through the political capture of public administration. The installation of local governments by military regimes was instituted in order to bypass the political parties and to create conditions for legitimising military rule in the country. Whereas the military regimes strengthened the political role of civil bureaucracy, under the civilian government of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) we witnessed the decline of the autonomy of the state bureaucracy. This chapter further focuses on the politicisation of bureaucracy and the implications of this for its accountability to society as a whole. In addition, it briefly describes the locus of the decentralisation reforms introduced by the military government in 2001, because of their distinctiveness from the previous decentralisation reforms in terms of substance and structure, and sets out how public administration is performed in the present-day state.

2. An account of the pre-colonial Indian Empire

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Indian empire was ruled by the Mughal dynasty. The Mughal Empire was established in 1526, and went through phases of expansion and consolidation, surviving, albeit in an attenuated form, until 1857 (Bose and Jalal 1998, p.35). The economy of the Mughal dynasty was dependent on revenue generated by the Indian merchants through exchanges of goods along its coastal regions (ibid.). The Mughal Empire had rich metropolitan cities with a continuous influx of revenue and a consequent accumulation of wealth. The community in this period consisted of heterogeneous classes, and among those classes two in particular were used by the Mughals to maintain control and authority over the rest of the communities. The first was the noble class, called *Amirs*, who were designated noble officials. They were paid from lands called *Jagirs*, and their powers of revenue-raising embodied both power and patronage (Misra 1977, p.310). The second class comprised the feudal chiefs and hereditary *Zamendars* who enjoyed a certain degree of independence and to whom the Mughals granted official status. Over a period of time the position of the *Zamendars* was strengthened in various ways, since they were contracted to

carry out *de facto* administration at local levels (Richard 1993). During this process, the Mughals succeeded in generating large revenues because of the docile nature of village society, which had been accentuated by colonial policy in order to subjugate the locals (Madison 1971).

The central authority of the Mughal Empire was undermined by the widening gap between the central and regional powers. The local elites and the regions controlled by them were concerned about the preservation of their vast tracts of land and could not keep up with the demand for revenue required by the empire to finance its expensive regional wars (Bose and Jalal 1998). The regional imbalance of wealth, along with economic disparities within classes, weakened the central power base of the Mughal Empire. As well as the high demand for revenue by the centre, the weakening of Mughal power was rooted in the “manipulation of central authority by the regionally based power”, and the “intra-regional disparities between classes” (ibid., p.50). The nobles (*Amirs*) of the Mughals were stripped of their powers and their jagirs were confiscated by the British, reducing them to abject poverty. There were also factors external to the sub-continent which drove the Mughal decline, such as tribal incursions into the hinterland of the Mughal Empire from the regions of Afghanistan, Eurasia and Central Asia (ibid.). Most fundamentally, however, it was the crisis of state legitimacy and its contribution to the schisms in local society which led to the weakening of the Mughal Empire in the Indian sub-continent. The advent of the East India Company and its penetration into the empire was a result of the decline of the Mughal dynasty and its loss of power over its vast territorial boundaries.

3. The colonial administration and authority

Control and authority over the East India Company was exercised by the British parliament through the board of directors in London (Misra 1977, p.46). The company was not accountable to its subjects and used centralised control to extend its domination across the entire Indian sub-continent. As Bose and Jalal argue (1998, p.67), the Company “operated within the indigenous structure” of the Indian Empire. The Company introduced a “centralised

civilian bureaucracy” which was essentially British and kept its distance from the lower-rank officers who performed the routine activities of government (Misra 1977, p.94). After the rebellion/mutiny in 1857, the British took direct control of the management of the Indian Empire. This period was the beginning of the British Raj, and instead of a governor-general, India was ruled by a viceroy (Bose and Jalal 1998, p.97).

After 1857, the most urgent task was reorganisation to maintain imperial dominance (ibid.). After taking formal control of the Company, the British imposed rule-bound bureaucratic institutions designed according to the conceptions of Western states (Misra, 1977; Jalal, 1995). The institutions were designed to penetrate into the economy and society of India. Between 1858 and 1919, the bureaucracy in India was marked by multiple attempts at rationalisation. Rationalisation meant hierarchy, rigidity in procedures, and adherence to codes intended to achieve predictability in public administration (Misra 1977). Thus, the centralisation of bureaucracy was achieved through bureaucratic control and uniformity in decision making. According to Misra (1977, p.91) “this was in fact a period of ‘bureaucratic despotism’ which at every level of the hierarchy tightened the chain of subordination from local officers through Provincial Governments to the Government of India”. The Indian Civil Service (ICS), as it was called from 1886 to 1887, was formally constituted through the enactment of statutory rights by the British parliament in order to protect the civil servants from political influence (ibid.). The reason for the constitution of the ICS was to grant an opportunity to educated Indians to be employed in the Covenanted Civil Service.¹⁵

The late eighteenth and mid nineteenth century have been characterised as the extension of power “over the peasantry through the ‘*Zamendars*’, granting them unchecked powers to raise rents for the Company’s revenue” (Bose and Jalal 1998, p.70). The company used coercive means to extract wealth from the indigenous population. The peasants and the weavers were stripped of

¹⁵ The public service was classified into two main classes: covenanted and the uncovenanted. “The former was a higher administrative service recruited in England. The latter was lower executive services recruited in India” (Misra 1977, p.93).

their property rights (ibid.). Moreover, the district collector, a creation of the British administration system, exercised arbitrary powers during the colonial period and created a personalised form of patronage system (Jalal 1995). As a consequence, the patronage system encouraged loyalty and compromised impartiality in public dealings. During the colonial period, local bureaucrats were used to suppress uprisings and to counter the pressure from below. In the following years, the bureaucracy established a strong hold over different levels of government due to its superior knowledge and expertise (Misra 1977). The bureaucracy was thus actively engaged at the political and administrative levels.

In 1917, Edwin Montague, Secretary of India, announced the prospect of self-rule in India, which was a formal commitment to a move towards independence. By granting some representation to Hindus and Muslims in the provincial legislatures, the broader agenda of the British was to establish control over their colonial subjects. The India Act of 1935 divided the subjects into categories and at the same time granted Hindus and Muslims limited authority in the internal affairs of the state (Lawrence 1997). The Muslim League, represented by Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, resisted the British policy of limited representation for Muslims in the constituent assembly. In the elections of 1937, Jinnah was able to unite the Muslims and secured some representation for them (ibid.).

The overwhelming victory of the Indian National Congress in the 1937 elections resulted in the Muslims being ignored in the sharing of power, as Nehru was determined to preserve his monolithic presence within the party. Moreover, the Congress did not acquiesce to the constitutional safeguards demanded by Jinnah for the Muslims. In the wake of these developments, Jinnah was convinced that without constitutional safeguards, the Muslims would not be able to garner support for their demands on an equal footing with Hindus (Lawrence 1997).

In the final decades of the British Raj, the All India Muslim League led by Jinnah used their platform to advocate for a separate Muslim state. Jinnah demanded that the Muslim majority states should form a Muslim state and the

Hindu majority areas should constitute a state for Hindus. Jinnah's communal demand was based on his idea of the creation of Pakistan out of the "Muslim-majority areas in the north-west and north-east of the subcontinent" (Jalal 1995, p.14). Jinnah argued that Hindus and Muslims would not be able to live together after independence because of the mistrust of the majority Hindu leaders towards the Muslims, and as a result his two-nation theory became a decisive factor in the establishment of a separate Muslim state in 1947.

The British in the Indian sub-continent established a unitary state structure controlled by bureaucratic institutions in order to skilfully impose its colonial policy, which, according to Jalal (1995, p.13) "allowed the colonial state to manipulate and administer the affairs of a society differentiated by region, class, caste and community". British bureaucratic authoritarianism was based on personal loyalties and the allegiance of the local landlords to the Crown. The British colonial policy was the result of using the landlords as intermediaries at the cost of dispossessing the tenants to broaden their colonial base and authority (ibid.). People of the Indian sub-continent were offered limited opportunities to rule and were denied rights to citizenship. The British Raj failed to recognise the Indian political structures, the communal problems of India, or its multi-ethnic roots and religious sentiments. The Government of India Act of 1935, adopted by both India and Pakistan after partition in 1947, served to establish the practice of bureaucratic authoritarianism. The hasty departure of the British in 1946 left deep imprints on the post-colonial state and left many issues unresolved.

4. The post-colonial state

Occidentals and the intelligentsia in Pakistan often cite lack of democracy, the crisis of governance, and low human development as the key impediments to development (Sayeed 1980). Such analysis does not take into account the historical legacy of British imperialism and the capitalistic mode of production in the Indian empire. Moreover, to understand the long period of military and bureaucratic alliances, it is vital to explain and examine the class structure and state within Pakistan. In order to analyse the roles and the character of

successive civil and military regimes in Pakistan, an understanding of the question of the 'relative autonomy' of the state requires explanation in terms of how the state and civil society are mutually integrated (Alavi 1983, p.42). This in turn calls for an assessment of civil–military alliances, the articulation of power, their class structure and the competing interests of other dominant classes in the post-colonial state. Different theories have been advanced (Miliband and Marx, cited by Alavi 1972) in the examination of the nature of post-colonial states. Here, I introduce the thesis proposed by Hamza Alavi, which is particularly related to the post-independent state of Pakistan. Alavi states:

“The central proposition I wish to emphasise is that the state in the postcolonial society is not the instrument of a single class. It is relatively autonomous and it mediates between competing interests of the three propertied classes, namely the metropolitan bourgeoisies, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed classes, while at the same time acting on behalf of all of them in order to preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded, namely the institution of private property and the capitalist mode as the dominant mode of production”. (Alavi 1972, p.2)

The above argument was developed in relation to the classical Marxist view of the state “simply as instruments of a single ruling class” (Alavi 1972, p.2). According to Alavi, the situation in Pakistan is more complex. Under British rule, the state apparatus was ‘over-developed’ in relation to society, and among the social classes it was the metropolitan class which carried out the tasks of colonial rule. The metropolitan class has played two different roles in the Indian sub-continent: one was to support the indigenous revolution for self-government, the other to establish “its domination over the indigenous class”. After independence, the metropolitan class was “separated but the indigenous class remained intact along with the pre-colonial state apparatus” (Alavi 1972, p.2).

Alavi's main thesis is that in post-colonial Pakistan, the state and its institutions have developed to look after the interests of not one but three competing classes. The emergence and constitution of these three different classes was unique and cannot be fully explained from a classical Marxist perspective, "simply in terms of a single ruling class" (Alavi 1972, p.2). In the post-colonial state, the processes of the development of the institutional framework are more complex. The structure of the post-independence state of Pakistan is based on this multiclass relationship (ibid., p.3). The apparatus of the state after independence did not only consist of the three propertied classes—namely: the indigenous class, the metropolitan class and the feudal class—but also included a civil-military oligarchy, which assumed effective command over the state in October 1958. The central issue in the articulation and sharing of power is that the three propertied classes did not directly influence the relatively autonomous role of the state. Rather, they mediated their demands through the state which was dominated by the civil-military oligarchy and exerted centralised control over society (ibid.).

A key point to understand is that the three dominant classes in the post-colonial state of Pakistan did not challenge the state apparatus because of 'relative autonomy'. In relation to the question of 'relative autonomy', the metropolitan class negotiated its demands within the state structure due to its financial strength and the considerable power it attained prior to and after independence. The metropolitan class could not impose its demands unilaterally as it had to forge alliances with other classes. Moreover, the relative autonomy in the post-colonial state had a different character as the bureaucratic-military oligarchy operated within the "existing matrix of the society and not outside it" (Alavi 1972, p.8). From its inception the state had established an independent material base and enjoyed an autonomy which was vested in the interests of state bureaucracy and the military. Alavi maintains that such autonomy was a distinctive feature of the post-colonial state apparatus, as it was "over-developed" and exercised command over the rest of society. The position of 'relative autonomy' to which Alavi draws attention thus has a two-fold explanation: one explanation relates to the legacy of an "over-developed" bureaucracy in relation to political and civil

society institutions; the other relates to three competing propertied classes (i.e. not one dominant class controlling the state in its own interest). These two explanations became reinforced by the significance of the military, which was established to subordinate the indigenous classes rather than to serve them. The metropolitan class emerged as a strong player in mediating the role of the state by forging alliances with civil bureaucracy. It was able to intervene in state politics and policies because of the civil–military cooperation and its ability to bring other ruling elites, factions and landlords under its influence and control (Sayeed 1980).

There are alternative perspectives which throw light on the post-colonial state and deal specifically with the nature of the state, the crisis of state legitimacy and continuation of the post-colonial legacy in Pakistan's various democratic and non-democratic regimes. Tracing the process of transition, Samina Ahmad argues that Pakistan inherited a fragile and a highly centralised authoritarian state. State legitimacy in the post-colonial environment was constantly challenged through the consolidation of power by the civil and military apparatuses (Ahmad 1988, cited by Shastri 2001). Similarly, Malik (1997) argues that after independence in 1947, Pakistan's highly centralised state structure and its political institutions were dominated by a non-representative elite. The government was primarily run by civil–military alliances, which thwarted the process of establishing “fully-fledged accountable, representative and mandated institutions” (Malik 1997, p.58). These perspectives are closely associated with the thesis of Alavi, who lays extra emphasis on tracing the class structure of and articulation of power by powerful elements, and the consequent impact on the political institutions in Pakistan.

Alavi's account of the post-colonial state does not fully encompass the social and political culture and the regional configuration of the state after independence. The regions of Pakistan make up a diversified multi-ethnic class-based society with four provinces, namely Punjab, Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa,¹⁶ Sindh and Baluchistan. Baluchistan is the country's largest and least-developed province. The province is inhabited by the Baloch tribes, and within these tribes there are land-based loyalties spurring local rivalries. The development of institutions in the province is mainly restricted to its capital Quetta. The British left the internal affairs of the province to the people of Baluchistan because it was too remote and inaccessible (Malik 1997).

The province of Punjab is the most prosperous province, dominated primarily by the feudal classes with huge land holdings. The legislative councils in the province were established by the British as early as 1897 and granted representation to the loyalist landlords, who thereby acquired a strong hold over the country's politics and its political institutions. The province had been ruled by the landed class through the Punjab Unionist Party up till 1947. After 1947, the All India Muslim league, led by the founder of Pakistan, faced impediments in holding the league together as one united party because of its confinement to urban elites (Malik 1997).

The second-largest province, Sindh, like south-western Punjab, has been dominated by tribal dynasties mostly of Baloch origin. Karachi, the provincial capital, has enjoyed metropolitan status since the transformation of the political, economic and demographic contours of the province by the Mahjir Quami Movement (MQM), a migrant community settled there (Malik 1997).

The province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has historic significance stemming from the era of Britain's incursions into Afghanistan, and the special interest of the British in deriving military advantage by enlisting the support of the local tribes. The province has a strong Pakhtoon tradition which dates back to ancient times (Malik 1997).

There are different tribes, and among these the Pakhtoons form a majority within an otherwise very diverse region. The regions bordering present-day Afghanistan are the tribal regions of the province and the administration of the

¹⁶ The North Western Frontier Province (N.W.F.P) was renamed in April 2010 by the constitutional committee set up by the Federal Government to propose certain reforms and amendments. The renaming of the province was a demand put forward by the ruling National Awami Party (NAP) in the province.

province was left to the tribal chiefs by the British. These regions have retained their own customs, alliances and centuries-old cultural traditions. After partition, the tribal regions were administered by the federal government and they maintain a separate identity within the state structure. The people in the province rely heavily on kinship for social security and social capital, though the specific nature of these kin relationships is dependent on the social status and class structure of the different clans, tribes and families.¹⁷

Different languages are spoken in the different provinces, and there is wide variation in culture, dress codes and social-cultural norms. The post-independence state thus comprises a multi-cultural society, wherein social relations are generally framed around ethnicity, strong family ties and kinship links.

5. Overview of the federal, provincial and local government systems

The India Act of 1935 established a federal form of government in the Indian state and introduced 'fully responsible' provincial governments in the provinces (Ali Cheema *et al.* 2004, p.3). Another feature of British rule in India was the introduction of local government in urban and rural areas. The urban–rural divide in local government was exacerbated under the British due to their efforts to provide municipal services in the urban areas. This was done to establish centralised control by the district bureaucracies over the rural classes and to co-opt the local elites, and was in effect “an extension of the system of patronage” (Ali Cheema *et al.* 2004, p.4). East Pakistan and West Pakistan were divided into divisions¹⁸ which were sub-divided into districts¹⁹ (Sayeed 1958).

¹⁷ The information in this paragraph is drawn from the author's own background and biographical experiences—the author being Pakhtoon, and thus familiar with the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

¹⁸ A division constituted a vast geographical spread and these divisions were large central urban cities such as Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Gujrat. A district consisted of urban and rural areas.

¹⁹ The level below the districts was the tehsil, a sub-division of the district consisting of several villages. See Inayatullah 1964.

Administration in Pakistan remained at the district level. The district officials, known as the Indian Civil Service (ICS), became the face of the government (Inayatullah 1964). After 1947, the local government system first introduced by the British was fully functional only in the province of Punjab, where it took the form of “village *panchayats* and municipal councils”²⁰ (Ali Cheema et al. 2004, p.5). Despite official declarations, the local government system in the rest of the country was not fully implemented, and this was for two reasons: first, the state bureaucracy dominated the local governments; second, the local governments “were denied legitimacy by not holding elections because of limited franchise and malpractices” (Ali Cheema *et al.* 2004, p.5). Thus, the local governments existed, but there was no real commitment to decentralising powers at the district and lower levels. In the first decade of partition the ICS bureaucracy penetrated into all levels of the government and established its control over much of the policy-making in the country.

The role that the ICS had inherited further strengthened the state apparatus, since all the key posts in the state administrative structures were reserved for select cadres²¹ and, as a result, they controlled the entire administration. In keeping with the imperial tradition of the ICS, the strength of the Civil Service of Pakistan²² (CSP) lay in its concept of ‘guardianship’, which required showing solidarity with colleagues (Gardezi and Rashid 1983). Hence, the CSP’s longstanding image of superiority and ‘guardianship’ was perpetuated after partition. The recruitment and the training of CSP officers were controlled by the Public Service Commission (*ibid.*), and public service in Pakistan was thus dominated by its ‘cadres’. The cadre system can be traced back to the East India Company: the creation of the Provincial Civil Service had been referred to as the ‘Indianisation’ of the services, its object being to recruit natives into public service, and this policy was pursued from 1887 to 1947 (Misra 1977).

²⁰ The term *panchayat* means the constitution of a forum known as a council, consisting of five members.

²¹ The cadre system defines career prospects and the civil servants are mostly recognised according to a particular cadre (Kennedy 1987).

²² ICS was renamed the Civil Service of Pakistan.

6. Chronology of regimes and key policy changes/reforms

In the period from 1947 to 1958, the social structure of the state differed between East and West Pakistan. In East Pakistan, the Muslim league failed to mobilise grassroots support to become a mass political party. The All India Muslim League (AIML), which was credited with the establishment of Pakistan, could not live up to the expectations of its leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The disintegration of AIML in 1956 was due to “intrigues, neglect and rivalries along personal and provincial lines” (Jalal 1995, p.53). As argued by Malik (1997), the AIML formed coalitions with non-representative rural elites to gain power and aligned itself with them for personal interests. The ruling elites were retired and serving bureaucrats and military leaders used the party to legitimise their illegitimate rise to power.

The political structure in East Pakistan was represented by the United Front Coalition, a group of diverse parties of which the Awami League was the most important (Sayeed 1980). The league challenged the domination of the Muslim League over the issues of language and provincial autonomy (Lodhi 2011). The major decisive turn in the political situation of Pakistan can be seen after the defeat of the Muslim League by the United Front Coalition in the 1954 provincial elections (Sayeed 1980). The triumph of the party resulted in the formation of a central government. To the civil bureaucracy, the army, and in particular the landed elites and families in the western part of the country, democracy was anathema. In this non-democratic context, “the military and civil bureaucracy was able to achieve their own narrow institutional interests” (Jalal 1995, p.50). The formation of alliances between the bureaucracy and military undermined the role of the parliament in the state structures. National elections in the country were not held and constitution-making was delayed because of differences over the distribution of political and financial powers between the centre and the provinces (ibid.). Moreover, the executive enjoyed superiority over the legislative and judicial organs of the state. This was evident after 1951 when the country was ruled by civil bureaucrats, and in the future collaborations between the civil bureaucracy and military in the internal governance of the state.

In 1953, the third governor-general of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammad (a bureaucrat), with the connivance of the military, overthrew the first elected prime minister, Khawaja Nazimuddin, despite the latter having a majority in parliament (Ziring 1997). The judiciary acted in favour of the governor-general by validating the dismissal on the basis of the law and order situation and upheld its ruling in favour of the dissolution of the constituent assembly. The ruling of the supreme judicial court thus legitimised military rule in the country. A major conflict existed between the bureaucrats and the politicians, and this conflict must be seen in the context of the arbitrary powers used by the British to suppress the politicians. The civil bureaucracy was able to justify the dismissal of an elected prime minister as an act of legitimising its authority without much political resistance. The centralisation of bureaucratic control undermined the independent functioning of the legislative and judicial organs of the state. This further worsened the precarious position of the political parties. The political events just before the first military takeover in 1958 thus make manifest certain factors which have marked the political situation in Pakistan since independence. These include the success of the military and the civil bureaucracy in undermining the political process, and their ability to establish writ within the state in collaboration with other dominant classes.

6.1 The military regime and 'Basic Democracies' (1958-70)

In 1958, General Ayub imposed martial law and introduced the concept of 'Basic Democracy' (BD) in the country. Parliamentary democracy was seen as a hindrance to the interests of the civil-military oligarchy. According to the 1956 constitution, holding general elections would have transferred power and authority from East Pakistan. The social and political situation after 1958 ushered in authoritarian rule using the bureaucracy as instruments of governance (Jalal 1995). Jalal further asserts that the institutions of the state were permanently damaged when authoritarian rule was introduced in the country. General Ayub legitimised the military takeover by the army and initiated the process of intervening between the state and society. His attack on politicians was an assertion of their inability to improve the living conditions

of the people, and he described the character of the politicians as “venal and unscrupulous” (Ziring 1997, p.260).

The declaration of martial law in 1958 in the country was a clear message that all political activities must cease, and many political leaders were disqualified and barred from engaging in political mobilisation. General Ayub needed the sympathy and the support of those groups who could provide him with an opportunity to bypass his critics. This resulted in forging an alliance with and enlisting the support of the bureaucracy. The state apparatus became totally centralised, and the authority and decision-making of higher officials were considered as final (Ziring 1980, p.87). The civil-military oligarchic alliance appealed to the landed class of the country who feared the introduction of land reforms and the loss of their wealth under democratic regimes. They lent support to the military regime, which further strengthened the authority of the General (Ziring 1980).

Prior to the introduction of the Basic Democracies, the politician in the local villages hardly visited the people. The politician would seek an understanding with a particular faction of the village and votes would be delivered in his favour (Ziring 1997). The parties before the Ayub era had followed this process, and no efforts had been made to alter the prevailing system. The introduction of Basic Democracies was meant to bring political change. The object of General Ayub’s Basic Democracy was two-fold: to establish a political constituency for maintaining a stable relationship between citizens and government, and to grant excessive powers to the president under the constitution of 1963. From the time of Ayub’s takeover, the ‘bureaucratic-military oligarchy’ remained at the helm for the entirety of the 1960s (Cheema and Sayeed 2006, p.9). Moreover, Ayub’s military regime gave the bureaucracy the space to play a vital role in policy-making within the country (ibid.).

6.2 The civilian government and bureaucratic reforms (1972-1977)

The first true elections of 1970 significantly altered the political system, and Pakistan shifted from an autocratic to a parliamentary form of government. A

true believer in parliamentary democracy, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto founded the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in 1967 (Sayeed 1980). In a short span of time, Bhutto was able to gather huge support among the rural masses. In 1970, elections were held in West as well as in East Pakistan. In West Pakistan, the Pakistan People's Party was the main winner of the elections in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto capitalised on the fact that Ayub's policies had failed to improve the social and economic conditions of the rural masses or to alter the existing political structure dominated by the landlords in West Pakistan (Sayeed 1980, p.153). The populist appeal of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with the rural masses, and his democratic ambitions following his victory in West Pakistan, made him an extremely popular leader. The Awami League Party headed by Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman secured an overall majority in East Pakistan (Ziring 1980). The political situation between East and West Pakistan became tense after the elections due to a number of political and military events, such as the military operation in East Pakistan to crush the separatist Bengali movement, Mujeeb's insistence on lifting martial law in the country, the delay in the transfer of power by General Yahya and the invasion of East Pakistan by India (Ziring, 1997; Sayeed, 1980; Waseem, 2007, Talbot, 1998). These events led to the formal assumption of power by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the Western part of the country and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.

In 1972, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the president of Pakistan and sought to reduce the influence of the military and bureaucracy. The major challenge faced by Bhutto in the consolidation of power was to deal with civil-military nexus. Bhutto knew that in order to achieve his political ambitions, he had to deal with a civil service which was closely aligned with the military and also played a dominant role in the country's development policies. After becoming president, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto initiated reforms in the state bureaucracy. In the initial phase, under martial ordinance, 1,300 civil servants were dismissed who were too close to the previous military regime and were also known for their dominance and influence (Noman 1998, p.61). This was followed by the abolition of the CSP in 1973. Instead of the CSP, a linear system was introduced which combined all the hierarchical structures into twenty-two pay

scales (known as the All Pakistan Unified Grade Structure). The entire structure of bureaucracy was crafted around this hierarchical framework (Noman 1998). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's reforms to the Civil Service of Pakistan were never fully implemented because the country was facing threats from its neighbours as well as from the separatist movements in the province of Baluchistan. The military once again frustrated the efforts of parliamentary democracy by arresting Bhutto and replacing his government by the military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq. Martial law was again declared in the country in 1977. This allowed the bureaucracy to extend its reach and exercise its authority in perpetuity.

6.3 The second military regime (1977-1988)

The second military regime was more autocratic than the previous one. General Zia dissolved the national and political governments in the name of restoring peace in the country, justifying martial law by citing the inability of the political leadership and political parties to manage national affairs (Ziring 1997, p.424). General Zia became the president. Under the rule of General Zia, political parties were banned, the press and freedom of speech were curtailed and, above all, Zia introduced his own constitution without any consultation and had it ratified by the legislature. The constitution gave the president all the powers needed to reign over the state, and unparalleled discretionary powers to interfere in the political institutions. In addition to the above, the president's authority was final (Ziring 1997). His actions could not be deemed unconstitutional because he had removed the authority of the assembly to make such judgements. The president enjoyed the powers to appoint the prime minister, provincial governors, officials, and also the judiciary (Noman 1988).

Another important scheme of the General was to enlist the support of a network of civilians similar to the objective of the Basic Democracies of General Ayub. Noman (1988, p.130) argues that there were two basic objectives behind this strategy. The first was that the civilians would form a core of loyalist beneficiaries; the second was to restrict the demands for

democratic rule and so help shore up Zia's power. Zia achieved his objectives—firstly in terms of political fragmentation, as a result of his interventions “in political parties to neutralise the presence of organised political parties within the political structure” (Cheema and Sayyed 2006, p.13), and secondly through his promulgation of the Local Government Ordinance of 1979, which was based on restrictive representation at the local level.²³

6.4 The civilian governments (1988-1999)

After the death of Zia in 1998, Ghulam Ishaq Khan became the president of the country. He was a seasoned bureaucrat who had served during the pre-independence period and had been chairman of the Senate. He followed the path of the military regimes and remained powerful under the 8th amendment of the 1973 constitution, which gave the president the power to dissolve political governments. After the writ petition in the Supreme Court which declared the dissolution of the National Assembly by Zia illegal, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan decided to hold general elections (Ziring 1997).

Two major parties became strong contenders in the elections: the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) under the leadership of *Shaheed* (Martyred) Benazir Bhutto, and the Islamic Democratic²⁴ Alliance (IJI) headed by Nawaz Sharif. In the election of 1988, Benazir Bhutto was the first “woman in modern history” to become the head of an Islamic state (Ziring 1997, p.510). The first clash of the Benazir government with the IJI was over the provincial ministry of Punjab, and the role played by Nawaz Sharif, the chief minister of Punjab, to influence the provincial elections in favour of his party (Ziring 1997, p.511). Instead of working together to build democratic institutions in the state, the politics between the PPP and the IJI (members of the Muslim League formed the core of the IJI) became increasingly confrontational. The head-on confrontation was not tolerated by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. In the following years,

²³ I explain this particular strategy of Ayub's regime in section 6 of this chapter.

²⁴ The term 'Democratic' in Urdu, the national language of Pakistan, is '*Jamhoriat*'.

coalition parties—namely the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the Awami National Party (ANP)—broke away from the PPP in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in Sindh. What emerged on the political scene was the formation of alliances of political parties²⁵ with the IJI to bring the PPP down (Ziring 1997). Key factors in the dissolution of Benazir's government were the close contacts between the president and the army, and the role of the Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) in 'horse-trading', the latter being an internal conspiracy by the army to derail the democratic government of the PPP (Talbot 1998, p.309).

In 1990, under article 58 (clause b) of the 1973 constitution, the president dissolved the national and provincial governments and dismissed the government of Benazir Bhutto (Ziring 1997, p.524). After Benazir was ousted from the government, Nawaz Sharif indicated that he would form a broad-based coalition with the urban and other classes. The urban constituencies which were represented by the industrial and commercial classes lent support to the policies of Nawaz Sharif during the elections (Ziring 1997, p.529). Following the 1990 elections, Nawaz Sharif formed the government at national and provincial levels and became prime minister. The tenure of Nawaz Sharif (1990-93) was marked by confrontational politics with the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA) instigated by the PPP, as well as corruption, and crises of law and order in Sindh. The incident that sparked a confrontation between President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif was the appointment of the new chief of staff of the army. The president appointed the new chief without consulting Nawaz Sharif: this, combined with the aforementioned factors, coincided with Nawaz Sharif's decision to review the Eighth Amendment (Talbot 1998, p.325).

Following the dissolution of elected governments by the president using the constitutional amendment²⁶ instituted by the Zia regime, Nawaz Sharif was

²⁵ Lodhi (2011, p.53) argues that provinces are organised around traditional kinship groups and influential political personalities, illustrating the significance of the dynastic character of political parties.

²⁶ The amendments made "in the articles 58 and 48 of the constitution of 1973 established a quasi-Presidential form of government in 1985" (Ali Cheema et al. 2004, p.15).

adamant about repealing the Eighth Amendment and empowering parliament instead. These measures were seen by the bureaucracy and military as an assault on their power (Ziring 1997). Nawaz Sharif was in a weak position to confront both the army and the president, who was also a civil servant. Moreover, what greatly undermined the power of Nawaz Sharif were the civil-military institutions, a legacy of the overdeveloped bureaucracy discussed by Alavi, which formed a powerful bloc with the military in the post-colonial state. In a televised broadcast, Nawaz Sharif cited the president “as the root cause of the country’s woes” (Ziring 1997, p.541). The split within the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) weakened the position of Nawaz Sharif, and after 1993 he lost the overwhelming support enjoyed earlier. Major charges were brought against the government of Nawaz Sharif relating to issues of “corruption, nepotism and maladministration” (Talbot 1998, p.326). The Nawaz Sharif government faced the same fate as its predecessor.

Benazir Bhutto’s second administration (1993-1996) was different from her first. The elections of 1993 gave her an overall majority in the parliament. Moreover, President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari belonged to the PPP and remained a staunch and sincere believer in building democratic institutions in the country. However, the relationship between the president and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto became tense over “extra-judicial killings, issues of corruption and economic mismanagement” (Talbot 1998, p.334). The country was witnessing the collapse of legitimate government institutions and the manoeuvring by the PPP and other political parties was seen by the president as compromising the credibility of the state institutions (Ziring 1997). The president became increasingly aware of the Benazir government’s designs and interests. Following a law and order situation in which the law enforcing agencies were not able to prevent the killing of twenty-one innocent people praying in a mosque, the president decided to turn against his own party and government (Ziring 1997). On 5th November 1996, President Farooq Leghari declared the dissolution of the national and provincial assemblies, and the tenure of the second term of Benazir came to an end.

After the dissolution of the assemblies in 1996, elections were again held in 1997. In these elections, Nawaz Sharif secured an overwhelming majority. The victory of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) was due to the massive support from the urban-based classes in the province of Punjab (Lodhi 2011). The loss by the PPP was attributed to the low turnout of voters (Ziring 1997). Nawaz Sharif formed alliances with other political parties, such as the Awami National Party (ANP) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Mahajir Quami Movement (MQM) in Sindh. Nawaz Sharif declared that he would not tolerate corruption and would begin the process of increasing political accountability; but at the same time, he made every effort to undermine the highest institution of the country, the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The prime minister faced charges of corruption in the award of contracts to international organisations and the rapid accumulation of wealth by his family (Ziring 1997). While cases against Nawaz Sharif were being probed by the Supreme Court, the elected Prime Minister and his party workers, including serving Members of the National Assembly (MNAs) and Members of the Provincial Assembly (MPAs), ransacked the building of the Supreme Court and made a mockery of the independence of the judiciary (Talbot 1998, p.362). Jones (2002) argues that Nawaz Sharif was never interested in politics. According to Jones, Sharif was more interested in protecting his own private business by seeking political influence. The country during the period 1993-1998 faced a crisis of democracy as a result of a continued civil war in the province of Sindh, weak political institutions, corruption and the politics of confrontation between the political parties (Talbot 1998).

6.5 The political structure under the Musharraf regime (1999-2008)

In order to understand the decentralisation reforms known as the 'devolution of power' introduced by the Musharraf regime, it is instructive to briefly describe the system of administration which existed prior to decentralisation. Up until 2001, administration was divided into four tiers; the centre, province, division and district (Khan 2006, p.1; Keefer *et al.* 2005, p.6). The centre held both administrative and financial powers. The districts and the divisions were distinct entities governed by the provinces through the bureaucracy (Khan

2006). The district tier had always maintained its traditional status of exercising substantial control vested in the office of the Deputy Commissioner²⁷ (DC). Although the local governments did exist during the previous regimes of Ayub and Zia, they did not significantly alter the centralisation of power at the provincial level. The powers of the local governments at the sub-provincial levels were restricted because administrative functions were performed by provincial line departments, a “deconcentrated bureaucratic tier that did not report directly to provincial elected representatives” (Ali Cheema *et al.* 2004, p.16). During the periods of Ayub and Zia, the importance of local governments as a means of decentralisation of political, fiscal and administrative authority fell short of establishing the legitimacy of local governments. The new devolution plan introduced by General Pervez Musharraf in 2001 significantly restructured the government at the sub-provincial levels, i.e. district and below (Ali Cheema *et al.* 2004).

Under the devolution plan, an elected government was created at the district level and political linkages were established at the sub-district levels (tehsil and union council).²⁸ The district government is headed by an elected *Nazim* (Mayor), and the administration in the district is headed by the District Coordinator Officer (DCO).

After the military takeover in 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, now the Chief Executive of the country, revealed in his speech to the nation his seven-point agenda. Among the seven points, devolution of power was identified as a mechanism to empower the people at the grassroots level (Khan 2006). The National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) was formally assigned the task of crafting a Local Government Plan (LGP) in 2000. The LGP led to the establishment of local governments (LGs) throughout the country at district,

²⁷ The DC performed several functions such as: magisterial functions which included law and order, revenue collection, general administration, and the coordination of service delivery.

²⁸ Political linkages have been established between the three tiers of local government—i.e. district, tehsil and union. The union *Nazims* (mayors) and the *Naib Nazims* (deputy mayors) “are the members of the district and tehsil councils respectively”. The formal administrative linkages between these tiers have been laid out in the Local Government Ordinance (2001).

tehsil and union (sub-district) levels. After the establishment of the LGs, fiscal, administrative and political responsibilities were transferred from the centre (Federal Government) to the LGs (ICG 2004). The primary motive behind the local government reforms in 2001²⁹ was to replace the previously centralised system of governance in the country. It was envisaged by the NRB that restructuring of bureaucracy, in addition to decentralisation of administrative authority and decision making at the district level and below, would improve public administration in the country. An overarching objective of the devolution process was to reform the political structure so that it would serve the interests of the disadvantaged citizens and increase access to local politics. The technical aims of the devolution plan were to improve the delivery of public and collective services. The underlying assumption behind the creation of local governments was that it would effectively and efficiently deliver primary education, health, and municipal services like water and sanitation.

6.6 The civilian government (2008 to present)

After the tragic incident of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007, national and provincial elections were held in February 2008. Asif Ali Zardari, the widower of Benazir Bhutto, became the leader of the PPP and the president of the country. In the national assembly, the PPP secured the largest number of votes and formed a government in coalition with various other political forces, namely the National Awami Party in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, MQM in Sindh and PML (Nawaz faction) in Punjab (Nelson 2008). The coalition government of the PPP continued to implement development programmes and policies under the LG system of 2001. However, the local government system had a limited constitutional protection for a period of six years, and after that period the provincial governments could make amendments in the LG system. Through a presidential ordinance, the PPP government made certain policy changes. First, LGs became provincial subjects. Second was the suspension of the LG in the country in

²⁹ The system is not been implemented in federal areas, cantonments and federally administered tribal areas in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

March 2010. The provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa appointed administrators³⁰ instead of *Nazims* throughout the province in the districts and at the sub-district (tehsil) level.

7. Political capture of public administration

In this section, I examine the changes and reforms introduced in the state bureaucracy under the military regimes and the civilian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in order to underscore the extent of the political capture of public administration by the state bureaucracy. In particular, I pay attention to the role that bureaucracy assumed after independence, and how the state bureaucracy lost its autonomy and became politicised under the military government of General Zia and, most recently, under the local government system introduced by General Musharraf. The objective of this section is not to provide an in-depth analysis of the bureaucracy but rather to focus on the institutionalisation of bureaucracy in the present state of Pakistan.

The bureaucratic structure of public service has been inherited from the colonial civil service—that is, it comprises a loyalist class, highly educated, trained and groomed in colonial traditions of rule. After independence in 1947, the civil servants were no longer subjects of the Crown. Instead of reorganising the centralised administrative system and undertaking the tasks of strengthening political institutions, it was more convenient for the members of the civil bureaucracy to run the country on a pre-colonial framework. The civil bureaucracy enjoyed considerable strength in a period when the weak elected assemblies were unable to make policy decisions. In Pakistan, bureaucratic elites were not much concerned about institution-building or acquiring political support to justify their policies. The decision-making process was totally dominated by the civil bureaucracy and there was little interaction with local citizens. Here, I refer back to Alavi's assessment of the relatively autonomous role of bureaucratic-military oligarchy in the state. As Alavi

³⁰ The provincial government, through legislation, appointed public officials to perform the functions of *Nazim* until such time that local government elections are held in the province after their suspension in March 2010.

argues (1972, p.4), from the inception of the state, parliamentary democracy and the consolidation of power by the political parties have always been weakened because the bureaucratic-military oligarchy was able to bypass the political leaders by using British techniques and dealings. The British techniques were institutionalised when state bureaucracy did not allow the mediation of political parties (Alavi 1972). Furthermore, the oligarchy has accrued benefits by developing close contacts with big businessmen and landlords, and, more importantly, the civilian bureaucracy and the military were drawn from the landed class (Alavi, cited in Gardezi and Rashid 1983, p.46). It is in virtue of these particular modes of operation that the bureaucratic-military oligarchy was not just able to retain its autonomous role, but also constituted and secured its mediatory role between the propertied classes—metropolitan, indigenous and landed. The three propertied classes have not been able to influence and exercise exclusive command over the state apparatus because the “influence and power of each is offset by that of the other two” (Alavi 1972, p.8).

During the era of General Ayub, the civilian bureaucracy enjoyed considerable power within the state and was not accountable to the citizens. One of the objectives of the introduction of the Basic Democracies system was to enhance the powers of the bureaucracy and to make the politicians subservient to Ayub. The civil service was able to manipulate the political process at the district level because the BD system was designed to place the bureaucracy in between the local community and the Electoral College. Furthermore, “BD was structured to enhance bureaucrat powers at the local level over and above the politician” (Cheema and Sayeed 2006, p.9). According to Jalal (1995) the entire façade of the political process has been one of exclusion, political patronage and personalised transactions between the civil bureaucracy and the dominant social groups. Furthermore, the institutional character of the state has not diminished and the objectives of the colonial establishment have been reinforced. The colonial administrative designs were used as instruments of personal gain by the military and civilian bureaucracy. A personalised network of “15,000 civil servants, 500 or more military officials and less than two dozens of urban families controlled the bulk

of industrial, banking and insurance assets in the country” (Jalal 1995, p.58). According to Alavi, the bureaucratic network was able to invest in businesses of all kinds which were established in the “name of their wives and close relatives” (cited in Gardezi and Rashid 1983, p.49). Due to a weak political base and the absence of representative democracy, the military-bureaucracy oligarchy continued to intrude in the internal governance of the country.

The government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was more successful in its attempts to break the autonomous role of the civilian bureaucracy which had dominated politics in Pakistan since 1947. The reforms of 1973 significantly altered the role of bureaucracy in the formulation of policies. The politicians outlined the policies, and in this process, the role, functions and duties of the civil servants were decreased in the public sector. The role of the civil servants was confined to the implementation of policies, and their previous role in the formation of policy therefore abolished. The restructuring of the civil service elite was not the only reform designed to make the public sector more efficient, but was also supplemented by the introduction of “lateral entries” into the civil service. These were measures to replace the “generalists” with more professional and technical people in the expanding public sector (Noman 1988). However, according to Noman (1988, p.62) “the lateral entry system was used not to attract talent from the private sector, but as an instrument for the distribution of political patronage”. With the increase of lateral entries, the public sector expanded and there was widespread nepotism, graft and corruption. As Jones pointed out (1997, p.340) “between 1973 and 1977 over 1,300 persons were recruited under these relaxed provisions, primarily benefitting relatives and associates of cabinet ministers, and those recommended by provincial governors and Pakistan People’s Party leaders”. Instead of transforming the role of bureaucracy, the reforms further encouraged political patronage.

The bureaucracy during Zia’s period was re-politicised, and this undermined the rule-bound hierarchical structures and processes of decision-making. These practices once again revived the previous role of bureaucracy which had been used by successive civilian governments for patronage or to gain

loyalty. Zia's promulgation of the Local Government Ordinance of 1979 was aimed at weakening the base of political parties. Quoting Cheema and Mohammad, Cheema and Sayeed (2003, p.14) state that:

“This was done through the disqualification of a large number of candidates with a PPP affiliation in the 1979 local bodies' elections and by holding local elections on a non-party basis. Although non-party elections had been the norm at the local level since independence, nonetheless during this period they represented an important reversal because mass-based political parties had emerged as important players in the electoral arena since the 1970 federal and provincial elections”

Zia's purpose in holding elections in 1985 on a non-party basis was to extend central control over the parties' political base, which could have otherwise turned the political situation in favour of a particular political government. The effect was to elevate localised clientelist factions to the federal and provincial levels (Cheema and Sayyed 2006, p.14). The politicisation of bureaucracy led to the manipulation of the rules, resulting in the establishment of a decentralised patronage-based system (Cheema and Sayyed 2006). As a result, the merit-based criteria of appointments in the civil service was compromised, so was accountability. Moreover, the bureaucracy was able to stay in its position due to its political connections, and promotions and appointments were based on forming close relationships with the politicians. A World Bank report commented that the “excessively frequent contact of politicians with the local staff” eroded the hierarchal structures of decision-making and inculcated practices of loyalty and patron–client relationships in the public service (Cited in Cheema and Sayyed 2006, p.16). In addition, General Zia used the quota system to accommodate regional disparities in the civil service, the CSP (Civil Services of Pakistan), and granted preferential treatment to favoured persons in the federal government. As a result, the tendencies towards impunity, favouritism and political patronage were exacerbated, which not only undermined the efficacy of the public sector but also contributed to a dysfunctional bureaucracy.

Musharraf's local government reform is a continuation of the practice of holding local government elections on a non-party basis,³¹ in that accountability of public officials and the empowerment of the local communities are the two basic ingredients of the reforms.

A critical analysis of the bureaucracy up to 1999 suggests that two different roles have been performed by the state bureaucracy in Pakistan. The first was its political role, following the imperial tradition and being further expanded due to the fragmentation of the state political structures and institutions. The assumption of the political role was strengthened by the successive military interventions, which induced a particular reliance on bureaucracy because of its professional background and the weak civil society in the country. The bureaucracy remained powerful and autonomous in making policy decisions, and although later reforms altered its direct role in policy-making, its role in the implementation of policies remained centralised. The second role played by the bureaucracy was the introduction of the 'lateral' entry system, which set a precedent for introducing patronage into the bureaucratic institutions. These 'lateral' entries institutionalised patronage and relaxed the strict criterion of entry into the CSP through examination and competition.

In the next section, I briefly describe public administration in Pakistan and how development interventions are being implemented, with emphasis on the good government techniques most recently used to improve public sector performance.

8. Public administration and good government techniques

The framework of public administration in Pakistan is mainly organised into specialised ministries in which officers of different rankings are posted. Administration is viewed as a technical field wherein the civil servants need technical expertise and are accordingly trained in various specialised Training Academies. In the early phases of development planning in Pakistan, i.e. not

³¹ The principle of holding elections on a non-party basis has been used by different military regimes to neutralise the influence of mass political parties that had emerged in the country since 1970 (Cheema and Sayeed 2003).

long after independence, the Planning Commission emphasised that coordination and adjustments between the various ministries and sectors was needed for the implementation of policies (Inayatullah 1964). Development and planning from the 1950s onwards were embedded in certain techniques and approaches. Development programs and policies in Pakistan are implemented through projects, and these development projects are generally based on preconceived and ambitious targets without carrying out an empirical examination of ground-level realities. Candland argues that policies aimed at social development in Pakistan have been implemented without interacting with citizens or articulating the necessity for strengthening social institutions such as community-based organisations (Candland, cited in Wilson and Shastri 2001, p.277). Social development was seen as a set of rational planning activities, cascaded from the federal to provincial governments. Administrative and management tools were overemphasised. Moreover, the projectised approach to achieving development objectives was top-down, and constrained by limited knowledge and insufficient managerial and technical capacity for the performance of highly diversified tasks.³²

During the 1990s, the World Bank and the IMF imposed conditionalities and introduced structural adjustment reforms to improve governance and economic indicators in the country (Zehra 2002). Since these international financial institutions are primarily concerned with macro-economic performance, market liberalisation and growth, key good government techniques were introduced to achieve quick-fix results. Moreover, the structural adjustment reforms were based on the premise of re-organising the public sector institutions, and the adoption of management techniques based on log-frames and input/output indicators. Such measures were adopted by the government to justify projects which had little impact on the service users. Inherent in these techniques was an oversimplification of the problems

³² These and points made in the following paragraphs are based on my own observations and assessments, gathered through experience of working with the National Commission for Human Development, and my heavy involvement in capacity development of state officials throughout Pakistan. The examination of projects designed to improve the capacity of state officials does not reveal the difficulties faced by poor segments and disadvantaged citizens in terms of poor quality of primary education, health and getting access to state officials.

confronting communities, which engendered a misunderstanding of the nature of these problems and a consequent inability to develop adequate solutions. The key source of obscurity thus lay in the actual conceptualisation of the problems of the target beneficiaries and their concerns. Moreover, in the implementation of the Social Action Program (SAP) during the PPP's second tenure (1992-1996), the lack of reliable data and the problems of allocation of resources created opportunities for corruption and diverting funds for other development programmes.³³

From the 1990s onwards, many donors and international agencies have justified development interventions in the country as means to improve the indigenous capacity of the public sector institutions. The criteria were that, through training of state officials held abroad and domestically, the organisations would acquire the necessary skills to be able to perform optimally. However, capacity-building measures have compromised the existing capacity of the state actors by introducing innovative organisational techniques which rarely took into account the social norms and cultural aspects of the organisation. As a result, most projects have failed to achieve their stated objectives. A more recent aspect of development intervention in Pakistan is technical assistance for enhancing local government's capability to improve the delivery of public and collective services.

³³ This is based on my personal conversation with a senior bureaucrat who was involved in the implementation of the SAP. The program was financed by a consortium of international organisations and involved the provision of social and public services implemented directly by the provincial governments in the districts.

9. Conclusion

The chapter has contextualised the historical formation of the state, its political institutions and the role of bureaucracy within the broad framework of the colonial legacy. In the formative years of the post-independent state, civil bureaucracy was involved in the politics of the state and it became more powerful and centralised as a result of constitutional provisions and the changes brought by the military and civilian governments in the structure and role of bureaucracy after independence. The fragmentation of the main political party, the Muslim League, created dissenting groups formed around landed elites with vested interests. It was unable to acquire political support or become a party which represented the social aspirations of the people. The thesis advanced by Alavi was discussed in order to show the complex structure of the state after independence. Between 1947 and 1958, the country was ruled by civil bureaucrats and due to their colonial legacy, resisted the civilian and representative governments. The introduction of the Basic Democracies system by General Ayub aimed to perpetuate the rule of the army in the country and acquire a stronghold in policy and decision-making. Bureaucratic capture was crucial in this process.

The bureaucratic reforms undertaken by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1973 can be analysed with reference to the abolition of the CSP and restructuring the civil service to eliminate the influence of the military. The reforms had little success. Rather, the reforms created new opportunities for patronage and loyalty acquired through 'lateral entries'. The reforms ignored the previous criteria of induction into the civil service and set a precedent which was used by General Zia when he politicised the bureaucracy. The institutional framework of bureaucracy was distorted when the appointment rules and merit-based criteria were neglected and the prestige associated with the civil service was thereby undermined. The return to democracy could not survive, due to confrontational politics, intrigues and manoeuvring to destabilise civilian governments. Corruption and the weakening of state institutions during the civilian governments paved the way for the presidents and the military regimes to use their powers to dissolve elected governments.

The central control over policy-making and the implementation of development interventions remained the prerogative of the central and provincial bureaucrats. The elected governments were dependent on the traditional role of the bureaucracy, which followed a top-down approach in the implementation of state policies. Given the political situation in Pakistan, the bureaucracy assumed both an administrative as well as a political role. Bureaucrats were least accountable to the citizens, and due to the weak civil society in the country, the bureaucracy was able to intervene in state political institutions. Public administration in Pakistan did not penetrate below the district level and did not recognise the importance of broad-based consultation and interaction with citizens. To achieve results, the provincial governments implemented development programmes directly in the districts using the provincial officers posted there. The decentralisation reforms of 2001 attempted to achieve accountability of civil servants and to improve decision making through elected representatives at different tiers of the government.

Chapters one and two have set out the problems of governance faced in Pakistan, providing both a historical perspective and outlining a number of theoretical explanations for its current dysfunctional state. However, these theoretical accounts have a number of deficiencies with which the bulk of this thesis aims to engage. Firstly, the academic research into governance is rooted in normative governance and cites patron–client relationships, poor accountability, politicisation, corruption etc. as the fundamental causes of bad governance and dysfunctional public sector performance in the country. These accounts do not provide us with a clear understanding of the actual practices of the state actors. Secondly, the actual functioning of public sector institutions in Pakistan has not been subjected to rigorous, systematic and empirical analysis. The literature on good governance eulogises neutral technical solutions to improve bureaucratic behaviour and ignores social relationships, networks, bonds of affinity and the relationships between officials and service users. Therefore, a deeper understanding of public administration in Pakistan requires an alternative approach. In the next chapter, I will outline my approach to engage with these lacunas.

Chapter Three

Political Clientelism: An Alternative Perspective on Governance

1. Introduction

This chapter sets up my analytical framework based on the literature review, and thereby addresses my research aims and objectives. In the first section of this chapter, I critically assess those elements of governance which are associated with questions of how public sector institutions ought to perform. The second section looks at the idea of political clientelism as an alternative framework to understand actual governance practices and behaviour. Under the broad category of political clientelism, I discuss four major analytical subcategories namely patronage, networks, moral attachments and access. In so doing, I draw on the works of recent anthropological explorations of governance (Oliver de Sardan, 2008; Blundo, 2006; Le-Meur and Blundo, 2009; Scott, 1972; Clapham, 1982; Legg and Lemarched, 1972; Sandbrook, 1972; Medrad, 1982; Smith, 2001; 2003, Lazar, 2005; Ruud, 2001; Osella and Osella, 2001). Much of this literature has been developed in the context of Africa. While some work along these lines has been carried out in India, there are no similar scholarly accounts rooted in the experience of Pakistan.

2. Critical analysis of good governance

The objective of this section is to critically analyse certain concepts of good governance. First, I clarify the terms 'governance' and 'good governance'. Governance is associated with administrative and managerial dimensions (Doornbos, 2001; Leftwich, 1993). The concept of governance also has a political dimension which, in addition to effective administration, places an emphasis on democratic politics. The political dimension of governance is closely aligned with the definition proposed by Hyden (1999) who argues that "governance is the stewardship of formal and informal political rules of the

game. Governance refers to those measures that involve setting the rules for the exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules” (cited in Kjaer 2004, p.3). The political and administrative dimensions of governance are often used interchangeably. Tracing the genealogy of the concept of governance since the 1930s, and looking at its different elements or layers, Le-Meur and Blundo (2009) note that governance has been divided into corporate and urban governance. Later, governance became the driving agenda of the Western institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. The historical shift, according to Le-Meur and Blundo (2009), shows the transfer of the application of the concept from the private to the public sector. The origin of the term ‘good governance’ can be traced to the period when West-driven structural adjustment and economic liberalisation programmes were acknowledged to be unable to address poor governance, accountability, weak government structures, incompetency and lack of openness in policy-making (Smith 2007, p.3).

The experience of structural adjustment policies, from the perspective of the international institutions and donor agencies, has identified incompetent and corrupt government as the cause of their failure, especially in the context of sub-Saharan Africa (Leftwich 1993). The phrase ‘good governance’ appears in a 1989 World Bank report on Africa, which argues that poor governance is a major cause of “Africa’s development problems” (Leftwich 1993, p.370). In the 1990s, the theme of good governance became the driving agenda in the context of aid-dependent countries’ efforts to improve the social and economic conditions of the poor (Smith 2007). The aid agencies/donors convey different meanings when they use the term ‘good governance’. According to Leftwich (1993, p.371) the meaning of ‘good governance’ can be understood from three primary levels, namely systemic, political and administrative. The systemic view of governance goes beyond the conventional view of government which is based on the premise of centralised decision making in the formal institutional structure of a modern state. The broader view denotes social, political and economic relationships and rules, encapsulated in a system which sees good governance as essentially based on a minimalist state and a

free market economy, a viewpoint promoted in particular by Western political leaders (ibid.).

The political view of good governance is based on the principles of liberal democratic states in which there is clear separation of powers between the state organs (legislature, executive and judicial). Moreover, the state assumes control of its territories through regional authorities and other state agencies. The power of the state is distributed across all regions, and there is a high degree of compliance with state directives, laws, constitution and other statutes (Clapham 1982). State legitimacy is derived from democratic norms and adherence to the principles of democracy (ibid.). Pluralism is part and parcel of representative democracy in many important ways, requiring, for example, the free association of people in order to influence state policies and hold the executive accountable on different levels (Leftwich 1993). From an administrative point of view, Leftwich argues that in Western states, the doctrine of good governance means “an efficient, independent, accountable and open public service” (Leftwich 1993, p.371).

In administrative terms, the concept of good governance fully endorses an impartial, incorrupt, competent bureaucracy, and an effective public administration. The normative framework of good governance has been criticized by Leftwich for its technical and managerial fixes, “detached from the turbulent world of social forces, politics and the structure and the purpose of the state” (Leftwich 2000, p.108). As previously argued in (chapter two) with reference to the operation of public services, there is general consensus on the nature of real governance and its features based on the normative principles of ideal governance. In a sense, attention has been focused on the frameworks and standard literature of good governance to evaluate the daily functioning of administration and reforms aimed at transforming dysfunctional bureaucracies in order to provide quality social services (Smith, 2007; Shafqat, 1999; Hijazi, 1999; Qureshi, 1999; Javaid, 2001). In the following sections, I critically assess those elements of good governance which are associated with Weberian bureaucratic administration. According to the

Weberian ideal type, modern bureaucracies should have the following characteristics: (2.1) Impartiality; (2.2.) Rationality.

2.1 Impartiality

State officials or bureaucrats are supposed to be impartial in their dealings and there are no exceptions by which impartiality is made the exclusive preserve of certain members of society. The ideal bureaucrat is impartial in his (or her) dealings because he attains a high level of proficiency through training and values himself as part of an elite culture. The organisation acquires an ambitious, competent and loyal body of staff whose allegiance is to the purpose of the organisation as bounded by common goals and shared expectations (Nicholas 1991). Impartiality inculcates a culture of ethics and morality based on the ideals of the public. The public know that they have expectations from state authorities when they seek their rights and make demand on the state. Public officials discharge their official responsibilities in a professional manner. Professionalism demands that bureaucrats fulfil a specific role without the intrusion of the social and cultural norms of wider society (Nicholas 1991).

In the formal state structures, people have equal opportunities to access state services as a result of impartiality (Smith 2007, p.6). According to Nicholas, the state creates public trust through a balance of distribution of power within the state and society. The diffusion of power across institutions creates a symbiotic relationship between the state, government and its agencies. A modern bureaucracy in a Western democratic state implements state policies and achieve its objectives since impartiality discourages discretion and favouritism. Impersonal dealings and impartially are intertwined. They reinforce the inherent qualities of officials in state organisations and the manner in which they perform their official duties. Within the framework of policy making and implementation, bureaucrats as 'agents' must act in the interest of citizens as 'principals' (Lane 2003). Crucial to impartiality is the promotion of the public interest as opposed to the private interest (Lane 2003, p.6). From the forgoing analysis of impartiality, both the state and community

can be seen to draw benefits, which could be state services or people waiting to be served by an official. Both these institutions develop relations which mutually harness these benefits.

The modern state and the formal functions of bureaucracy assume a clear-cut distinction between public and private. The gap between the formulation of development schemes and what happens in practice exemplifies the inherent problem of the public–private distinction. The formal model of good governance treats state and society as two sets of distinct entities. In the formal state, despite the existence of formal laws and government institutions, there are powerful actors such as groups and individuals who pursue their own private interests by circumventing the public decision-making process (Lund, 2006; Oliver de Sardan, 1998; Clapham, 1982). These actors participate in local politics and also influence public authority in day-to-day encounters. Moreover, they also impose their own decisions, which inevitably means challenging state legitimacy (Clapham 1982).

In the implementation of policy, public authority is exercised by the state officials. In the public sphere, Lund (2006) highlights a paradox in the exercise of public authority in the classic Weberian sense. The paradox according to Lund is related to two interrelated elements. On one hand, public authority is underpinned by impersonality in administrative practices. On the other hand, public authority is subject to negotiation and contestation. Public servants constantly engage with the state as well with society, and there are conflicts, dealings, negotiations and interactions between them. For state officials, their concern is to function within the public sphere in order to legitimise their decisions and actions. For the service users, “they may stretch or restrict the public domain through flows of interactions” (Le-Meur and Blundo 2009, p.26). This means that the boundaries between the public and the private are permeable and not upheld in practice. The political nature of public services therefore lies in defining the permeability of these intricate and complex boundaries (ibid). Permeability, in governance terms, refers to a process whereby formal state authority is subverted by competing logics and private interests and, as a result, the formal rules of governance and public decision-

making processes are circumvented. Oliver de Sardan (2008) uses Erving Goffman's metaphor of a 'semi permeable membrane' in African states to describe the permeability which allows the penetration of socio-cultural norms of a society into the public sphere.

Wood (2000; 2004; 2006) advances discussions on permeability through the ideas of positive and negative permeabilities. Positive permeability refers to situations when state institutions perform according to the ideals of the public and the outcomes of state interventions meet the expectations of the society. Positive permeability, according to Wood, means following official norms and morality in public dealings without falling into illicit practices such as corruption, nepotism and the misuse of official resources. The penetration of private interests, informal practices, personal relationships and social norms of society into the public domain is termed negative permeability. Negative permeability refers to situations where poor and the disadvantaged people rely on social relationships and informal/personal networks for personal security and to get access to resources where these are not formally granted by the state (Wood 2004). Formal rights and entitlements or access to state services in these structures are acquired through patron–client relationships. A poor person may have to seek security informally by relying upon his patron. In certain circumstances, people rely on their immediate family members and kin groups to get employment in the public sector (ibid). As a result, external considerations such as personal and social relationships in official dealings become privileged over intended and stated priorities. The real significance of achieving state ambitions and ideas can be appreciated by locating bureaucratic rationality in a modern state.

2.2 Rationality

The state implements policies and plans which are intrinsically linked to the wellbeing of the people (Clapham 1982). In the allocation of resources intended to improve the welfare of people, decisions are made by state officials in order to maximise gains and optimise resource allocation (Ibid.). This entails the 'bureaucratic rationality' of Max Weber (Nicholas 1991).

The state institutions operate under rules which embody a close alliance with the rationality of state actors and state institutions. Bureaucratic rationality emanates from organisational procedures, organisational structures and processes. The state institutions and the notion of bureaucratic rationality become the key points of reference through which power is exercised and the demands of the citizens are met (ibid.). Bureaucratic rationality accepts state authority and legitimacy, and makes rational judgements through the structures of the state. The system of bureaucracy is rigidly hierarchical and “everything depends on formal regulations and the specific orders of superiors” (Willott 2009, p.8). The bureaucratic system and the role of bureaucracy are publicly accepted as the most efficient means of achieving public goals and state ambitions (ibid.).

The decisions are evaluated against the formal rules of institutions and rationality. Despite political struggles and pressures from interest groups and society, official behaviour remains rule-bound (Kjaer 2004, p.20). The functions of the state officials are driven by the organisation’s broader interests. The rationality is never compromised since bureaucratic behaviour demands observance and enforcement of official rules and formal procedures.

The other guiding principle of rationality is to achieve efficiency and fairness in achieving the ambitions of the state with least cost and maximal equity in access to state benefits (Clapham 1982). On the other hand, people also know that when they are not treated with fairness, they can rely on state rules and laws to counter the discriminatory practices of state authorities (Plumper *et al.* 2003). Bureaucratic rationality not only ensures that the demands of citizens are met by accepting state power structures, but also that personal and impersonal relationships do not impose constraints on policy decisions (Nicholas, 1991; Willott, 2009).

The element of rationality lays emphasis on the observance of official norms³⁴ or the professional norms of an organisation. However, besides the existence

³⁴ Professional norms are the official rules, regulations, codes, procedures, official decision-making processes, organisation charts and bureaucratic rationality in Weberian terms. These rules/regulations and institutional procedures are formalized by the state and used to

of official norms, there are also social norms and practical norms, which are expectations or obligations that arise from family, friends and followers (Oliver de Sardan, 2008; Blundo and Le-Meur, 2009). In diverse social, economic and political contexts, state bureaucracy does not perform its official tasks and does not take decisions according to official norms. In bureaucratic dealings and encounters with citizens, bureaucrats often use non-official norms which are at odds with their expected official behaviour. There are instances when officials sideline or ignore official rules. The official norms are at times replaced with practical norms which are open to negotiation and manipulation (Blundo 2006, p.807). Two crucial points have been mentioned by Blundo (2006). First, the administrative laws are seldom disclosed to the public. Second, the superior bureaucratic knowledge of state officials coupled with their weak accountability to the public give rise to illicit practices. As articulated by Blundo, these may happen in different circumstances which involve administration and its users. In the case of public officials, they may be unable to perform their official duties due to pressures from “social, identity and political networks” (2006, p.808). Anders’ research in Malawi (cited in Le-Meur and Blundo, 2009) highlights that in state bureaucracy, social relationships are extremely important as they infringe on the official norms. Under different circumstances social relationships are used to grant favours such as avoiding taking actions or granting preferential treatment to an officer who has contacts with senior officials.

The social norms exemplify social expectations, multi-dimensional relationships and informality in official dealings. The official norms of the state officials are confronted by social norms or the prevailing norms of individuals and communities, and the officials become unable to perform their responsibilities in strict compliance with official rules and regulations. In the context of Africa, Oliver de Sardan (2008) argues that the actual behaviour of state employees is inconsistent with their official expected behaviour because

determine state officials’ performance, job descriptions and how organizational structures are developed. Performance, monitoring, training and evaluation of officials are guided by these norms. These norms set “rights- duties and responsibilities” of state employees (Oliver de Sardan 2008).

of informal practices. Moreover, informal practices are regulated as a consequence of the interpenetration of the social norms into the public sphere or the official norms (Oliver de Sardan 2008, p.9).

In bureaucratic organisation, a pattern of hierarchy is observed. Hierarchy is closely linked with power.³⁵ The priorities of a higher-ranked officer are at times related to certain institutional constraints. The exercise of power may be to use discretion by overriding the authority of certain officials to comply with the demands of a patron and to engage in acts of intermediation.³⁶ In post-colonial countries, a higher officer may be under obligation to act on a decision which may not be in conformity with existing bureaucratic norms. Schaffer (1969) argues that in a political system, whether centralised or decentralised, the relationships in bureaucratic structures are asymmetrical and there are principal and agent relationships. Schaffer further argues that the greater the asymmetry the more compromises are made, and thus the relationships become more complicated. The asymmetrical relationships are within bureaucratic structures and between leaders and citizens. Asymmetric power relations inevitably lead to either conformity of decisions or give rise to a conflict.

Lipsky (1980) discusses conflict between higher officials and junior officials associated with their positions in the organisation. One aspect of the difference is that managers have different priorities than those working below them. Lower-level officers resort to different coping strategies as means of survival in the organisation. According to Lipsky (1980, p.17), in these type of organisations the “policy may be carried out consistent with the interests of

³⁵ The terms ‘power’ and ‘authority’ are sometimes used interchangeably and may have similar meanings. The word ‘power’ is preferred over ‘authority’ to show the interrelationship of hierarchy and power.

³⁶ The term ‘intermediation’ is used by Wood (2007) to refer to official norms being sidelined in order to accommodate private interests, that is, that an official takes into consideration social relationships with friends and patrons when acting in an official capacity. Intermediation arises in different institutional contexts. A political leader is under obligation from family to mediate between the state authorities by neglecting the official rules and laws. A junior officer, when he lands in trouble, approaches close friends to escape from accountability.

higher levels, but this should be understood as resulting from the mutual adjustment of antagonistic perspectives as well as the result of shared interests”. In the empirical chapters which follow, I argue that the senior officers often resort to discretionary powers to bypass the junior officers in order to maintain their superiority and status in the organisation. This entails negating or bending official rules and regulations.

The critiques of Weberian bureaucracies and their functioning show that good governance is normative and prescriptive. The normative dimension of governance assumes an ideal bureaucracy, and this does not account for personal and social relationships emerging out of repeated interactions between actors and institutions and thus penetrating boundaries which are not predefined. The model of good governance is formal and is strictly confined to official norms, laws and policies. The formal model ignores the significance of social interface, i.e. social interactions and face-to-face encounters with diverse social actors which give rise to different patterns of negotiations, multiple relationships, meanings and experiences. The literature on good governance also falls into the subtractivist trap. It analyses, evaluates and judges un-official practices with reference to ideal-type Weberian organisations. Moving away from the formal governance to examine the everyday practices which involve citizen's interactions with bureaucracy, I am offering an alternative approach which is organised around the notion of political clientelism.

3. Political Clientelism

Anthropologists have not been unanimous over the concept of clientelism, with some equating the term with “machine politics” and others describing it as a specific type of relationship which falls outside the formal system of government authority (Legg and Lemarchand 1972). From the available literature, I have used the definition of James Scott (1972, p.92) who describes clientelism as being

“a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher

socioeconomic status (patron) uses his influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron”.

Scott's definition suggests three important features of political clientelism. Firstly, it is an un-equal personalized social relationship between a person of higher status who enjoys superiority over a person of lower status. The superiority is established due to un-equal power relations and differences in social and economic status. Secondly, the relationship is based on reciprocal exchanges between actors, consisting of “mutually beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the simple dyadic relationship” (Legg and Lemarchand 1972, p.152). The reciprocity and the benefits accrued through transactions, which are often persistent and durable, are tilted towards the patron because the patron holds a higher social status or a position of authority which cannot be challenged by the client who occupies a subordinate position (Scott 1972, p.93). Thirdly, clients are able secure access to certain benefits by attaching themselves to patrons who are in a position to offer the desired benefits.

In contrast to an ideal-type bureaucratic relationship which involves anonymity, rationality and impersonality, clientelism is rooted in a broad social structure. It involves multiple relationships between patrons and clients beyond the exclusive dyadic-type relationship. Clientelism entails an asymmetric relationship between patrons and clients which is expressed in the differences and control of resources, and reciprocal rights such as privileges, preferential treatment and moral obligations (Clapham, 1982; Legg and Lemarchand, 1972). For example, a political leader extends material and other benefits to citizens or a family in return for their votes and loyalty. Thus, patrons and clients enter into stable and predictable sets of relationships to secure mutual objectives. In this way, the patron–client relationship develops into a clientelistic system which expands outwards and gets replicated across the society, as well as into formal institutions. At this stage, it is pertinent to

engage with selected conceptual categories to deepen our understanding of political clientelism.

3.1 Patronage

Sandbrook (1972, p.108) identifies disagreement between anthropologists and political scientists over the use of the term 'patronage'. According to Sandbrook, for anthropologists, patronage is based on interpersonal relationships between two persons of unequal status. For political scientists, the patronage system concerns the ways in which the party in power distributes jobs and extends special favours in return for votes. Medrad (1982, p.166) argues that patronage from a political perspective is diffused across the society and tied to achieving particular benefits such as jobs and access to public resources. It is less personal than a patron–client relationship, which is based on affectivity and friendship unrelated to a formal organisation such as a political party. At this point it is essential to look at the mechanisms and principles which underpin the actual system of patronage.

Nelson (1996, p.45) describes the basic principles and the system of patronage in an educational institution. The basic definition of patronage according to Nelson is that a patron uses his power to provide opportunities to get access to resources, and appoint people in posts without merit. A system of patronage is created in the institution forming a patron–client structure in which the power of a patron is directly related to the number of clients. The relationship between a patron and a client is based on reciprocity and loyalty, two crucial elements of patronage accompanied by informal rules for extending rewards and threats of sanction. Nelson describes this as an inclusive system of patronage which benefits a large number of clients in different ways in the institution. Devine's (1998, p.90) research identifies patronage and factionalism in the context of Bangladesh, and affirms that class and patronage are interrelated concepts. It is through the process of patronage that the differences between these two conceptual categories are observed. In a country where access to resources and inequality persists,

class and faction³⁷—which are group categories—are headed by a leader who has followers. These categories establish patron–client relationships and factional leaders such as village elites manipulate their social relationships and patronage to establish their claims to leadership. The patronage dispensed through economic and non-economic transactions enables the leader to develop wider obligations and commitments. Devine (1998, p.91) further argues that patronage is not limited to exchange of goods and services, instead “it operates as a mechanism which reflects and reinforces the allocation of social power and status”.

In the context of new democracies in Southeast Asia and parts of Africa, Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) mention patronage-based party-voter linkages between political authorities and citizens. The politicians identify resources which are offered to clients in return for support in their electoral campaigns (ibid., p.8). Differentiating between programmatic exchange relationships³⁸ and clientelistic linkage relationships, clientelistic exchanges are contingent upon a direct exchange relationship between the politician and specific members in a community. The distinctiveness of clientelistic exchanges is that the politicians identify target beneficiaries to secure mutually agreed services and ensure the provision of these services in return for their votes. In a direct exchange clientelistic system, the politicians (principals) provide benefits based on their perception and crafting of a policy from which their own voters (citizens) would benefit (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, p.10). The policies are devised in a sense which benefits a particular group rather than others. These services may be economic, jobs, preferential treatments or “discretionary access to highly subsidised good ...” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, p.11).

³⁷ The central feature of a faction is that a leader recruits followers who are either known to a leader from previous acquaintances or belong to the same kin group (Boissevain 1974, p.192). The leader of the faction knows how to manoeuvre a situation towards his own advantage and attempts to build a large clientele (1974, p.196). Sandbrook (1972, p.111) conceives of faction as a “segment of clientage network organised to compete with a unit or similar types within one or more political arenas”.

³⁸ Programmatic exchange relationships do not involve a direct, predictable and binding relationship between patrons and clients. These relationships operate on collective preference based on an ideological framework in countries that have established democratic-party-based politics under democratic conditions (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).

The authors further argue that democratic accountability in these countries is not contingent upon the politicians' success in providing material benefits, since clientelistic accountability diffuses formal accountability and impartiality when voters are incorporated into the state structures.

The relationship, being informal, is rather at variance with formal rules or moral expectation of government and the way it operates within hierarchical structures. In states where there is a high degree of discretion enjoyed by officials and politicians in the enforcement of rules, citizens regard it as essential to have access to powerful patrons who assure that state officials deal with their clients either honestly, or dishonestly, in cases such as ignoring official rules and receiving favours through extra-legal means (ibid.).

With the departure of colonial legacy, the state of Pakistan became strongly dominated by powerful social identities who are engaged in patronage-based politics.³⁹ They compete for power in different parts of the country to gain political influence over state institutions. These social identities represent different tribes headed by a powerful political personality. The political personalities are local politicians who are in possession of assets and disposable income. The local politicians appoint clients from their own constituency into the state institutions. A typical example of the process through which officials seek preferential treatment would be as follows: An official writes an application to a local politician, and the politician endorses the application which then becomes a political requirement to acquire a particular benefit which may not be granted under official rules. The same process is followed by others and the process becomes an informal channel which is not publicly announced and remains hidden from the general public. In my field work, state officials in different situations narrated that unless one has political connections, it is too difficult to perform formal functions according to rules, as one would come under pressure from different sources.

³⁹ Patronage-based politics is organised along a system of kinship and social ties of political leaders who come from the landed class. They acquire political support in the form of votes from their patrimonial and kinship based relationships, and from the people who are working as tenants on their lands.

The system of patronage, and citizens' experiences of it, differs in different societies and is contingent upon the political and social structure of the society in question. Moreover, the transactions in a patronage system involving clientelistic relationships vary. According to Legg and Lemarchand (1972, p.155) these transactions in terms of access to resources and the flow of patronage can be at the local level and beyond. In the following section, I discuss the characteristics, structural dynamics and the formation of networks in social, political and bureaucratic institutions.

3.2 Networks

James Scott's (1972, p.92) seminal work on patron–client relationships informs us that bureaucratic institutions in Asia are penetrated by “informal patron–client networks that undermine the formal structure of authority.” Clapham (1982, p.6) argues that patron–client networks consist of more than a simple relationship between two persons, as the nature of transactions are extended to other relationships which manifest an interconnected series of patron–client ties. The system that so develops is multifunctional and has certain specific characteristics. The multiplex relationships exemplify wider interactions which cut across different strata of the society exhibiting the attributes of personal, interlocked and multiple relationships in societies where poverty persists, and where security, social status and wealth are weak. The social structure and exchange relationship among networks is based on different typologies and types of composition. One form of network is analysed by Clapham (1982, p.2) through the concept of “representative clientelism”.

Despite universal suffrage, electoral clientelism works in those areas where the patrons have established their political base for mobilising support. According to Clapham (1982), “representative clientelism” penetrates into state institutions and not only becomes the controlling authorities within structures, but rather represents the state structures. This type of clientelism can be seen in those countries which have been under imperial domination and lack representative governments and stable democracies. These

societies are dominated by the extension of politically motivated exchange relationships such as securing allegiance to a party in power.

The clientelism of representation is manifested in the form of a vote. The citizens use their vote as a crucial resource of the state and through this resource provide support to the politicians to take control of the state. Clapham (1982, p.3) focuses on understanding this type of clientelism as a form of rational behaviour rooted in the logic of personal relations rather than an attribute of a particular culture. Clapham further asserts that this type of clientelism must be seen in the context of the nature of relationships between patrons and clients. Scott (1972, p.98) mentions an interesting case of public officials who use discretionary power to deviate from official norms by rewarding their clients. Scott's observation can be seen to characterise different situations depending upon the nature of transaction and the type of resource which causes deviation. One reason for the deviation could be rewarding a patron based on a potential resource. Clients use their own resources in reciprocating their patrons' support, and the nature of the reward will depend on what resource is required by the patron. In case of my own research, the political resource is critical for patrons to win elections. James Scott refers to this resource but does not examine the modalities and contexts under which this resource is considered critical for patrons and clients and vice versa. In the same vein, we may ask how this resource is exploited by patrons and clients for political and personal ambitions.

Social networks also permeate into bureaucratic organisations, a phenomenon which Clapham (1982, p.26) terms "bureaucratic clientelism". Bureaucratic clientelism is associated with the internal politics of an organisation. Clientelist politics occur in bureaucratic organisations and, according to Clapham, in these organisations clientelism appears behind the facade of a legal-rational universe. Clapham identifies two limitations on "bureaucratic clientelism". One is associated with formal rules of bureaucracy, and the other with factional interests depending on circumstances. In bureaucratic organisations, Clapham further argues that there is a conflict of interest between the power enjoyed by the mid-level officials by virtue of their

official status and the limitations imposed on them to use their powers in relation to the formal rules of bureaucracy. The patrons occupy a central position in bureaucratic structures and have political ambitions. Moreover, according to Clapham there is a clash of interest among patrons in the organisation, and to counter this conflict the patron relies on subordinates to get information and to promote the patron's policy agendas or block the ones which are threatening to their survival. The reason for this is that the structure of the state is occupied by networks of state actors within the formal state hierarchy and provides a perfect habitat for clients to have direct contact with their boss by circumventing the authority of others in superior positions (Clapham 1982, p.27).

According to Lemarchand and Legg (1972, p.153); in a bureaucratic framework clientage networks function as interpersonal relationships between patrons, and exercise command and authority outside the framework of formal rules and regulations. The patron–client relations are replicated in a clientage network which is not just restricted to the level of organisation but may be extended across the entire society (ibid.). In general, the more persistent the asymmetrical relationship between clientage networks, the more durable and extensive the chain of reciprocities becomes from the bottom to the top in a political system (1972, p.154). The underlying interrelated arguments discussed so far relate to patron–client structures, linkages and relationships between patron and clients, their penetration at the local level, and in other instances their integration into hierarchical structures. In the next section, I turn to the concept of moral attachment.

3.3 Moral attachments

The conception of moral attachment is central to understanding bureaucratic practices in different contexts and situations. Moral attachments refer to the quality and the nature of relationships between patron and clients seen in the light of four interrelated factors. These factors, and the relationships between them, are: (a) the dynamics of exchanges between patron and clients which

show loyalty embedded in primordial loyalties, kinship ties⁴⁰ and social relationships. These relationships are manipulated to acquire access to particular benefits and services from the state, and thus (b) the exchange becomes familiar and what it entails is taking actions and decisions which are considered to be morally correct. However, (c) familiarity breaches public and private boundaries, and thus (d) unofficial practices become legitimate, connect patron to clients, and involve obligations, personalised and informal relationships in contrast to legal-rational ones.

Ekeh (1975) argues that the elements of citizenship are deeply rooted in primordial ties associated with moral obligations. Ekeh (1975, p.92) talks about two realms in post-colonial Africa. One, which is termed the 'primordial public' and operates according to moral sentiments linked to ethnicity and community of origin, is 'moral'. Alongside this is the 'public realm', also termed the 'civic public', which is "amoral because it does not suffer from the moral imperatives in the private realm and in the primordial public". Ekeh's argument about morality is imbued in primordial loyalties and sentiments which influence official behaviour. Elements of citizenship are embedded in primordial relationships associated with moral obligations. In the civil republic, the state is privatised,⁴¹ in that corrupt practices are viewed as legitimate in order to benefit the "primordial public". Through the logics of two realms, Ekeh emphasises that individuals in the "primordial public" have certain obligations which must be fulfilled by extracting benefits from the civic public to strengthen the primordial public. In the civic republic, duties are de-emphasised and rights are informally acquired which have an element of amorality. What Ekeh does not mention is the interpenetration of public sphere into the private sphere. Primordial loyalties run parallel to the public sphere and their co-existence creates confusion in any attempt to differentiate between public

⁴⁰ In my research, kinship ties operate at the local level and they show moral obligations, social expectations and solidarities.

⁴¹ The term 'privatisation' is used in the context of appropriating state resources for personal gains and not as in (neo) liberal economic strategy, where the term privatisation has a different meaning.

interest⁴² and private interest. Primordial and traditional loyalties continue to function, however it is important to recognise that these loyalties co-exist along with the modern impersonal norms of a rational bureaucracy.

Lazar (2005, p.213) explores the concept of corruption in a non-normative sense by asking how people in Bolivia perceive corruption when their elected leaders are unable to deliver public goods. According to Lazar, people in Bolivia perceive corruption in two different ways. The first is that those who are elected would deliver promised goods according to the expectations of the people. Second, people construct a moral element through which people attempt to hold their leaders accountable when involved in the appropriation of state resources. When people talk about corruption, they condemn the political power of political leaders who divert state resources for personal and private gains. These people feel powerless to hold their leaders accountable when they talk about the unlawful distribution of state resources because they are not part of a system which operates on patron–client ties. Those who are inside the system would judge a political leader as a good patron. For them, extra-legal practices are considered legitimate and justified.

Political power further implies the abuse of state laws by offering people jobs, and providing a framework for the accumulation of wealth and its downward distribution. In this manner, a clientelistic network is formed which according to Bayrant involves the “politics of the belly”. In Bayrant’s view, politics is about accumulation of wealth and its distribution among clients to increase the politician’s clientele (cited in Lazar 2005, p.223). In the case of Bolivia, the patrons redistribute state resources as well as the wealth of the state through public works among their family in the form of jobs.

In Nigeria, Smith (2001, p.345) argues that the issues of corruption, identity and patronage are inextricably linked. They are closely related to the discourse of morality and the state. People have a moral obligation to invest in

⁴² Public interest is the responsibility of the state. The state performs certain functions in accordance with the ideals of a society without any discrimination or inclination towards a group or a political party. The private interest is a human endeavour to act in accordance with personal motivations towards a particular.

their immediate kinship relations by placing immediate family members in strategic positions to acquire access to resources. Smith's (2001, p.344) ethnographic research in the Igbo community in Nigeria explores how corruption is rooted in the political economy of clientelism consisting of kinship ties, moral obligations, reciprocity and bonds of affinity. Corruption is a key feature in the Igbo community and its social reproduction is taking place between members of the same kin and via informal relationships (2001, p.345). Corruption⁴³ is propagated through the system of clientelism and sustained through the personal interests of those people who do not have political connections. Thus Nigerians extract benefits from the state by relying upon their social connections. Political economy and politics in Nigeria exhibit patron–client relations, reciprocity and mutual obligations to immediate family members.

According to Smith (2003, p.707), patron–clientelism among Igbo people has two important characteristics. The first is hierarchical reciprocities and the second is obligations along the lines of kinship relations. The dependency of people on their kin is due to the unreliability of formal state structures in providing access to economic opportunities and resources. The ordinary people excluded from securing access to social services exploit kinship ties and social relationships as alternative options. Smith further argues that political economy and politics in Nigeria shows patron–clientelism through the idea of “having people”. Instead of navigating one's way through the bureaucratic structures to acquire a particular service, it is easier for people to look for personal connections. What Smith (2001) succinctly captures in his

⁴³ While dwelling on corrupt practices and exchanges, bureaucratic dysfunction and ineffective administration are commonly associated with some form of corruption. Corruption is most common in those countries where the relationship between the principals and agents are imperfect (Vannuci and Porta 1999). The agents are endowed with powers which they use to engage in illicit transactions and violating formal state laws. In everyday affairs of the state, effective provision of public services is undermined by corruption, a phenomenon which pervades into the state institutions (Oliver de Sardan and Blundo 2006). Oliver de Sardan and Blundo (2006) argue that the dimensions of exchange and the process of unlawful distribution of resources not only give rise to misuse of authority, power relations but also “generate mechanisms of inequality and exclusion” in terms of access to resources. Corruption sheds light on how citizens' expectations fall short because those in power have patron–client relationships.

research is that morality and behaviour is structured by people using ideas such as ancestral ties and kinship to maintain relationships. The idiom of ancestral connections is used to nurture a sense of duty and obligation. The instances of corruption become prominent when people assist kin. They do so because they feel morally obliged to do so even when this is illegal or informal. Oliver de Sardan's research (2009, p.49) in post-colonial Africa suggests the widespread existence of this phenomenon:

"To survive in the administrative domain it is necessary to know somebody or know somebody who knows somebody. When faced with an administrative problem that needs to be resolved, people do not try to find out about the procedure that needs to be followed, but who they need to see, someone who can pull strings for them".

Smith (2001; 2003), Lazar (2005) and Ekeh (1975) argue about the notion of morality from different perspectives and in different contexts. A careful analysis of morality suggests a political economy of politics and corruption in the state and society which needs to be understood through the examination of informal practices in the "familial idioms of patronage and connectedness" (Osella and Osella 2001, p.156).

Ruud's arguments (2001), concerning the public and private spheres in the case of India, deal with politics, relationships and moral obligations. Ruud's (2001) ethnographic study of everyday politics indicates that politics is about conflict, clash of interests and disputes. This kind of politics involves the mediation of powerful personalities such as political leaders who are in possession of social capital and who belong to the same community. Ruud (2001, p.128) further argues that a politician in a village engages with public and private boundaries. In a village setting, the politician represents voices of the people. He adjudicates in local disputes and establishes himself as a man who enjoys power by virtue of his position. In other words, to become a leader, there is a strong desire to establish control over material incentives and the distribution of state resources which enhances one's own economic status and of the leaders' family. People also have expectations from the

leader to work for their own community. A significant feature which Ruud's anthropological study identifies in the village is that if the leader is able to deliver, then his unsavoury characteristics are sometimes overlooked because he meets the interests of the citizens in the manner that suits the community.

In the community where I was conducting research, people are integrated in a system of '*Biradari*'.⁴⁴ The system of *Biradari* has developed on the basis of strong bonding between members of the community and an elected political figure. The moral proximity of the political figure beyond his nuclear family is to his immediate kin group members, since they voted for the political figure to acquire a high social status in their community. The local politician is under moral obligation from his own community to meet their demands and interests.

In the state of Kerala, morality and politics is expressed by the people in a narrative of the lost golden age which highlights the identity of the Malayali, taking state and society as entry points for developing relationships with each other ingrained in familial relationships, moral obligations, reciprocity and patronage (Osella and Osella 2001). According to these authors, on the one hand familial relationships enforce demands on the state and bureaucracy, and interventions are justified because of social intimacy. On the other hand, it is expected that people as clients have to make claims based on morality within the ambit of rights and entitlements, which is often denied to the citizen in a democratic state.

The authors further argue that "discourses on deception and sincerity are embedded in wider notions of mediation and compromise in which personalised relationships allow for a great degree of bargaining and flexibility ..." (2001, p.151). The authors also comment that adjustments are made when the villagers and the *sarkar* (government) share personalised ties. However, there are cases when social connections are lacking and bureaucratic distance is observed, and therefore the adjustment becomes difficult. The underlying argument of these authors is that when relationships

⁴⁴ The system of '*Biradari*' means that people in the community are known to each other because of their common ancestral past, kinship ties, allegiance to family members and social relationships.

between the state and the people are embedded in the myriad familial and other relationships which characterise the patronage system, “they become the site for political struggle and the assertion of collective rights” (2001, p.157). Moreover, political relationships characterised by increased social distance and bureaucratic indifference are re-constituted through patronage and personalised relationships and, in this, clients are able to advance their demands.

3.4 Access

During the 1970s, Bernard Schaffer, along with other authors developed the theory of ‘access’, in which he studied how beneficiaries gain access to services in administrative systems. ‘Access’ refers to the ways in which the state policy and programmes define who gets what and in what ways. In developing countries, the problem of access and distribution of state resources are problematic given the nature of difficulties faced by people when interacting with bureaucratic institutions (Schaffer and Wen-hsien 1975). Schaffer and Wen-hsien pay special attention to how applicants use active strategies to establish relationships with bureaucratic entities. A strategy may be confirmative, such one which follows bureaucratic rules and procedures. This strategy is less likely to redress an applicant’s dissatisfaction with a service if he/she is unaware of these rules or lacks the necessary resources to come to know them. There are applicants who use strategies which include the use of personal, social and political resources. In bureaucratic institutions, access produces different outcomes depending on the design of a distribution system. In the case of frustrated applicants hoping to acquire a particular service, they team up with other applicants and attempt to change an existing distribution system (ibid.). The strategies vary depending upon different choices and options people attempt to adopt.

The deployment of strategies depends on the relationships of applicants with a bureaucratic entity (1975, p.18). Political connections, social ties and relationships are exploited by applicants excluded from a service. On the other hand, people deploy a combination of resources to counter the negative

effects of a distribution system. As pointed out by Schaffer and Wen-hsien (1975, p.18) people/applicants search for personal connections such as patrons, use social capital, or formally complain to the officials. Access depends upon social situations faced by people, cultural settings and their relationships with officials (ibid.). The important argument of these authors is that different access situations lead to politics. The politics of access becomes obvious in the case of exclusion and inclusion. The politics is not restricted to the level of the organization. There are other levels at which politics operates such as at the conceptual level where policies and programs are conceived, and at the implementation level when the plans are implemented with unexpected results. The politics of access reveals several dimensions and these are: the actual intentions behind the delivery of services, what the applicant insists and complains about, and the nature of institutional processes involved in the provision of a service (Schaffer and Wen-hsien 1975, p. 22). I have argued in chapter six that access also involves what sort of responses, social and institutional, are adopted to convey complaints and dissatisfaction by those who are excluded from a particular service.

Schaffer and Lamb (1974, p.73) define the problem of access as “the relation between the administrative allocation of goods and services and the people who need them or for whom they are intended”. Schaffer together with Lamb lays emphasis on “service definition” as requiring “the move from policy activity to the institutionalisation of programmes, so that resources can be allocated to the service and an organisation built to carry it through” (1974, p.73). Factors affecting access depend on different situations in which the behaviour and responses of the people involved may vary. Making reference to the work of these authors, Peter (1992) argues that access is localised as well as institutionalised when the state is trying to address a particular problem in a community. It is precisely in this context that an access problem arises (ibid.).

Schaffer and Lamb analyse different access situations and the ways people respond to or attempt to influence these situations through voice and exit. The use of voice by people conveys their dissatisfaction at an institutional level

and in their encounters with front-line managers, given the fact that in access situations there exists much “discretion, much room for interpretation and therefore for the exercise of voice by an applicant” (ibid., p.75). On the other hand, eligibility and service provision rules can also be circumscribed or undermined by people using political support. Schaffer and Lamb (1974, p.75) describe this by arguing that “the eligibility conditions, the gateways, will look different on either side of the gate”. This means that they will be viewed differently by the front-line managers and by the beneficiaries who are included and excluded. This would produce unanticipated effects when a policy is implemented. During the process of service provision or prior to it, employing voice therefore indicates politicisation.

Access to public goods and services involves both voice and exit, and these are closely related. Voice plays a central role in access situations but, at the same time, exit can also occur. Schaffer and Lamb (1974, p.77) argue that the option of exit is less feasible for those who are totally dependent on state services when there is a state monopoly, and when there is one institution involved in its provision. On the other hand, under different conditions, people do have a choice to acquire a required service from elsewhere, such as the market or other decentralised state agencies. As pointed out by Schaffer and Lamb, in actual access situations, it is not by design that people are left with no choices. In fact, people are excluded even when they do meet certain conditions, for example in a formal queue-like situation.⁴⁵ Similarly, when people move out from an access situation in which voice remains central, they are forced into their own peculiar realities—poverty, reliance on existing services or forced to acquire a degraded service. People exit because their

⁴⁵ In a bureaucratically dominated system access becomes possible for those applicants who meet three conditions, namely eligibility, ordering (sequential admissibility of applicants based on arrival and waiting time), and encounter with the rank and file. This according to Schaffer and Wen-hsien (1975, p.23) is a system of queue. When the three conditions are met without any discretion or discrimination, the system becomes an ideal type queue. This type of queue means that planners and service providers can perform their functions in a fair manner with predictable outcomes because the rules of application for entry and exit are known, stable and straightforward. This process also enables potential applicants to decide whether to avail themselves of a service or refrain from it altogether.

prior experience of access is too cumbersome; relying on voice needs time and resources, and at times leads to uncertain outcomes (ibid.).

4. Conclusion

In this chapter I dealt with the limitations of the formal governance model, which has been shown to be inadequate as a tool with which to study actual practices and the significance of social norms. The critiques of the functioning of the ideal bureaucracy and administration by authors such as Lund (2006), Oliver de Sardan (2008), Blundo (2006) and Wood (2000, 2006) highlight the problem of permeability. Giorgio Blundo and Pierre-Yves Le Meur (2009) and Oliver de Sardan (2008) have shown how informal practices are justified and make reference to practical and social norms, and have discussed their interpenetration into official norms. Lipsky (1980) discusses conflicts of interest between hierarchies, and relationships that are at odds with organisational goals. These assessments helped me to reach the conclusion that the notion of political clientelism should be introduced as an alternative approach, and thus I engaged with the anthropological literature in order to study actual practices and informality in official and public dealings. The anthropological literature on political clientelism highlights the importance of networks and their penetration into state and society (Clapham, 1980; Scott, 1972; Legg and Lemarchand, 1972).

The concept of patronage offers insights into the actual functioning of patronage systems in different societies and social and political structures (Devine, 1998; Sandbrook, 1972; Neslon, 1996; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). The analysis of morality by authors such as Smith (2001; 2003) and Ekeh (1975) focuses on primordial loyalties highlighting the relationship between the state and society. Based on a combination of factors, officials and users alike pursue their particular interests which involve abusing state laws, strengthening pre-existing forms of clientelist relationships and capturing state resources. The literature on access highlights problems of access and agent–recipient relationships. Factors affecting access depend on different situations in which the notions of voice and exit are important, particularly when the state is trying to address a particular problem in a community.

The literature on South Asia does not explicitly deal with informal practices of state officials in the delivery of public and social services. However, the literature is extremely useful when dealing with the issues of moral obligations, politics and strategic relationships at the micro-level. The vast literature on patron–client relationships, and in particular the studies on these relationships by Scott, Devine and Clapham, suggest different approaches and variations in these relationships. Although, they do share certain common attributes. Due to the diversity in the methodologies and the contexts of their research, we can assert that these relationships are multi-dimensional, asymmetric, personalised and structured under different social and political conditions. All these arguments, concepts, issues and debates are complex, and it is not a straightforward matter to arrive at a single conclusion. However, I consider them complementary as they provide sophisticated and multi-dimensional explanations with which we can study administrative practices and the actual behaviour of state officials in different institutional and political milieu. In the following chapter, I discuss the epistemological and methodological dimensions of my research.

Chapter Four

Epistemology and Methodology

1. Introduction

Before embarking on field work, I undertook an extensive review of the literature and produced a research strategy paper. The paper sets out an interactionist epistemological framework which aims to analyse official behaviour and administrative practices through an interface approach. Bernard (1998) proposes that gaining epistemological understanding is a discovery process which enables the researcher to understand events and the behaviour of actors. My research methodology is an ethnography of three case studies which are treated in relation to my interface themes: clientelism, access, capture and clash of rationalities.

The adoption of three case studies brought both advantages and limitations. Having three case studies provided me with the opportunity to gather a lot of data by interacting with a diverse set of actors in the research sites. In addition, the case studies enhanced the acquisition of detailed knowledge pertaining to how officials go about their daily routine tasks in three different contexts. And, further, they provided an opportunity to concentrate on the influence of social and political factors on official behaviour. The limitations were linked to the availability of time, the need for physical presence and the extensive travelling that was required to visit rural schools and meet citizens situated in villages in mountainous/hilly terrain. When I began my field work, I came to learn that the education policy, as well as the accompanying strategies and other development interventions, were already underway. Instead of trying to analyse the normative discourse associated with how government policies do not meet their targets, I focused upon how state bureaucracy actually performs—i.e. I aimed to understand its language, meanings, actions and motivations, and to immerse myself in situations whereby conflicting arguments and multiple forms of explanations of

institutional and development problems could be studied in a non-normative sense.

At the outset, conducting research with the state bureaucracy and citizens presented difficulties, and this was for two reasons. One was the initial questionnaire that I had developed before leaving for field work, and the second was the need to find an interface with respect to the case studies. My colleagues, as well as my key contacts in the bureaucracy, advised me to change my initial research questionnaire. Their advice was proved right when I attempted to test the questionnaire during a formal interview with an official of the tehsil municipal administration who was involved in the allocation of funds reserved for development projects. The officer was less than passionate about answering my questions and at times was evasive in his responses. The semi-structured questionnaire attempted to solicit answers to broad questions which were, *inter alia*: how rules and authority influence officials' decisions; how state bureaucracy defines access in relation to beneficiaries; and methods of evaluation, consultation, participation and inclusion, or more generally the way citizens are involved in the implementation of interventions. The officer found these questions complex and intrusive. I realised that the objective of the questionnaire was being interpreted in terms of probing bureaucratic practices and that therefore the officer did not want to share information with me. This encounter provided me with an opportunity to rethink my research strategy on how to approach state officials, deal with sensitive issues and extract information, and this is discussed in the different sections of this chapter. Data collection, documentation, and developing relationships and techniques were therefore ongoing processes. In the following sections of the chapter, I discuss research sites and access, research methodology, selection of case studies, techniques, data collection/analysis, relationships and issues of ethical significance.

2. Description of research sites and access

My research site was the district of Abbottabad, located in Northern Pakistan. The district was named after Sir James Abbott, the last non-native Deputy

Commissioner of the district. The district, which is surrounded by low-peaked mountains, was once occupied by the British and dates back to late eighteenth century. The population of the district is over one million (IUCN 2009). Roughly 80% of the population lives in rural areas and the remaining 20% in urban areas. The district is divided into urban and rural union councils. There are thirty-five union councils in the district, and, out of these, four are urban union councils. The rural union councils consist of villages comprising a scattered population situated mostly on the tracts of mountains. The urban union councils encompass planned towns and cantonment areas.⁴⁶

Abbottabad district contains different tribes⁴⁷ with varied social and economic backgrounds. These tribes are *Jadoon*, *Syed*, *Karral* and *Dhoond*. The tribe of *Jadoons* occupies a special place in the early settlement and habitation of the district. Jadoons are quite influential because of their economic status and political connections—politically, Abbottabad district is a stronghold of the *Jadoons*. Their economic status is due to the acquisition of vast lands and urban property. Within the *Jadoons* there are sub-clans, called *Khhails* in the local language, whose genealogy is the same. In terms of politics, *Jadoons* have been winning elections in the district due to their political affiliation with the Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam (Q) league. In the elections of 2008, the Muslim League (Q)-backed candidate lost the elections to the Muslim League (N) group headed by ex-prime minister Nawaz Sharif. The candidate of the *Jadoons* lost the election to Sardar Mehtab Abbasi, who was politically aligned with the Muslim League (N) group. The political situation in the district also

⁴⁶ These are those areas which are administered by the Military Lands and Cantonments Department (MLCD). Cantonment areas do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA). Since my research on case studies involving water supply and waste management fall under the preview of the TMA, I have explained this tier of administration in the case studies chapter.

⁴⁷ The tribes are basically organised according to kinship ties and family lineage. Sometimes *biradari* and tribe do appear to have the same connotation in Pakistani perspective of genealogy. It is because of the tribes who have gradually grown weak and adopted alien cultural traits due to various sociological compulsions—when inter-marriages become common and mixing of blood and cultures results. In a nut shell, *biradaris* are more socially grouped together and tribes are more blood-based. Tribe and *biradari* share common characteristics due to multiple reasons such as social standing, common culture and common language. (Local residents/senior officials in district administration)

reveals the active participation of *Abbasi*⁴⁸ in politics and the formation of political alliances. In the present regime, two Members of the National Assembly (MNAs) belong to the tribe of Abbasi, and in the same elections a candidate of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) also won a national assembly seat. Thus, the political landscape in Abbottabad district is shared by these three major political parties.

I chose Abbottabad district because it offered a good test case to try and study official performance in view of my previous experience of working with district officials. The research site for the case studies on water supply and solid waste management was the urban union council Nawansher. Geographically and historically, Nawansher is a village with a heterogeneous population. The social-cultural dynamics and politics of domination in Nawansher are based on kinship ties particularly among the *Jadoons*. Due to migration and a rapid increase in population, Nawansher has expanded with the development of new hamlets on land which was once used for agriculture. The expansion of the population falls in 'new' Nawansher. This distinction is important because the majority of population in 'new' Nawansher comprises non-*Jadon* tribes, namely *Rajpoots*, *Syed* and *Kashmiris*. Communities belonging to these tribes are mostly employed in public and private sectors. There is no authentic statistical record available which can indicate the exact distribution of *Jadoons* and other tribes in the urban locality. Through informal interviews with local residents, it seems that between 65% to 70% settlers in 'old' Nawansher are *Jadoons*. There are also differences over the exact population of Nawansher. Local residents think that the population of Nawansher is over 90,000; but according to the survey conducted by local NGO LokParya in 2009, the population of Nawansher is 40,000, and according to government records, the population of Nawansher was 23,000 in 2007.

⁴⁸ With respect to *Abbasi*, it is a common name by which the tribe *Dhoond* is addressed. People living in most parts of Abbottabad district prefer the name *Abbasi* to *Dhoond*. (Local residents/senior officials in district administration.)

3. Negotiating access

Familiarity with local customs, language and norms was not too much of a hindrance in getting access to public bureaucracies. I was able to develop contacts at an early stage through interactions with senior officials in the bureaucracy and other colleagues working in the district who had contacts with senior officials as well as community members in the research sites. When I arrived in the district, I met the District Coordinating Officer (DCO) of Abbottabad district, the counterpart of the Deputy Commissioner (prior to the implementation of the local government system in 2001). I had known the DCO from the time when I was working with the National Commission for Human Development (NCHD). In granting formal access to state officials in education and the tehsil municipal administration, the DCO was kind enough to officially send a letter to the senior officials of these institutions and ask for their cooperation and support during my research. Under the local government system, the DCO heads the district administration, and accordingly the letter allowed official access. An obvious advantage of official access was that it allowed me to bypass the normal bureaucratic processes of meeting and getting access to civil servants in Pakistan. In an unofficial capacity, one would require an informal official contact with a higher official in the state bureaucracy to get formal access. In other words, I have informally approached previous contacts to negotiate access.

After meeting these officials a number of times, I soon developed trust and a good rapport. I knew that formal consent or access would also require frequent meetings and permission to freely move and meet other officials. I initially concentrated on meeting frontline managers. In these meetings, the context and background of my research, and the nature of support required both officially and at times unofficially, were discussed. The frequency of these meetings enabled me to identify the frontline managers as my key informants. To clarify and justify my epistemological standpoint, it is essential at this stage to describe the interface approach.

4. Interface Approach

Norman Long's (1992) actor-oriented approach draws on symbolic interactionism and phenomenological perspectives developed and practiced by anthropologists. Central to the development of the interface approach is the significance of 'human agency'.⁴⁹ This further implies focusing on the "lifeworlds and interlocking projects of actors" and employing social research methods to describe "social meanings, purposes and powers" (Long 2004, p.15). The epistemological stance acknowledges "multiple social realities" and questions the positivist ontological explanations of the world in which we live. In addition, an actor-oriented approach conceptualises knowledge as an emerging complex phenomena constitutive of a "complex interplay of social, cognitive, cultural, institutional and situational elements" (ibid., p.15). In pursuing an actor-oriented approach, the researcher reflects upon events and shows sensitivity to the lifeworlds of social actors.⁵⁰ The vantage point of an actor-oriented approach as discussed by Long is to inquire about types of knowledge, which also includes our knowledge, formed by domains of power, and the "social relations in which they are generated and embedded" (ibid., p.16). Interface analysis builds on social interactions and focuses on how linkages and networks are developed between social actors. Over a period of time, prolonged interaction establishes the interface as an entity that defines the "interlocking relationships and intentionalities" (ibid., p.29).

The interface highlights dissimilarities and conflicts of interests between individuals, groups or organisations. Moreover, its canvas is that of the negotiations, conflicts and expectations which take place within different social entities. The interface reveals the clash of rationalities or cultural paradigms in different situations, which provides an opportunity for individuals or groups to

⁴⁹ Agency is observed through social interactions in which social actors use their capacity and the ability to alter a pre-existing situation towards a desired end (Booth 1995, Long 1992). In the context of actor-oriented analysis, all social actors are endowed with agency which is used in ways such as influencing decisions or enrolling people in a project for particular purposes using different social strategies and practices (Arce and Long 1992, cited in Long 1992).

⁵⁰ The examples of social actors are individuals, households, state officials and non-state officials such as political leaders and members/personnel of other institutions such as NGOs (Hindes 1986, cited by de Vries 2001, p.115).

define their own “cultural or ideological positions” (ibid., p.29). To understand the social interface, the importance of knowledge cannot be ignored. People acquire knowledge of themselves and others, and such knowledge is constantly shaped by “experiences, encounters and discontinuities that emerge at the points of intersection between different actors’ lifeworlds” (ibid., p.30). The interface approach focuses on how different actors interpret social realities and events which are embedded in society. It treats development interventions as consisting of complex negotiated processes which are influenced by many factors, such as an actor’s strategies, negotiations, interpersonal relationships and how they can be analysed from the actor’s point of view.

5. The selection of case studies

Yin (2006) argues that case studies are often selected by researchers to investigate certain topics in a particular context that involves a pre-established criterion for exploring and studying different phenomenon. Yin further argues that case studies are beneficial when an attempt is made to study descriptive and exploratory questions in detail in order to understand people and events. In addition, case study methods allow the researcher to observe events in their natural settings. The selection of three case studies in this thesis aims to contextualise my interface themes in order to observe and to understand the actual practices of state bureaucracy in three different institutional settings.

The case study on water supply allows me to focus upon the dynamics of access. In an urban locality, it enables me to understand the problematic nature of access by focusing upon the role, interactions and dealings of a local political leader. The case study on primary education offers an opportunity to examine at an abstract level the complex inter and intra-relationships of bureaucracy in the implementation of policy. The case study on waste management looks at an external intervention. The most significant aspect of the waste management study is to examine the role of a non-governmental organisation in improving the practices of state officials in refuse management.

6. Ethnography

During my initial round of interviews with public officials, I realised they had not understood my interface themes. This in turn made me realise that the bulk of research in Pakistan adopts a more positivist approach, associated with getting quantitative data through structured interviews. What I discovered from the official documents did not in reality make much sense. Therefore, it was more appropriate to approach my target audience in order to get close to knowing the informal practices of state bureaucracy through observations carried out in a non-judgemental and descriptive way. Moreover, in traditional societies, cultural practices and norms are associated with meanings which are often expressed through practices and actions (Herbert 2000). Wacquant (2003b, p.5) emphasises the importance of “social research based on the close-up, on-the-ground observation of people and institutions in real time and space, in which the investigator embeds herself near (or within) the phenomenon so as to detect how and why agents on the scene act, think and feel the way they do”.

In observing events in the field, I positioned myself as someone trying to look through a microscope to see different things. I encountered two different worlds which required different lenses, and I focused on those things which revealed and constituted basic ethnographic inquiry. In conducting research, heuristically, people and bureaucrats in Pakistan see them as two different worlds and it is through the lens of interface that these two worlds can be connected. One is associated with formal rules and the other with informal practices. It is more appropriate to draw out analysis which enables an understanding of the reality. In actuality, it is difficult to stand apart and not mention that official rules are ignored. State officials in different circumstances evaluate their own situations in ways which are context- and case-specific. An official might follow official rules to convey the message that he has to observe the rules, while in reality adopting a particular behaviour which favours his patrons and their clients. The official behaviour cannot be straightforwardly interpreted as to whether a decision was taken according to official rules or whether was it taken to create a situation which could enable the official to

circumvent official rules. The two worlds are not separate or clearly divisible. The civil servants frequently move between official norms and informal social norms. Ethnography enabled me to observe instances when official norms and official practices were challenged by informal social norms.

An ethnographic endeavour entails both dangers and opportunities to document in detail the narratives, stories, perceptions and actual work practices of state institutions which involve state bureaucracy and citizens. By adopting an ethnographic approach, I was able to make a detailed account of what was conveyed to me privately and through un-official and official interactions. The nature of the case studies presented both opportunities and drawbacks in doing ethnography. In the case study of primary education, a pure ethnographic approach was not possible. It transpired during my initial observations and informal meetings with senior officials that they spent most of their time in their offices examining official documents and had little interaction with the community. This became even more evident when I was offered a rare opportunity to observe an official meeting of female field officers of the district education department who were sharing field visit reports with their immediate reporting female officer. After observing the meetings and reflecting on what was discussed therein, I reached the conclusion that these discussions and decisions required visiting schools. Had I conducted ethnography in the district education headquarters, this would have restricted my unconditional access to schools, since the senior officials could have interpreted my ethnography as too intrusive.

Quite apart from this, my interactionist-interface approach required observing interactions between citizens and officials in person, in order to attain a deeper understanding of the research community, which clearly is something which can only be undertaken in the field. These interactions can be classified into two different types: social interactions and official interactions. Official interactions with public officials complemented my data as gathered through social interactions in the field. As a native of the country, but not entirely from the local community, these interactions enabled me to record the details of the

actual practices of the state bureaucracy. These practices were observed in the field.

6.1 Participant observation

Participant observation is recognised as central to ethnography. Participant observation allows the examination of social practices and observing people and communities in the field. It elicits information by paying attention to the events which take place in the process of interaction, and recording them for detailed analysis (Bernard 1998, p.264). Participant observation involves immersion in events and in the realities experienced by people in different social and political contexts. Ethnographic field research involves observations and other techniques. My experience of observation was that of trying to adopt an interpretive, reflexive posture so that my interactions with different state and non-state actors could be transcribed in order to examine meanings, perceptions and institutional practices. With an eye towards retrospective processing, the data was gathered and kept in its original form for in-depth analysis later on. To get deeper insights into different social events, observations were made in order to uncover the reasons behind the social practices of state officials and citizens in different social contexts. In the case of water supply and solid waste management, observations were made during my frequent visits to the town committee in Nawansher and in observing people's habits of disposing waste. I used to leave around 9 a.m. and would reach Nawansher at 9.20 a.m.

During my conversations and observations, I always presented myself as someone who was trying to understand the routine functioning and processes of service provision and the dealings of officials with the community. In the beginning, it was difficult to make officials understand the nature of my research, but after some time they became accustomed to my attendance and observations. Since I was a frequent visitor to the town committee and had close contacts with its members, I was able to observe instances when the community members turned up and argued with the water supply staff. It was a difficult task to grasp the intricate and complex backgrounds to these

complaints in this particular geographical milieu. As Herbert (2000, p.550) points out: “because ethnography provides singular insight into these processes and meanings, it can most brightly illuminate the relationships between structure, agency and geographic context”. In the main town committee, observations and interactions helped me understand community complaints and the internal logics and justifications of the water supply staff. These complaints were of a quite sensitive nature.

In the beginning, it was a struggle to attain a deeper understanding of the water supply distribution, its rationing and how it was being managed by the town committee. It was only after developing trust and closeness with water supply staff that I was able to understand the frequently used political terms and the social practices of the town committee. During my observations I encountered situations which did not conform to objective truth and reasoning. The water supply distribution system excluded certain hamlets in ‘old’ Nawansher. Prior to these observations, I met a community member. The member knew about the water distribution system and resided in one of those hamlets. He disclosed information on the design of the water distribution system put in place by the previous *Nazim* of Nawansher. This meeting was coincidental and came after many weeks of sitting in the office of a member of the town committee, observing angry protests. One protestor narrated the story behind the water distribution system and showed me how the system worked. The accumulation of data and the discussions that took place between the community and members of the town committee became an important source of data, as well as key to developing my research position.

The political nature of water demanded I pay special attention to local practices, and especially to the role played by the incumbent *Nazim* of Nawansher in managing access. This political nature of access to water, being a highly technical field, has been ignored in other research which is based on the standard secondary sources of qualitative data. Focusing on the water supply case study made me aware that close observations of social events requires attention to social and political dynamics. As Auyero (2006, p.258) puts it, “Unfortunately, ... in concentrating almost exclusively on the models,

charts, regression, and correlations of standard political research, social science has missed a significant aspect of the ongoing reality that is politics: namely it has missed the nitty-gritty details of politics.” When I asked the members of the town committee about problems of access, they were apprehensive about disclosing the actual facts, as they thought I might disclose them in turn to senior officials. I adopted a technique which was to move away from the officials of the town committee for a period of time, and to engage instead with the affected community through holding informal discussions. The socio-political dynamics could not have been explored without establishing the basic facts in the region from which they originated. On one occasion the affected community members had not received any water, and during my observation of the unfolding social events in the office of the town committee, I came to understand that this community had been facing water crises for the past two years.

Focusing on their stories and then drawing on the information gathered from the technical staff and the community, I came to understand that the social practices were embedded in kinship ties and social solidarity between the serving *Nazim* and his own community. Emerson et al. (1995, p.3) assert that “rather than detracting from what the fieldworker can learn, first-hand relations with those studied may provide clues to understanding the more subtle, implicit underlying assumptions that are not readily accessible through observation or interview methods alone”. When faced with complex phenomena and unexplained events, unstructured interviews were conducted with the water supply staff and members of the local community. I also developed a checklist for conducting informal and formal interviews with my key informants and state officials. These questionnaires were prepared in order to examine personal motivation, institutional practices and the knowledge of the members of the town committee. In conducting these interviews, I relied primarily on my key informants, and also on people introduced to me by those informants, who in turn facilitated my meeting other important persons who possessed rich information about social and political events in the research site.

6.2 Interviews

Interviews supplement observations in the gathering of additional information, creating the conditions for recording responses and so attaining greater clarity through the process of face-to-face interaction. As a technique for collecting data, interviews are the most widely used tool in qualitative research. The tool serves to gain access to people's perceptions and constructions of reality, and to uncover the meanings with which they define situations (Punch 1998). I conducted thirty-one interviews across the three case studies, with school teachers, the *Nazim* of Nawansher, community members, staff members of the local NGO LokParya⁵¹ and officials of the district education department (see appendix 4, 5, 6 and 7). These interviews were generally semi-structured. The semi-structured interviews were located within my ethnographic work, as they helped me acquire a certain type of information. I carried out some intimate observations, which were then reinforced by open-ended questions. Semi-structured questions offer the versatility and the freedom to sequence questions in a preferred priority, and to vary the amount of time and attention devoted to different topics (Robson 1993, p.237). Interviews also provide a response appropriate to the researcher's interests, which is investigated "rather than treated as 'a problem' standing in the way of accurate reporting of 'facts' or 'experiences'" (Silverman 2006, p.127). Starting with generalised, semi-structured interview questions contributes to the formation of concepts and ideas that can direct the researcher to record the respondent's responses, followed by analysis and reformulation. Interview studies follow a deductive logic, while observation methods can complement that deductive logic inductively. Interviews with staff of education departments took place in the schools; the interviews conducted with teachers focused on their teaching experiences and the meanings they attached to multiple social and administrative problems.

During the interviews with teachers, which in most cases were formal, I frequently asked them about issues of access to quality education. Their

⁵¹ Most of my interviews with the staff of LokParya were based on their official documents and field activities.

responses indicated excessive contact between certain teachers and local politicians in posting and transfers, and preferential treatment to teachers who had political contacts. During field visits, informal teaching practices were observed in which a teacher remained absent from duty and employed a local teacher by paying her a certain amount from her salary. The stories of these teachers revealed the reasons for the declining quality of education between urban and rural areas, which is discussed in chapter seven. The interview with the *Nazim* of Nawansher was informal and enabled me to grasp the delicate matters and situations which bring the *Nazim*, state officials and local citizens into negotiations within the different structures relating to issues of access to water supply.

The interviews in the case of education mostly took place in rural areas. I used to travel extensively, in some cases having to walk for several miles, since most of these rural schools were located in the hills and were not easily accessible. My key informants in conducting these interviews were teachers: in particular, the senior teachers who had a lot of teaching experience became my key respondents. During these interviews, the teachers would ask me if I had a questionnaire (i.e. a structured questionnaire) on which to document their responses. They used to get quite surprised that, in all these interviews I talked to them informally, trying to get their views on issues and problems in access to quality education and relating them to my interface themes. Making sense of what these teachers revealed required me to pay attention to their responses, concerns and administrative practices. In other words, organisational practices and utterances were socially constructed according to particular contexts. In most cases, there were issues of mistrust and frequent reference to the powerful 'clout' of the main education office. In conducting these interviews, I paid attention to their stories by keeping quiet and preferring to listen. The primary focus of these interviews was to come to know their subjective realities, and to explore in more depth the actual work practices of the state officials. Gaining knowledge in the field about actors' perspectives, social practices and perceptions of others, leads to the construction of different types of knowledge which emanates from organisational practices and process, interactions, relationships and decisions

in both institutional and social settings. Mason (1996, p.12) argues that “social processes, interpretations, social relations, social practices, experiences and understanding” need to be tightly matched with the research methodology.

My interviews with female teachers in both rural and urban schools took place in the presence of senior female officials of the education department. In these interviews, I was accompanied by female mentor teachers, since females in the local community were reluctant to talk to the opposite sex. During these interviews, I made an attempt to observe the community in which these schools were located, since my unstructured interviews with parents and teachers enabled me to understand the reasons behind the lack of trust in public schools. I paid specific attention to the accounts of the respondents, rather than getting them to react to particular questions. I also observed that, in the presence of their immediate Assistant District Officer (ADO), female teachers were reluctant to disclose information and they constantly looked at the officer before uttering a response. After conducting a number of interviews, I became aware that these teachers wanted to talk about their experiences: problems of children’s access to schools, their own limitations of teaching in difficult conditions and, above all accessibility for these teachers, which was a problem in itself.

Informal interviews were conducted with my key informants to gain clarity on issues of accountability and actual practices, and to deal with ambiguity and contradictory statements. These interviews were held with officials of the tehsil municipal administration in the beginning of 2010, before returning to Bath in March 2010. The diversity of respondents across the three case studies and the nature of the information meant constantly adjusting the questions I had developed in the field. In the case of water supply, informal interviews with the technical staff were extremely useful. These interviews were held in private and during field visits when the technical staff went out to investigate the complaints of citizens. In the case study on solid waste management, I held detailed and frequent conversations with the team leader of LokParya, as well as going out and meeting the communities during the implementation of the project in ‘new’ Nawansher. The team leader of LokParya was extremely

helpful throughout the research. When the project was initially implemented, my interactions with him and the chief officer of the town committee took place in their offices. Soon we developed good relations based on trust, but at the same time they did not talk openly about the practices of the water and sanitation staff. However, since official documents and other information were easily accessible, and after my frequent interactions with the team leader of LokParya, I became aware that the sanitation staff were serving the residents of 'old' Nawansher and the residents of the new Nawansher were neglected. As I had gathered data from my other informants on the actual practices of the town committee, I also required the official documents and inside information to validate my findings.

I used different techniques to ensure that formal and informal interviews were properly documented. I seldom took notes while conducting formal interviews, as there was a danger that note-taking could put the official in an awkward situation and that the actual story might be distorted. It can also be argued, however, that officials seldom reveal the real intent and motivations behind their un-official practices. Since I had established trust, and because I had the distinct advantage of having worked with officials previously, the interviews were extremely useful—although, in certain cases, these interviews did not reveal the factors influencing official practices. Most of these interviews lasted for almost an hour and were written up on the same day. Writing about what the officials uttered and recording their words, I sometimes wrote up these interviews in the car immediately afterwards, especially where I thought they had to be written up sooner rather than later.

6.3 Informal encounters

I also gathered a lot of data through informal encounters. These encounters generally took place in very relaxed environments, or in passing moments with bureaucrats and non-bureaucrats. During my initial visits to the tehsil municipal administration, personal conversation with two officials helped me get to know how officials talked about their own limitations when performing their official responsibilities. During these conversations I had requested that I

could take notes, to which the officials did not object. I must emphasise, though, that one official was more careful in his conversation while the other was more open. At a later stage the careful officer opened up, but refrained from giving too much information. The official who spoke freely was an extremely bold officer who did not hesitate to reveal how a local politician was able to extend preferential treatment to his clients, and how taking action against this person was considered to be creating problems for themselves. Our personal conversation benefited me a great deal, since I was able to take notes and interpret them afterwards.

During informal encounters, I did inform the officers that I needed to meet them regarding my research, which required an interface with officials and the community in the sector of urban services such as water supply and education. The bold officer said: “these two sectors have not been explored from the perspectives of the officials, examining their difficulties which they have to face on a daily basis in the provision of municipal services”. Informal encounters with the water supply staff in Nawansher yielded extremely useful information about local politics. In these interactions, staff requested that I not disclose their identity. I assured them that their identity would not be disclosed, and emphasised that my research was about knowing what goes on behind closed doors and in private conversations between the local politician and the officials—in other words, that I was trying to understand what officials say explicitly or implicitly about certain acts, decisions and the institutional logics behind informal practices.

Informal interaction with the *Nazim* of Nawansher was very useful in terms of his views on his political role and his understanding of the importance of kinship ties and the expectations of the local community. The *Nazim* narrated that when the community sees that their problems are being resolved, their social expectations are raised even higher. The most important element of my casual conversation with the *Nazim* was to acquire his views on his role in managing access and resolving local community problems. The *Nazim* said: “the people in the community elected me their *Nazim* so that I can solve their problems”. According to the *Nazim*, he was elected to meet the social

expectations of the people. When I was doing field work, these casual opportunistic moments yielded important data. These moments helped me to overcome the challenges that I faced in the collection of data. Through these casual moments, I got closer to the interface because people were more relaxed, and this enabled me to come to a better understanding of the dynamics of the interface.

6.4 Focus groups

I conducted eleven focus group discussions. Six were held with community members and the remaining five with state officials (see appendix 1, 2 and 3). The purpose of holding these discussions was to seek responses and opinions from the officials and community members on different aspects and specifics of the research across the three cases. As pointed out by Krueger and Casey (2000), the focus group enables the researcher to acquire information in a particular group in which each participant either reinforces what others say, or influences others' responses so as to convey a different line of argument. Focus groups were also essential to discuss certain concepts which required more clarity and further perspectives subsequent to conducting the interviews. Morgan (1997, p.20) asserts that focus groups "reveal aspects of experiences and perspectives that would be not as accessible without group interactions".

Prior to conducting focus groups with officials, I framed a questionnaire to guide the discussion, keeping in mind logical sequence, consistency and clarity. In the beginning I asked general questions, followed by more specific ones. The questions were descriptive and designed to encourage the participants to elaborate on terms such as power imbalances, informal practices, the nature of pressures and the penetration of informal norms into official norms and decision-making processes. In the focus groups these terms were heavily discussed between and with the participants. In the case of primary education, I conducted two focus group discussions with ADOs: one with males and another with females. In the focus group discussions, I was able to compare and contrast the meanings assigned to the

aforementioned terms. Focus groups enabled me to grasp the intricate details of how official practices and the performance of junior officials are affected by political and administrative pressures.

One focus group discussion was held with the water supply staff in Nawansher. I used the same questionnaire. The concepts of intermediation and using political connections arose in both the case of primary education and that of water supply. The context was different, however, as the water supply staff adopted different institutional practices in providing access to water. In the focus group discussion held with the water supply staff, it came to my knowledge that the pressure, in terms of political influence on the water supply staff in Nawansher, was from the *Nazim* and his clients. The focus group participants elaborated on how they had to accede to the *Nazim's* interests, and at the same time how it became increasingly difficult for them to follow official rules. Focus group discussions confirmed and validated previous findings and analysis of data.

Similarly, one focus group discussion was held with sanitation staff to discuss the impact of an external intervention in the management and disposal of solid waste. Focus group discussion with sanitation staff was quite difficult, as the staff working under the authority of the chief sanitation officer were apprehensive about disclosing information. The questionnaire was not very useful and I decided to talk to the group in a casual manner.

Focus group discussions with community members were held in local villages. The objectives of these discussions were to document the views of citizens on primary education and the utilisation of state resources by a select group of community members known as the Parent Teacher Council (PTC). These discussions were of a different nature, as the people in the local villages were mostly illiterate. The community members had diverse backgrounds and were from various social classes. They presented their community's concerns on the quality of public education and the problems their children faced when attending and commuting to schools. These discussions were held in the presence of officials. In view of the overall manner in which officials were interacting with citizens, the focus groups became venues for the confession

of illicit practices and the expression of concerns regarding the declining quality of education.

Focus group discussions with parents were rather informal, again because of high illiteracy. To acquire information, I used to narrate the experiences of parents living in my own village. I observed that these parents were listening carefully. I felt strange telling local people about local problems, and wondered whether these meetings would enable me to extract information of vital importance. My feelings were mixed: I was pessimistic, but at the same time retained some optimism. In some cases, I attempted to incite people of the community to break the silence. This was primarily because I knew from my previous experience that local parents/citizens are ignored in decision making and face problems of inaccessibility of information about policies. During these meetings, their own reasoning and logic were challenged by probing delicate matters. Their own logic and arguments swayed whenever someone revealed the truth, such that the entire spectrum of discussion oscillated between confessions, ignorance and heated verbal discourses.

Focus group discussions with state officials across the three case studies were held at different venues. In most cases, they were held in their respective offices. These discussions complemented my observations and provided depth and clarity on terms such as “politics” and “political connections”. These discussions were tape recorded and transcribed afterwards. Focus group discussions with PTCs were facilitated by the head teacher and written up on the same day.

6.5 Reflexivity

An important aspect of pursuing this kind of research is that every researcher faces problems when investigating and probing issues of a sensitive nature. During my research, many state officials talked to me candidly about their problems and the issues which confronted them daily; but there were also officials who only spoke about the official versions in narrating the same issues. The reason why I was able to succeed in identifying who was telling me the official version and who was more open was my previous experience

of working with state officials. The uniqueness of my being previously acquainted with state bureaucracy put me in a privileged position. In Abbottabad district there was wide recognition among the bureaucrats that they were dealing with someone who had exposure to administration in Pakistan. During the course of field work, I encountered informal practices, the disclosure of which could have negative repercussions for the actors involved.

I overcame this by building trust with my key informants and developing a good rapport, especially among the bureaucrats in the district. Developing trust, the frequent exchange of ideas, interactions and having good relationships were the most important aspects of the process of conducting observations. Moreover, I enjoyed particularly close contacts with the senior officials in the district. I had the advantage of having these contacts, but I was also aware that my advantages could also be construed simply as being personally well-connected. Since I was residing in the district, during the initial days of my research most of my time was dedicated to getting to know people and talking to them informally about my research. I noticed a certain atmosphere among certain segments of bureaucracy who confidentially shared their problems with me perhaps in the hope that I would be able to resolve them using my connections with bureaucracy. I thus had a unique advantage over other people and researchers in carrying out this kind of research which involved observing complex institutional problems, conflictual situations and un-official practices. I can also affirm that there have been no negative consequences for my informants as a consequence of my discussions and observations.

6.6 Triangulation

Reporting and writing involves investigating diverse perspectives, and operating within a less structured social representation of events, which inevitably leads a researcher to confront ambiguities (Stake 2005). As a researcher, it was my foremost responsibility to get the facts right without misrepresenting events, interpretations or judgements. To reduce the margin of misrepresentation, I used triangulation to seek clarification of concepts,

interpretation and meanings, dealing with multiple realities and verifying observations. As argued by Jick (1979, p.602), “triangulation is used for the validation of data ... this would involve the use of multiple methods to examine the same dimension of a research problem”. Triangulation was useful in two ways. The first was after coming back in March 2010 from my first research visit, which had lasted for six months, when I was able to write the initial drafts of my empirical chapters. Although I had already gathered a lot of data in the initial six months, I was encouraged to confirm the contents and the analyses of data across the three case studies with my informants and the people with whom I interacted. Initially, when I carried out my research, a senior official in the education department told me something which was contradicted by another officer in the same department. When I met another officer in the same department, she disclosed some information which was totally different from the versions of the previous officers that I had interviewed. The accurate construction of reality perhaps lay in between these versions and conversations. During the research, I noticed that different people would tell me a different story, and initially it was a struggle to discern the facts and reality. Ingrained in the interface approach is the need to work around and analyse such stories. As a matter of fact, I was dealing with a plurality of truths. Upon gathering official versions and learning what was happening in the field, it became more evident who was telling me the truth and who was narrating the official context. As a countermeasure, I also examined official documents, and was greatly indebted to certain officials who shared confidential documents with me.

With this background, and in view of the sensitive nature of this research, I presented my findings to officials, keeping the original data intact to allow the informants and others to agree, disagree, or make novel suggestions concerning any aspect of my findings and analysis. The data contained accounts of informal practices, appropriation of state resources, intrusion of social norms into official norms, politicisation, the *Nazim*'s political interests and issues in managing access. While sharing research through the process of triangulation, I was prepared for comments and disagreements. During presentation, however, I was quite surprised that my findings and analysis

were confirmed by the officials. There were some officers who gave me additional inputs and enhanced my own understanding on certain aspects of the findings. During the presentation of data, one officer responded that: “we follow official rules”. The officer further said that: “as we do observe official rules, we cannot ignore the influence on us from different sources”. Another officer responded in the same context by saying “we have to observe rules and there is an official process which we have to follow. In case if we are caught when we do something against official norms, we could face inquiry and may be sacked”. These responses clearly presented their dilemma in responding to normative rules and informal social norms. The officials were responding to my analysis with reference to how and under what circumstances they deviate from official norms. While presenting and validating the research, the officials knew that I had been going around, had access to official documents, and had been talking to citizens and observing their practices. Still, the validation of data with the sanitation staff was difficult as they had different versions and stories. In the entire process of validating the analysis of data, I encouraged everyone to openly critique my findings, respecting those who had shared inside information with me and had trusted me during the research process.

7. Writing field notes and the analysis of data

Data relating to detailed accounts was gathered by observing people in local government institutions and selected villages. Simultaneously carrying out observations and interviewing was useful to capture those aspects of events which can only be transcribed and interpreted by asking questions. Moreover, combining interviewing with observations was helpful in exploring the components of the interface. Negotiations between officials and citizens in different settings led to better understanding of the emerging themes, concepts, language, practices and contestations. Throughout the field research, I spent a lot of time writing field notes and constantly interacting with state officials and key informants regarding what I had observed and was writing up on a daily basis. Ethnographic writing, in the form of maintaining diaries, enabled me to view and gain vital information on the case studies.

While writing, I would constantly engage with my raw data to get a comprehensive grasp of social realities, events and what transpired from the interactions with diverse social actors. I observed events and, while writing them down, I later conducted interviews with key informants to establish the validity and reliability of data.

The process of data analysis began during the field work by producing a detailed interim report which I sent to my supervisor for his comments and further advice. The analysis consisted of identifying emerging key analytical concepts and preliminary reflections. Since this process started in the month of January 2010, after already conducting three months of field work, I had ample time to collect more data. I followed up the case study on water supply by meeting the members of the town committee and the *Nazim* of Nawansher. While I was in the field, I was working through my data. During this process, I identified key arguments and concepts which became saturated before returning to Bath in March 2010. By conducting preliminary analysis of the data around key themes between April and June 2010, and after returning to Bath from my second field visit in October 2010, I was able to reflect on my data in more depth, as I was maintaining my daily diary. When I read the literature, my process of analysing data was an iteration between my initial detailed notes and diaries. Through constant iteration between data collection, analysis and external conversation, I focused upon key concepts which helped me in the development of an analytical framework.

8. Ethical issues

In this kind of research it is important to be cognizant of ethical issues, as many of the people with whom the researcher comes in contact must be informed about the nature and purpose of the research. The sensitivity of my research was quite high, and entailed, first of all, informed consent. The consent was acquired before the research began from all the institutions and the people interviewed. There were a lot of ethical issues to deal with in the field. These issues were handled by disclosing to the researched community what I was doing, what information was required, and how their information

and identities would be protected throughout the research. What I was trying to achieve was to make the entire research process explicit to the researched community. Because of the sensitive nature of the research, a difficulty arose when presenting my research to the respondents. In the early stages I asked direct questions, which were answered but with little clarity. At a later stage, I changed my style and language whenever I approached different social actors within the researched community. In ethical terms, the research audience began to understand that my research was based on understanding informal practices through the examination of social norms.

In interactions with citizens, the greatest ethical issue was assessing the risk in exploring how state officials develop interpersonal relationships with citizens and use these relationships for personal benefits. I dealt with this ethical issue by asking the citizens to reflect upon what they thought were the most important issues which affect the quality of social services. With state officials my strategy was different, since confronting an official about appropriation of state resources would immediately be dismissed on many pretexts. In these situations, it was more appropriate to know how state resources were utilised. This question was posed to stimulate a discussion, and in most cases the answers were vague and general; still, however, I found them useful.

To remain focused and to add precision to the data, questions were asked indirectly about specific events and actions. However, at times I adopted an aggressive approach in order to probe a matter which was unavoidable, since information is not disclosed to outsiders when the state officials and citizens are engaged in extra-legal practises such as appropriating state resources or giving bribes. The respondents became used to the ways I asked questions, which were meant to explore an important event by narrating their own experiences. Moreover, issues of corruption, accountability and actual behaviour are quite openly discussed in the state institutions but in a more abstract way.

A major ethical issue was anonymity of key informants and the sharing of official documents. Matters of a sensitive nature—such as people revealing facts, inquiry reports and certain stories—have been documented with a

proviso of not naming the real persons involved. Some informants told me that they would not object if I mentioned their names. This reply was perhaps related to the fact that the most conspicuous events are widely known in the community and some get reported in the local newspapers. A senior officer informed me that the local press had levelled false allegations against him because he did not succumb to bureaucratic and political pressures: therefore it did not matter to him if his name was mentioned in my research.

Another ethical issue was dealing with the local community where tribal and political interests are mostly localised and the people of the community do not want to talk openly about them. This meant that I could not talk to people about what was happening in reality as compared to what was being conveyed through official language and bureaucratic responses. Observing social events and what was happening between members of the town committee, the *Nazim* and the community, I tried to remain neutral and to avoid siding with any particular community or official. In the case studies concerning primary education and waste management, I tried to talk about political connections and local practices in a positive manner so that the people with whom I had been working did not feel uneasy about what I had gathered from observations and through other research methods.

9. Conclusion

The most important aspect of my research was the development of an interface approach and deploying various research methods across the case studies. Most of the research evolved from the field, and I did not enforce a particular theme during my observations and interviews. The research was undertaken across different institutions involving state officials, citizens and non-state actors. I began my research with pre-decided questions, but amended them in eliciting responses in order to create a close fit between my research interests and the questions I was asking. The diversity, context and the nature of research enabled me to understand actual behaviour and administrative practices. An important aspect of the research was paying close attention to informal social norms and their significance from the perspectives of the officials were of paramount importance to delineate the delicate boundaries between official norms and actual practices. Interactions with local citizens highlighted how officials deal with local communities and how citizens cope with their own peculiarities of circumstance in trying to get access to public and collective services.

The sensitivity of the research demanded trust and developing close relationships with officials and others. I must emphasise that developing trust was a rather frustrating process: officials are always wary about their own practices and relationships. Dealing with different versions, official practices and differentiating between officials' informal norms was an extremely arduous and difficult task. Ethnographic research is by all means quite useful, but each individual has to reconcile it with his or her own personality and choose different options when dealing with complex realities and situations. Focus groups and triangulation were extremely useful, as they had the potential to contribute to my previous observations and analysis.

This research draws on the experiences and practices of state officials, and the social life of citizens who are marginalised in terms of their inability to exercise voice and face difficulties in getting access to social services. Moreover, the examination of politics and power are central attributes of

everyday practices, and negotiation and resistance is often not visible to the researcher. Partly, this is because of what has already been discussed among public officials and citizens in order to maintain the existing system and devise different social strategies for presenting their own experiences to the researcher. It is also the product of social relationships, norms, culture, affinity between the citizens, and the kinship ties which get revealed as one becomes immersed in and part of the community—which in my case was less problematic than for someone who is a total outsider.

Reflecting on my research experiences and the personal relationships that I developed with public and non-state actors, the data conveys the language of the people with whom I have shared personal experiences and developed relations of trust. I also encountered problems during data collection, especially in the case of primary education where I was seen as an intruder. However, I still enjoy good relations with my key informants and met most of them before returning to Bath in March 2010.

In this chapter, research questions were explored with a two-fold objectives. The first objective concerned understanding how administration was performed. The second objective was associated with knowing the modes of actual practices of state officials, points of view, relationships and experiences which characterise bureaucratic encounters with citizens and non-state actors across the three case studies. In the following chapter, I introduce the three case studies.

Chapter Five

Introduction to the Case Studies

1. Introduction

This chapter has two goals. The first is to discuss the three case studies, their objectives, and some key background issues on decentralised local governance narrated to me by state and non-state officials. The three case studies are: primary education, water supply and waste management. Primary education is a state-led intervention and deals with the provision of elementary education. Under the local government system, primary education is devolved to the district government, and water and sanitation is devolved to a sub-district tier known as the tehsil municipal administration. The case study of waste management concerns an external intervention designed by an international organisation and implemented by a local NGO. The three case studies present their objectives and processes in terms of what they intend to achieve, the involvement of different key actors, and how they are implemented in different geographical areas. In this chapter, I look essentially at the formal construction of education policy and development interventions, and do not infer anything about what happens in practice. The second goal of the chapter is to explain the rationale underpinning the choice of the three case studies, and their overall relevance to my research aims and objectives.

2. The case study of primary education

After the promulgation of the local government system in 2001, primary education is devolved to the district government. District government comprises district councils and district administration. The district council is headed by the district *Nazim* (Mayor), elected by union councillors⁵² in the tehsil. The district council is partially constituted by the union council *Nazims*,

⁵² The total number of seats in a union council is 21 (Khan, 2006). Abbottabad district is divided into two tehsils, namely Abbottabad and Havellian. According to government records, in Abbottabad tehsil there are 35 union councils, which means a total of 735 union councillors.

and the rest of the council is composed of women councillors, peasants and minorities. The role of the *Nazim* in the devolved district education department is limited.⁵³ The district administration comprises, among others, the district education department and officials of different ranks responsible for the provision of primary education.

Primary education is a national program. Under Pakistan's 1973 constitution, primary education is established as a provincial concern. However, education policy is still formulated at the federal level under the umbrella of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The preparation of the PRSP is based on a consultative process which involves, among others, state and non-state institutions, and the active participation of respective provincial governments in the policy-making process. The PRSP is considered to be of special importance, as the wider objectives of the document identifies a number of challenges in primary education, namely: a shortage of trained and qualified teachers, lack of a well-defined criterion for allocating funds to schools, teacher absenteeism, lack of accountability, and an absence of mechanisms which bridge the gap between policy conception and implementation (PRSP 2003, p.67). While these challenges are widely recognised, the objective of Education for All (EFA) lays emphasis on improving access and quality with respect to primary education in the country (ibid., p.68). In the Pakistan PRSP, EFA⁵⁴ is a ten-year plan (2001-2011) conceived as a "sustainable and well-

⁵³ In the local government elections held in 2001, district *Nazims* were able to assert their authority over the officials of district administration since there were no provincial assemblies/cabinets. Therefore, the role of provincial government in district administration was minimal. In the 2005 elections, the *Nazims* were unable to exercise their official authority, as provincial governments headed by political leaders had taken effective control of the provinces. Provincial ministers were constantly making changes in the rules of local government so that they could sideline the *Nazims* using their legislative authority, sometimes lawfully but also unlawfully. For example, in the garb of different notifications of various departments such as Establishment, Education, Health, etc., political leaders carved their role and overshadowed the authority of the *Nazim*. The induction of Members of Provincial Assemblies (MPAs) in District Public Safety Commissions and District Reconstruction Advisory Committees shows how provincial political leaders intervened in district administration (EDO finance and planning).

⁵⁴ Pakistan is a signatory to achieving the EFA goals and targets by the year 2015. The main policy sectors of EFA are: primary education, adult literacy, teachers' education, early childhood education, etc.

integrated framework linked to poverty reduction and development strategies” (PRSP 2003, chapter 4, p.69). EFA has been considered as critical to achieving poverty reduction and sustainable development (PRSP 2003, chapter 5, p.78). In addition to the above, the National Education Policy is based on the Education Structural Reforms (ESR) embedded in the PRSP document. The main thrust of ESR in each province and in each district of the country is to achieve the goals and targets of the education policy being implemented under the National Plan of Action (NPA). The main objectives of the NPA are:

- a) “To reach the disadvantaged population groups in rural and urban areas with emphasis on girls and women”
- b) “To promote community participation and ownership of basic education programs at the grassroots”
- c) “To improve relevance and quality of basic education through enhancing learning achievements of the children, youth and adults” (PRSP 2003, chapter 4, p.69)

When I arrived in Abbottabad district, my first task was to meet key officials of the district education department who were dealing directly with primary education. In 2009, after an initial round of interviews and in line with PRSP and national education policy (1998-2011), the district education department had prepared a ‘project digest’ commonly known as the Planning Commission Proforma (PC-1).⁵⁵ After acquiring this information, I came to know that the actualisation of the ‘project digest’ was reflected in the District Plan of Action (DPA). The DPA attempts to meet the challenges of primary education identified in the PRSP. Moreover, a special unit was established, termed the

⁵⁵ Planning Commission Proforma 1 (PC-1) is a detailed project document which provides information on project objectives, targets, monitoring mechanisms, detailed costs, implementation strategies and actions. The Proforma is developed by the district education department in order to receive funding for the attainment of EFA goals and its objectives in the district. This Proforma is not a public document and it was prepared back in 2001. The district education department did not have a copy of the document. I got a copy of it through my personal contact with a senior official in the district finance and planning office.

Education For All unit (EFA),⁵⁶ in district headquarters, which is supposed to perform certain functions such as overseeing, monitoring and taking the necessary steps in achieving policy prescriptions and goals in the district. When I met the focal person who knew about policy goals, she informed me that education policy in the district focuses on improving access to schools for children between ages 5 and 7 (especially for girls living in rural areas); reducing dropout; appointing teachers from a union council for specific schools falling within that union council; reducing qualification and age limits in areas where no qualified female teacher is available; and improving performance of existing schools by ensuring optimum utilisation of resources. One way of knowing how policy objectives in the district have been implemented was to approach the front-line managers.

2.1 Official functioning of primary education

The education policy is implemented by the district education department in rural and urban areas of the district. In the beginning, the organisational chart was not very useful, as I discovered from an official who advised me to meet officials rather than get facts and figures from official documents. After meeting several officials who were in charge of implementation, I came to know that the district education department is an institution which has a hierarchical administrative structure. The department is headed by an Executive District Officer (EDO). On the basis of formal interactions with senior officials, I came to understand that the formal functioning of primary education can be split into two domains, headquarters and the field. In the headquarters, the formal authority and decision-making rests with senior officials of the education department. The higher-ranked officials in the department are senior in grade and experience, and spend most of their time in the headquarters. It also appeared that senior officials undertake very few

⁵⁶ The EFA unit is officially mandated. However, its functioning is not formal, as the progress on goals and targets is usually discussed within the education department and not with other members of the forum. The monitoring of targets and goals is performed by the Assistant District Officers (male and female) and Mentor teachers. Mentor teachers have been assigned additional responsibilities which are to visit and monitor 3 to 4 schools close to the school where he/she teaches (District Education Officer-elementary and secondary).

visits to schools and there is also no strict criterion for visitation. Personal and coincidental encounters were also useful in coming to know other officials in the hierarchy and their functions. These officials were Assistant District Officers (ADOs) subordinate to Deputy District Officers (DDOs). The primary responsibilities of ADOs are monitoring, supervising and reporting on the performance of children and teachers⁵⁷ in their respective circles.⁵⁸ On the last Friday of each month, ADOs hold meetings with DDOs to discuss the overall progress of schools, teachers' performance in terms of their attendance in schools, and other matters relating to the formal functioning of schools. As encounters with bureaucracy continued, I thought that it would be a good idea to approach actors in the field.

The field is characterised as the actual service delivery unit. It includes both male and female schools situated in rural and urban areas. The male teachers teach in the male schools and the female in the female schools.⁵⁹ Primary school teachers are appointed by the head of the district education department on the basis of provincial government policy, which lays emphasis on merit and qualifications. The policy states that 75% of candidates be recruited from the union councils in rural areas, and 25% be hired on the basis of merit (ADO-female). The reason for this disproportionate percentage is to take into account illiteracy and inadequate educational facilities in rural areas. The policy is crafted to achieve two specific objectives. The first is related to encouraging competition among applicants, which means applicants appointed on merit are given preference for teaching in schools which fall in the urban areas.⁶⁰ The second one is supposed to minimise absenteeism in rural schools because the majority of the applicants are recruited from rural

⁵⁷ The teachers in public schools have a secondary school qualification which is equivalent to 'O'-levels, and a nine-month mandatory Primary Training Certificate (PTC).

⁵⁸ There are 20 circles in the district. The circles are divided into rural and urban union councils. Female schools in a circle are headed by a female ADO and male schools by a male ADO. In each circle, there are more than 50 schools (DDO female).

⁵⁹ During field visits to schools I came across only one mixed school.

⁶⁰ During interviews with male and female teachers, I came to know that most of them are living in urban areas, and that education facilities and better living conditions are the key factors in opting for urban schools.

union councils. For example, a teacher would be recruited from a union council in which he/she resides. Moreover, teachers are supposed to teach in a school for a period of three years.⁶¹

In the field, schools in urban and rural areas are divided into the following two categories:

- A) Government Girls Primary School (GGPS) Urban and Rural
- B) Government Boys Primary School (GBPS) Urban and Rural

The schools in urban areas (both male and female) are situated in rented houses, since the education department cannot afford to construct schools for children in urban areas. Based on my interactions with teachers, I was not surprised to learn about the issues affecting the quality of elementary education. Teachers in schools emphasised teacher absenteeism, the dearth of facilities in schools, and a high dropout rate particularly in the rural areas of the district. The education department had taken a number of steps to overcome these problems, the most significant of which include: identification and training of Mentor teachers, which is an internal arrangement for monitoring the performance of teachers, and the establishment of a Parent Teacher Council (PTC) in each school. In different interaction settings involving field-level bureaucrats and institutional managers, I was able to explore how officials interacted with citizens.

2.2 Official–citizen interactions

The interaction of education department with citizens is held through forums known as Parent Teacher Commissions (PTCs). These have been implemented by the provincial government which sought to formally institutionalise the interactions of teachers with the community, as well as promote civic engagement in overseeing the delivery of elementary education in each school. Civic engagement in the form of the PTC is considered a

⁶¹ According to the posting and transfer policy of the Provincial Government (2009, p.1) “the normal tenure of posting shall be three years subject to the condition for the officers/officials posted in unattractive areas, the tenure shall be two years, and for the hard areas the tenure shall be one year”.

highly effective way of exerting the citizen's voice on the quality of service. Moreover, the incorporation of societal actors in the PTC is supposed to hold the state officials accountable for their actions and to monitor teaching practices at the community level. In addition to the above, the constitution of the PTC at each school is meant to ensure transparency in the utilisation of state resources. The forum is constituted to resolve citizens' complaints pertaining to the quality of primary education, discourage child dropouts, ensure regular attendance of teachers, and to spend state resources on the needs and at the discretion of the PTC (PTC guide book 2007).

The official guidelines on the PTC refer to its constitution in each school. The PTC consists of eight members, including the head teacher (principal or headmistress), four elected members from the community, an influential person from the same community, a retired government official residing in the same locality, and a councillor from the respective gender belonging to the same locality where a school is situated (PTC 2007). The most important aspect of the constitution of a PTC is the election of chairman/chairperson by the members.

The process of interaction and the specific role of PTCs are pre-defined in the official documentation. Here I will briefly explain its salient features. As a primary step, a meeting between the head teacher who represents the school and the PTC is supposed to be held on a quarterly basis at least. Moreover, the head teacher is assigned the responsibility to formally schedule these meetings in the school. In a formal meeting, the head teacher informs the members of the PTC about the problems faced by the school, such as low attendance of children, inadequate strength of teachers, teacher absenteeism, missing facilities, etc. At the end of the meeting, a resolution is passed by the members of the PTC on those issues which are considered to be important, and which require immediate actions and policy decisions. The administrative procedure then is to put into concrete terms the decisions taken and agreed upon, with appropriate justifications by the members of the PTC. Citizen's involvement is meant to promote active participation in investigating, evaluating and making judgements on issues impeding the expected delivery

of elementary education and resources, and in taking corresponding remedial measures.

Before introducing the case study on water supply, the following section provides a brief description of the Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA). The reason for introducing the TMA is to enable the reader to understand the structure and functions of tehsil administration, how and why urban services such as water and sanitation had been restructured after the introduction of decentralisation reforms in 2001, and what changes have been made in their provision as a result.

3. Tehsil Municipal Administration

After independence in 1947, water supply and sanitation were provided by the provincial governments. In all four provinces of the country, the Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) was responsible for the management, operation, maintenance and supervision of both water supply and sanitation. After the establishment of local governments in 2001, the entire management operation and maintenance of these urban services is handed over to TMAs. The creation of tehsils in the district is conceived as a means to improve access to water by adopting certain measures such as decentralised decision-making in the delivery of urban services, as well as to improve efficiency and the capacity of this tier in managing access, and to promote equity in the distribution of resources. In Abbottabad district water is managed and provided by the TMA in the urban areas of the district, while the rural areas of the district manage the water supply through community-based infrastructure projects initiated by the government. At this point, a brief introduction to the political and administrative structures at the level of the TMA is essential in order to comprehend administrative and decision making linkages concerning the provision of urban services.

The TMA is composed of government officials and elected representatives known as tehsil⁶² councillors. The political structure of the tehsil⁶³ council

⁶² A tehsil comprises all the union councils formed in both urban and rural areas. A union council is made up of villages of different sizes and population (Chief Officer Nawansher).

embodies all union *Naib* (Deputy) '*Nazimeen*' (Mayors) of a *tehsil*, and an elected Tehsil *Nazim* and *Naib Tehsil Nazim*. The administration structure of the tehsil comprises the government officials working under the Tehsil *Nazim*. In Abbottabad district, the political head of the TMA is the Tehsil *Nazim* and the administrative head of the TMA is the Tehsil Municipal Officer (TMO). Having established this background, in the following sections I explain the case studies of water and refuse management.

4. The case study of domestic water supply

The research on drinking water supply was carried out in the urban union council of Nawansher. When I began my research, I gathered a lot of information from official documents. Before meeting other actors, I decided to concentrate first on the background to water supply in order to establish basic knowledge about the management and distribution of water supply to citizens. International agencies, including the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the German-owned development bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) have been involved in the design and implementation of the water supply system here. In Nawansher, a district water and sanitation unit collects a water tariff which is based on the actual consumption of water by households and is measured through water meters. This effort was facilitated by a grant from KfW which was instrumental in rehabilitating the local water supply infrastructure (IUCN Report 2009). Moreover, Nawansher also generates enough revenue to cover the operation and maintenance costs of the water supply; however, under the current institutional arrangement, only a small amount of revenue is allocated to the water sector. The reason for this is that excess revenue goes to the TMA, and therefore leaves insufficient funds for maintaining infrastructure in Nawansher.

As I used to frequently visit local residents of Nawansher, I became aware that several residents were complaining about access to water. These conversations highlighted community debates on questions concerning

⁶³ Here it is worth recalling that in Abbottabad district there are two tehsils: Abbottabad and Havelian. Furthermore, Abbottabad is a district as well as a tehsil.

distribution and management of the existing water supply by the town committee.

4.1 Town committee in Nawansher

The town committee was established in 1867-68 by the British, who introduced municipal services and appointed local staff to look after them (former *Nazim* of Nawansher). Despite the fact that water supply is now the responsibility of the TMA, the town committee in Nawansher retains its eminence, particularly since rural and urban services in the past have been run by elected committees similar to it. Both administrative and financial functions were also delegated to the members of these committees, which were headed by a chairman. Moreover, decision-making and local issues were resolved by the elected chairman as well as the rest of the members who elected him. For a long time, water management in Nawansher was based on the pre-eminence of locally elected people and their ability to manage the expectations of the local population, and therefore local people have had a close association with the town committee since its inception.⁶⁴ In 2001, though, the decentralisation reforms altered the structure, functioning and central role of the town committee.

After the creation of sub-district tiers, the town committee and its functions were transferred to the TMA. This further led to the absorption of local employees in the TMA. These employees were locals and have family and social relationships within the community of Nawansher. The town committee is now an institution with formal rules and consists of officials who perform different functions under the overall authority of the TMA. The direct control of the town committee by the TMA has restructured the authority and management functions of the town committee. Although the town committee works under the authority of TMA, it is now headed by a public official known as the Chief Officer (CO). As a frequent visitor to the town committee, I noticed that there are other technical and administrative officials working

⁶⁴ This was narrated to me by the cousin of the serving *Nazim* of Nawansher, who at the time was writing the history of Nawansher.

directly under the chief officer. Based on my several informal and formal meetings, I learned that their official functions and responsibilities are not laid out in any official record. In addition to the above, there are also no job descriptions or performance evaluation criteria for these posts. In fact, the LGO of 2001 outlines broad parameters under which the chief officer in the town committee provides urban municipal services including water and sanitation.

4.2 Management and operation of the water supply system

In Nawansher there are two main sources of water: a natural spring, and tube wells. The natural spring water has an underground source, the precise nature of which is unknown. There are different stories about this source, accepted by some and rejected by others, and due to this indeterminacy I have decided not to discuss them but to focus instead on the water distribution system and the key officials responsible for it. The natural spring water is stored near the three main pumping stations situated in the main city, walking distance from the office of the town committee. From these pumping stations, water is channelled through pipes into the main city overhead tank. The other source which provides water to local residents are tube wells constructed at different locations. They draw water from beneath the ground.

The officials of the town committee assume a central role in the management and operation of the water supply system. The senior technical supervisor is the most senior official in the town committee. Moreover, he is also responsible for the provision of drinking water supply to the households in Nawansher. Besides official assignments, his extensive dealings with international NGOs in the past have earned him a great deal of respect in the local community, with members of the town committee and amongst local political figures such as the *Nazim* and councillors.⁶⁵ The senior technical supervisor deals with all kinds of projects in Nawansher related to the construction of overhead water tanks, and the water distribution and supply

⁶⁵ Councillors are elected representatives consisting of different categories such as male/female peasants, farmers and minorities.

system. In case of a conflict over access to water and its management, the senior officials of the town community and the chief officer⁶⁶ summon him for explanation regarding the technical aspects of water supply and its distribution to the households. The senior officials in the main municipality also seek his guidance and rely on his information, expertise and local knowledge when a water supply project is implemented in Nawansher. Moreover, pipe fitters and pump operators also seek guidance and advice from the senior technical supervisor in situations when they have to provide explanations to the senior officials such as the TMO in the TMA and to the head of the town committee.

In the past, Nawansher has been a centre of attraction for donors, and a water supply system based on natural spring water was designed, financed and implemented by an international organisation⁶⁷ to improve access in terms of meeting the demands of the community (former *Nazim* of Nawansher). In the context of operation, water is stored near three pumping stations and channelled through underground pipes to the biggest reservoir.⁶⁸ The operation of the water supply involves two different crucial responsibilities which are simultaneously performed by the pump operator, namely pumping water from the underground source to the main water reservoir, and ensuring its release at predetermined timings. The management of the water supply is also based on two interrelated tasks, namely operating the pump and releasing water to different hamlets according to the system of zoning.⁶⁹ Operation further involves opening the valve at designated places, which blocks the water supply to certain hamlets and diverts it to others. It must be

⁶⁶ Nawansher is a non-tehsil urban headquarters unlike the other three union councils which fall directly within the jurisdiction of the tehsil administration. All those urban union councils which do not fall within the limits of headquarters are called units.

⁶⁷ According to the by-laws prepared by the GIZ Company, the water supply system and the provision of water was strictly meant for the residents of Nawansher, keeping in view their demands and future needs.


⁶⁸ The biggest overhead water reservoir is located at Lakpati *Choak*. Lakpati *Choak* is a junction which bisects old and new Nawansher.

⁶⁹ Zoning means that certain populations will receive water at certain times. Nawansher is divided into different zones according to the logic of water distribution, which is to ensure the water supply to different houses and colonies in old and new Nawansher.

noted that if the valve is not opened on time, the water will continue to flow to those hamlets which have already received water. In Nawansher, the functions of pump operator and valve operator are performed by the same person. When a pump is switched on, the pump operator travels a long distance to open the valve. During my informal interview with a pipe fitter, it came to my knowledge that the senior management in the town committee had sent written requests to the TMA, demanding an increase in the number of valve operators. However, the TMA declined these requests. One major reason for not fulfilling their demands, according to the pipe fitter, was that the TMA “is not willing to send additional staff because they would have to work according to the prevailing social and political logics of water supply in Nawansher”. During visits to the town committee, I met a person who told me that he was a meter reader who performs multiple tasks, including visiting each household to take a reading of the water meter; preparing and distributing water bills among households; and maintaining a record of revenue generated from water consumption.

Figure 2.

A SCHEMATIC VIEW OF OLD AND NEW NAWANSHER



5. The case study of waste management

The problem of refuse collection is a major challenge for the sanitation staff of the town committee. Walking through certain hamlets, heaps of solid waste in the main streets and in the water channels creates an unpleasant situation for local residents. This presents a complex reality, in which people's cultural habits in terms of their waste disposal practices indicate a lack of concern for public sanitation. Many residents told me that the cultural habit of the local community is to keep their houses clean and dump refuse at places where it is convenient for them. This narrative became evident as I walked through a street with the objective of observing how people dump their refuse. After walking through several houses, I saw a lady who came out of her house and dumped domestic waste in an empty plot beside her house. This incident also affirmed that dumping of refuse in designated places called the 'secondary collection points'⁷⁰ was rarely practiced by the residents. Some residents would take their refuse and dump it in the designated points, but as I witnessed, in most cases people used open spaces. People walking through the locality have to pass by various illegal and inappropriate sites where refuse has been dumped. Children playing near these sites is another everyday observation.

The improper disposal of refuse raises questions about the existing institutional arrangements for collection and removal of waste. The existing facilities, such as wheel-barrows, spades and a tractor for transporting refuse, are rarely used. There is a disagreement between local citizens and officials over the use of existing facilities for the proper dumping of refuse. This disagreement is more obvious in the case of citizens living in new Nawansher.⁷¹ The citizens criticise the sanitation staff for not visiting their colonies and it is precisely for this reason that they dispose of their waste in open plots. The officials narrate that they face two critical problems. The first is about the low number of officers, which makes their task of visiting the

⁷⁰ A four-walled structure of medium height used for dumping solid waste.

⁷¹ In my empirical chapter I explore why this disagreement is less obvious in the case of old Nawansher.

colonies of new Nawansher difficult. The other is about poor incentives to improve performance. Throughout the urban environment, the accumulation of plastic bags and waste lying close to the water channels is a major concern for those residents who were willing to accept an external intervention by exhibiting their willingness to contribute socially and economically to manage the problem of solid waste disposal in their colonies. This is documented in the report of the international organisation International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in introducing Environmental Fiscal Reforms⁷² (EFR) to deal with the problem of ineffective refuse management in Nawansher.

5.1 Brief introduction to IUCN and LokParya

The IUCN was created in 1948 after bringing together 82 states, over 850 NGOs, around 10,000 scientists and experts from over 180 countries to encourage societies in conserving nature (Pakistan Environmental Programme, Ministry of Environment⁷³). IUCN is the world's largest environmental knowledge network, credited with implementing national conservation and biodiversity projects in over 75 countries (ibid). The areas in which IUCN specialises are: environmental assessment, awareness raising, education, policy making, capacity building, and technical support in the development of environmental conservation strategies (EFR progress report 2009). Prior to the implementation of the refuse management project, the Project Steering Committee (PSC) conducted extensive research and held several meetings with district officials, the community and professional experts with a view to seek technical input on design and implementation of a pilot project to improve the existing sanitation system and its management.

IUCN subcontracted its project activities to the local NGO LokParya. LokParya works in Pakistan on solid waste projects and has a high reputation of

⁷² The EFR study was a broader initiative of IUCN and its development partners in Abbottabad district. The refuse management project was first implemented in Nawansher on a pilot basis.

⁷³ This information is drawn from a brochure named 'Pakistan Environment Programme', which does not mention the year of publication.

engaging local communities and officials in the management and disposal of solid waste through training, advocacy, community awareness and building the local capacity of residents and state officials in refuse collection and its disposal (team leader, LokParya). The project model which the NGO followed was based on the introduction of fiscal reforms in households to improve the capacity of local residents in generating sufficient income to employ people locally for collecting solid waste. The project was designed in view of the existing problems in the management of refuse in Nawansher, which was not generating sufficient income.

5.2 EFR goals and strategies

The driving agenda behind the IUCN refuse management project was to reduce poverty through Environmental Fiscal Reforms (EFR). In 2009, with the financial assistance of the Swiss Development Corporation (SDC), IUCN designed a pilot project on refuse management in Nawansher (IUCN Report 2009, p.1). IUCN conducted detailed research, engaging local officials, influential personalities and other international consultants to explore the possibilities of introducing EFR, which involved the following key goals and strategies for intervention:

- i. Introduction of user fee, taxes and incentives for garbage collectors;
- ii. Making the TMA accountable as a result of community mobilisation in refuse selling/collection.
- iii. Extension of support to TMA sanitary staff in effective collection and disposal of solid waste; and
- iv. Income generation from selling solid waste to pro-poor initiatives, thus creating employment.

The project was implemented by LokParya in October 2009 and ended in December 2009. Before the implementation of the project, LokParya designed a comprehensive questionnaire to acquire information on communities and households' knowledge of solid waste and disposal practices. The team

leader of LokParya, assisted by female staff, initiated the survey which was known as the Community Attitudes and Practices (CAP) survey. The objectives of the survey were three-fold. The first was to determine the number of residents in each household; the second was to calculate the average production of solid waste in the houses surveyed; and the third was to acquire information from the residents on their cultural habits in disposing solid waste. The survey was conducted in the month of September in old and new Nawansher, adopting a process of random sampling. The survey was not restricted to households but also included local shops. The results of the survey revealed that between 15 to 16 tons of solid waste was produced in Nawansher each day.⁷⁴ In addition to acquiring information on the quantum of refuse, the NGO was able to explore the cultural habits and practices of the local community. The cultural habits indicated the dumping of solid waste by the local residents outside their homes which was then collected by the sanitation staff the following morning. The NGO also perceived certain problems in the management of solid waste when circulating the questionnaire and conducting the survey. These problems were related to the lack of proper dumping points in old and new Nawansher, insufficient sanitation staff to collect solid waste from the entire population of Nawansher, and the lack of awareness among the local residents about the environmental hazards of solid waste. All these problems became part of project activities.

6. Rationale and context

This section engages with the rationale of selecting the three case studies. In so doing, I have adopted Harry Blair's (2010, p.3) framework which sets out three different routes to accountability in the delivery of public services to people. The routes to accountability⁷⁵ are as follows:

⁷⁴ The results were based on the CAP survey.

⁷⁵ I am aware that routes to accountability are a construct and not a reality, but for my purpose they provide a useful framework in explaining the context of the case studies.

(i) Long route to accountability

The long route to accountability presented by Blair shows how citizens develop linkages with political leaders in order to secure benefits and access to public and collective services across wider constituencies. In the long route, citizens acting as principals initiate their needs through elections of political leaders who, acting as agents, promise certain benefits mostly through public policies. Public policies are then implemented through 'compacts'⁷⁶ by the bureaucracy. This is the case in advanced countries where political leaders are elected, and if they fail to deliver the citizens hold them accountable by voting them out of office (Blair 2010, p.3). Another dimension of the long route to accountability, according to Blair, is the lack of access to essential information on policy and the mechanism of utilisation of state resources in schools.

(ii) Short route to accountability

The short route, which Blair also terms the direct route to accountability, enables citizens to avoid the long route by directly dealing with service providers. Blair (2010, p.4) further suggests that there are two short routes, characterised as 'choice' and 'voice'. The 'choice' route is associated with the use of 'client power', when citizens are able to hold service providers directly accountable for their performance. The 'voice' route serves as a platform through which citizens are directly involved in state decision making.

(iii) Middle route to accountability

Blair (2010, p.5) argues that, between the long and short routes, civil society can be considered a middle route to accountability. Blair further asserts that civil society is different from the short route primarily in that it can operate independently without acquiring support from the state. However, Blair mentions that civil society depends on the assent of the state to operate. Moreover, civil society does not belong to the state–citizen relationship in a

⁷⁶ A compact is defined by the World Bank as a "long-term relationship of accountability connecting policy makers to organisational providers" (World Bank Report 2004, p.48).

formalised sense. It is distinguished from the long route because of its ability to focus on specific objectives as opposed to adhering to the broad agendas of political leaders as presented in their party declarations and manifestos.

To explore the relationships between officials and citizens, the three routes to accountability model helps in exploring the interconnections between the state and society and the interactions of officials with citizens at three different levels. In the case of primary education, there is a long route to accountability, one of elected leaders and state officials. The state bureaucracy takes advantage of the long route and provides bureaucrats with opportunities to develop different kinds of relationships with political leaders. Bureaucrats operate in a relationship framework based on patronage. The provision of education services promotes the personal agendas of political leaders as opposed to giving importance to rights and entitlements. Thus services rendered by officials are tilted towards the benefits they receive from politicians, and also tend to promote citizen's cooperation with service providers—for example, teachers and their informal relationships with parents in the community. In the implementation of education policy, local citizens interact with district officials who manipulate policy agendas and hide information from citizens. So in the case of education, the long route to accountability implies greater policy distance between citizens and political leaders.

In the case of water supply, there is a short route to accountability because citizens have direct dealings with a locally elected person—the *Nazim*. The *Nazim* is known to the people in their community because of his position and personality. Moreover, increased social proximity to public officials enables citizens to raise their concerns through voice over issues of access. In case they are unable to use 'client power', the *Nazim* uses his political authority by mediating between citizens and service providers. The short route to accountability is more direct when citizens attempt to get access to urban services by approaching the *Nazim* and when these services have to be delivered effectively. Local citizens have extensive knowledge of the practices of local officials since they share the same social space and their interactions

with *Nazim* are rooted in their own local customs and norms. They also know that they can rely on the social position of the *Nazim* in case of dissatisfaction with the performance of officials. The short route to accountability allows us to understand access. Moreover, the short route to accountability has a distinct advantage in observing how an access situation produces different kinds of power relationships between a political leader and officials with respect to the administrative practices of local citizens in getting access to water.

The case of refuse management was not originally planned. One reason for choosing this study was that it coincided with my research in Nawansher on water supply. The most important reason was to describe the social exchanges and complex relationships between local actors and an NGO involved in the area of urban sanitation by concentrating on their concerns, modes of expression and interactions. The case study is a useful one to document how an external intervention fails to take into account deeply entrenched management and local customary practices of sanitation staff.

7. Conclusion

Education Structural Reforms and the long-term goals and targets of education policy are envisaged to improve elementary education and are considered to be the key determining factors in alleviating poverty in the long run. The policy targets and key initiatives of the district education department attempt to improve both access to and the quality of primary education. The establishment of parent teachers' councils is an evolutionary step to ensure civic engagement at the level of service delivery, with increased funding, community participation and oversight. The case study of water supply by the town committee shows a complex system concerning an urban resource which represents how access to water is managed and operated by the town committee. Moreover, the town committee is directly responsible for meeting the expectations of citizens in terms of ensuring access to water. The waste management case is an international effort to improve the management practices of sanitation staff through specific project activities. The external intervention justifies itself based on the existing inadequacies in the disposal of solid waste, its impact on the environment and how they can be effectively tackled through different localised strategies. The wider rationale emphasises that there are three different routes to accountability and further engages with the structural dynamics of civic and official interactions across the three different case studies.

At different levels, the case studies demonstrate how bureaucracies, grassroots associations and international NGOs interact in the delivery of public and collective services. The case studies of water supply and refuse management present two distinct common grounds. The first one relates to the study of social interactions and the structure of negotiations encompassing a local political elite, public officials and non-state entities in the same locality. The second one pertains to personal relationships and administrative practices in an urban locale. The empirical examination of water supply and refuse management presented in the following chapter focuses on the aforesaid common grounds, encompassing social interactions highlighting the significance of kinship connections and moral attachments. The empirical

examination of education presented in chapter seven will enable the reader to observe, beyond the urban locale, the wider connections between informal social norms, personal connections and actors' interests, and gain a deeper understanding of different sets of relationships and administrative practices.

Chapter Six

Social and Administrative Practice: The Significance of Personal Relationships

1. Introduction

This chapter will demonstrate how formal access to water is undermined by institutional practices, kinship ties and social relationships. This chapter further engages with the examination of complex social relationships, compromises and resistance surrounding the management of refuse involving state officials and a non-state entity. In the case of water supply I have concentrated on how access is provided to local citizens, as it involves inclusion and exclusion. Instead of focusing on financial constraints and other technical problems in the management of and access to water supply, I have focused on the administrative practices and the interactions of citizens with officials in dealing with citizens' complaints, and how they are resolved. Access to drinking water supply therefore illustrates the concepts and theoretical debates on access advanced by Schaffer and Wen-hsien (1975) and Schaffer and Lamb (1974). According to Schaffer and Wen-hsien (1975), the actual experience of access and distribution exhibits personal loyalties and the sort of tactics to which dissatisfied applicants resort.

In the case of refuse management, I pay attention to the institutional practices of sanitation staff, and discuss the reasons why the project could not achieve its intended objectives. The analysis of an external intervention presents a classical case in which refuse management becomes an arena for officials and others to sidetrack project objectives through different social and political strategies. In addition to the above, this chapter aims to understand the role of the *Nazim*,⁷⁷ his dealings and interactions with the local community and with the officials of the town committee.

⁷⁷ Since only a brief introduction to the role of *Nazim* is provided in chapter five, here it is therefore important to engage with his role in more depth.

2. Access

Access to water supply is the responsibility of the town committee and the technical staff who deal with its management and distribution. Up until 2006, citizens of Nawansher apparently had access to sufficient water, or at least did not complain about issues of access to it. When I began research in 2009, I learned that local residents of old Nawansher face difficulties in gaining access to water, and this also causes problems for the town committee. Local residents perceive that access is related to the scarcity of water which is used by the town committee to favour certain segments. Moreover, when they register their concerns and complaints they are often not addressed in an impartial way. The local community also blame the pump operators for not fulfilling their responsibilities. The town committee meanwhile has its own logic and accuses the community of illegal appropriation, while also citing lack of rainfall, financial constraints and an increase in population which has widened the gap between demand and supply. There are diverse actors in the provision of water, and they all contribute to the social construction of how and under what circumstances access to water is undermined by institutional practices and personal connections. Despite the presence of a town committee and the fact that the water supply system is managed locally, the problems of access became aggravated when residents of the hamlets⁷⁸ *Shoaib Zai*, *Musa Zai*, *New Muhala* (New Hamlet) and *Khalil Zai* in old Nawansher⁷⁹ did not receive water, due to the loop system discussed below.

2.1 The loop system

The problem of access to water partly reflects the design of the distribution system, in which water flows in a loop. This makes access for certain hamlets easy, and for others problematic. Here I attempt to describe the way the actual system of distribution benefits certain residents, and the sharp reaction by


⁷⁸ Hamlets consist of houses (between 150 to 350) and each hamlet in old Nawansher is named after the sub-castes of *Jadoons*.

⁷⁹ A schematic illustration of the loop system is provided on p. 150 to get a better understanding of the areas served by the system.

those who are deprived. The water from the biggest reservoir is released to residents of new and old Nawansher. When the water from the main source/tube is released, it flows towards the end and then takes a U-turn towards those houses which fall within hamlets *Shoaib Zai*, *Musa Zai*, *New Muhala* and *Khalil Zai*. When water is released, the residents residing along the side of old and new Nawansher receive water in a straight line without any detours. The water is consumed by these residents for domestic and non-domestic purposes since the system of distribution enables them to get access conveniently and more expediently. After meeting the domestic and non-domestic needs of those residents, the water flows towards the rural union council Damtour, and also to those areas which do not fall within the urban limits of Nawansher. The residents of Damtour and others take advantage of the distribution system before the water is diverted to hamlets *Shoaib Zai*, *Musa Zai*, *New Muhala* and *Khalil Zai*.⁸⁰ An obvious disadvantage faced by the aforementioned hamlets in securing access is that they are situated on a slope.

⁸⁰ In old Nawansher, people living in different hamlets locally known as *khallils* have retained their ancestral names.

Figure 3.



Access to water supply had been a persistent problem and complaints relating to accessing water by the local residents were in fact happening routinely. In a series of complaints about pump operators, I observed a particularly relevant meeting between residents and officials of the town committee. The residents of hamlets *Shoaib Zai* and *Musa Zai* collectively lodged a complaint to the officials dealing with water distribution about the negligence and callous attitude of the pump operator, who fell asleep during the night and caused a major conflict between them and officials dealing with water. These residents were assured by the town committee that they would be provided water despite their peculiar situation. The conflict further escalated when these residents made reference to repeated complaints. During the conflict over the distribution of water, I heard from one resident that he was receiving water for only a few hours during the day. The same resident mentioned that access to water is also provided to those who are not legally entitled.⁸¹ Speaking on behalf of other residents, a vocal resident residing in the hamlet of *Shoaib Zai* said that they had been facing water crises for the past two years, and everyone in the town committee knew how they had spent their last summer in the severe heat.⁸²

The Chief Officer (CO) tried to pacify the disgruntled residents by saying that officials provide services to all local residents. He further mentioned that the pump operators are locals, and the officials are concerned when they do not provide water to their own people. One resident asked the chief officer and the senior technical advisor to take immediate action against the pump operator. The chief officer assured the residents that he would take disciplinary action against the pump operator.⁸³ Since the affected residents knew about the

⁸¹ According to the by-laws of town committee, water is meant for the local residents. However, it is also provided to commercial institutions such as a medical college. This observation was ignored by the chief officer and the matter was not pursued further.

⁸² In summer, domestic consumption of water for drinking increases, and people also frequently take showers as most do not have air-conditioning in their homes.

⁸³ The chief officer was recently posted in Nawansher and did not belong to the same community. He was least aware about the complaints levelled against pump operators. The chief officer, for the most part of the day, is preoccupied with official duties such as record keeping, checking the staff register, hearing complaints by citizens and making short field visits.

protracted problem of access, they asked the CO why the town committee had not considered putting a valve at Ghari Pana⁸⁴ which would divert the water towards them instead of flowing out of Nawansher. The CO was unable to provide a convincing answer. Instead, he and other officials responded by referring to technical problems. These excuses were rejected by the residents, who were not convinced by their reasoning.

After hearing these complex debates relating to the problem of access, at a later stage I talked to the residents of *Shoaib Zai* and *Musa Zai* to learn the story behind the loop system. These residents held the *ex-Nazim* of Nawansher responsible for the difficulties they faced. The following statements illustrate their concerns: “we have told the *ex-Nazim* that you have betrayed us and we are not going to vote for you in future” (Resident). Another resident said, “the problem that we are facing today is because of the *ex-Nazim*”. The problem of access was linked to the social and political dynamics behind the construction of the loop system.

2.2 Social and political dynamics

The approach adopted in this section is based on two hypotheses. First, infrastructure projects provide opportunities for local political elites to benefit from these projects. Second, these elites extend favours to those who have close association with them viewed in terms of kinship ties and social relationships. Thus, social and political dynamics promote personal as well as other political interests. Viewed from this perspective, therefore, access to water and its distribution is not just a matter of public concern, but also relates to private interests. The construction of the loop system privileged those politically affiliated with the *ex-Nazim*, i.e. the Nawaz Sharif group (a sub-division of mainstream political party the Muslim League), and his primordial ties with the people of Damtour. In Nawansher, primordial loyalties are part and parcel of the community and people frequently make reference to these loyalties in terms of social expectations and obligations from their leaders, both in the past and in the present. Moreover, the *ex-Nazim* was the chairman

⁸⁴ This place delineates the boundary between Nawansher and rural areas around it.

of the town committee,⁸⁵ and since he enjoyed considerable support among other members of the committee, he constructed the loop system and provided access to allied people of rural areas who lacked access to water.

The loop system also served the private interests of the *ex-Nazim*. Across the boundary of Nawansher there is a poultry farm which belongs to him. To run the poultry farm water was an essential commodity, and without it the *Nazim* would not have been able to promote his private interest. Moreover, the loop system also stretched the political constituency beyond Nawansher and raised his public profile among those who benefited from the construction of the new system. The senior technical advisor informed me that social and political relationships played a key role at the time when the loop system was implemented by the Germans in 1998. As a consequence, the loop system enabled the *ex-Nazim* to build a large clientele based on kinship ties and facilitated by the members of town committee.

At this stage, it is important to mention how the *ex-Nazim* was defeated by the current *Nazim* in the elections of 2005.⁸⁶ The *ex-Nazim* belonged to the sub-caste of *Imran Zai* and the incumbent *Nazim*⁸⁷ belonged to the sub-caste of *Muhammad Zai*. The local government election of 2005 was actually an election between two competing patrons who belonged to the tribe of *Jadoons* but had different casts (tribal lineages). The *ex-Nazim* lost the election to the incumbent *Nazim* who was voted into office by people of his own caste and family members residing in New *Muhala* (New Hamlet). As a result, the kinship ties of the *Nazim* with his own caste reinforced social cohesion and

⁸⁵ Prior to the introduction of the local government system in 2001, the town committee was headed by the *ex-Nazim*.

⁸⁶ The elections were conducted prior to my research, and officials and residents cite different reasons for the defeat. The key reason which directly contributed to the loss of the *ex-Nazim* was the splitting of votes within the tribe of *Jadoons*. The other reason is the additional votes casted in the favour of the *Nazim* elected in 2005 by the *Awan* tribe living in old Nawansher.

⁸⁷ From this point onwards, I use '*Nazim*' to avoid repeating the word 'incumbent' in the remaining sections of this chapter.

strengthened the social position of the *Nazim* within his own *Biradari*.⁸⁸ Here I would revert back to the conflict between the residents who were affected by the loop system. It was interesting to observe that during the conflict, the *Nazim* entered the office where the entire social event was unfolding. After a prolonged debate between the *Nazim*, the chief officer and the unhappy citizens, the *Nazim* told the chief officer that he would talk to the pump operator and tell him to perform his duty, and that the overhead tank which was under construction would soon be made operational to meet water crises. The *Nazim* was aware of the local practices of pump operators who used to leave the pumping stations unattended during official hours. Moreover, the *Nazim* reassured the affected citizens that they would be provided access from an additional source of water.

3. The politics of access

In this section, I discuss the politics of access by examining the role of *Nazim* in the operationalisation of a water supply project known as the National Urban Development Project (NUDP). This project was an additional source of securing access to water by the residents of *Shoaib Zai*, *Musa Zai*, *New Muhala* and *Khalil Zai* (ATO water and sanitation). The project was awarded to a private contractor, and entailed the construction of an overhead tank and the installation of a tube well at the source of water. After its completion, the management and operational functions of the project were to be transferred to the town committee. These were the formal procedural activities in the implementation of the project. While I was out in the field, I encountered a different reality. The *Nazim* called the private contractor to install the water pump at the source of water. To assist the private contractor, the *Nazim* also called the senior technical advisor and pipe fitters to lay the pipes overnight, and connect them to the water pump.

⁸⁸ I use the terms *Biradari* and tribe interchangeably in order to inform the reader that the term *Biradari* is used in the context of kinship ties based on family lineage among the tribe such as *Jadoons*.

The aforesaid activities and the strategy deployed by the *Nazim* were in contravention of the contractual agreement of the NUDP. To make the project operational, the formal bureaucratic procedures did not matter. Under the project agreement, unless a project is completed and a completion certificate is granted by the provincial government/TMA, the town committee cannot formally take over the management of the project. The project was still underway when the *Nazim* put pressure on the water supply staff. The most interesting and surprising fact was that the *Nazim* used the project for the residents who were associated with his own *Biradari* and his followers at the cost of hamlets *Khalil Zai* and *Musa Zai*.⁸⁹ Schaffer and Wen-hsien (1975, p.21) emphasise that “different access can actually produce different politics ... for example the establishment of system of distribution can be intended or appear to provide access for some who would otherwise be excluded”. Schaffer and Wen-hsien have developed an original approach to study access but do not pay attention to the pressures on officials in the field which give rise to illicit transactions, fears and conflict of interests.

The *Nazim* enjoyed immense power over the water staff and they were under insurmountable pressure to negotiate a bribe. Electrical wires were needed for the transformer so that electricity could be provided to the water pump in order to discharge water. The cost of wires in the market was Rs 2,000 per feet, which was a costly option. The *Nazim* approached the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA)⁹⁰ but they informed him that they did not have the wires. The *Nazim* either had to wait, or get the wires from the market. Afterwards, it transpired that WAPDA was playing a tactical game of trying to get a bribe from the town committee. The *Nazim* instructed the supervisor to get the wires from the WAPDA as someone inside the institution was asking for money. The institution had the wiring, which had been stolen from the store, and someone inside the institution sold it to them privately. When the

⁸⁹ Residents of these hamlets voted for the ex-*Nazim* in the 2001 elections, and they basically formed and served the constituency of the ex-*Nazim*. He must have also received votes from other hamlets. However, while conducting research, I focused on the problem of access.

⁹⁰ Electrical wires are usually provided by the state institution WAPDA, which undertakes projects relating to the construction of dams and small water supply schemes.

technical supervisor and his aid (pipe fitter) decided to leave, I offered them a lift since they had no transport. The *Nazim* told me to stay behind because he feared that my presence would be a hindrance for them in negotiating the price for the wire. I told the *Nazim* that I would wait in the car and let the water staff deal with the transaction.⁹¹ The *Nazim* agreed and we drove to the office of WAPDA.

When we reached our destination, I waited in the car and the technical supervisor and his aid went inside the office. After a short while, they came back and we drove back to the construction site. On our way, I asked them rather casually whether they had been successful in getting the wires. The technical supervisor informed me that officials of WAPDA were asking for Rs 9,000, but that they had offered them Rs. 5,000 which was accepted.

The *Nazim* wanted the interests of his own family and followers to be promoted at all costs, which involved extra-legal practices and ensuring the compliance of water supply officials to execute the project. As narrated to me by one official, the *Nazim* only cared about his own people in accessing water, and was less concerned if certain people were excluded. In addition to the above, during my informal discussion with water supply staff, I was informed that they had executed the project, but that when the town committee receives the bill for using the electricity, they will be unable to pay.

The operationalisation of the NUDP project by the *Nazim* and water supply staff also triggered a concern among the water supply staff. They feared an audit inquiry from the main municipality and provincial government concerning their unofficial practices. The technical staff had to protect their jobs as they feared that, if an organisational inquiry into the operation of the water supply project took place, they would be implicated for violating the project agreement and official norms. Moreover, the senior technical supervisor termed the entire situation an *attab* (curse) on him and his aides. The following views highlight how officials respond to pressures:

⁹¹ I was fully aware of the research ethics involved in pursuing this type of research. However, the technical supervisor and his aid had to get the wires with or without me.

“On a daily basis, I face a lot of pressures while performing official and routine tasks. They come from the *Nazim*, community, and from my immediate boss [chief officer unit]. In case of a conflict between chief officer and the *Nazim*, I advise the former to manage the conflict through negotiations so that we are able to perform our duties properly. In implementing the project, the chief officer was aware of what we were doing on site. He has kept himself out because he did not want get involved in politics”. (Water technician and pipe fitter)

In the water supply project, the *Nazim* is rarely described as ‘corrupt’. Instead, he is often described as acting ‘justly’ or ‘rightly’. This raises the question of examining the nature of moral relationships.

3.1 Analysis of moral relationships

The project was executed by the senior technical supervisor and his primary aids. The officials were constrained to obey the instructions of the *Nazim* because the *Nazim* has 12,000 people behind him, and he instructed the officials to do what the community demanded (pipe fitter). The water supply staff were caught between the political interests of the *Nazim* and the bureaucratic norms underpinning their official duties. For instance, the *Nazim* articulated his interests in terms of relationships and necessity. In the execution of the project, the role of the *Nazim* clearly revealed his political aim of securing the loyalty of his voters and family. The technical staff’s bureaucratic procedures and standardised rules could not have made any difference in challenging the rationality of the *Nazim*. Bureaucratic rationality was equally problematic due to social and kinship relationships, and rational accountability was dependent on actors’ formal responsibilities. In reality, officials had to respond to the demands of the community, driven by its moral relationships with the *Nazim*. The *Nazim* was an elected person who made promises during an election campaign, and after getting elected with a huge mandate he did not assign importance to the local institution (senior technical

supervisor). This became apparent when the *Nazim* expressed his actions and ambitions in the following words:

“I represent the people and I am their spokesperson. The people in the town committee are government servants. They are paid by the government to perform their responsibilities. In case they fail to meet the expectations of the community, it is my responsibility to monitor them and even ‘force the officials’. People know that there is no scarcity of water, rather the problem lies with the pump operators who are not performing their responsibilities. In the past, I have taken action against pump operators who were found sleeping on duty”.

The above observations were made to describe how people of Nawansher perceive the working of officials in rendering services. It must be noted that *Nazim* exercised de facto control over pump operators. The *Nazim* was aware of their actual practices such as leaving the pumping stations unattended and running local tea shops during working hours. The pump operators were locals and they were often monitored by the *Nazim*. The chief officer of the town committee seldom visited the pumping station, and when faced with no water the community relied on the *Nazim*’s intervention to manage access. Moreover, the technical staff dealing with water only intervened in the case of serious problems such as pipe leakages, and when they had the budget to do so. Therefore, the formal reliance of citizens on the officials on the town committee was relatively less, and more focussed on the *Nazim* because of ‘political understanding’.

The *Nazim* belonged to the local community, in which kinship ties play a key role in fulfilling the social expectations of the people. Moreover, for the *Nazim*, this was a matter of honour as he did not want to compromise his own reputation of being a strong man who sticks to his promises. The above illustration, highlighting the involvement of the *Nazim* in administration, clearly demonstrates that local governance is dominated by differences in power relations based on politics and imbued with moral arguments. In an

ethnographic study conducted in a district of Punjab, Nadeem (2009, p.1005) argues in a similar context that “beneath the surface, *Nazim* largely benefit the members of their own *biradari* and people who would vote for him”. The *Nazim* was only interested in providing access for his own people, and can be characterised as being situated within a milieu of moral relationships. In the *Nazim*’s view, the interests of his political/personal clients were more important than following official norms and formal processes of service provision. As pointed out by Blundo and Le Meur (2009), personal acquaintances, kinship relationships, informal rules and family ties are above the ‘bureaucratic universe’ which is based on formal rules and procedures. It must be acknowledged that the traditions of moral obligations and kinship ties are deeply entrenched in Nawansher. As a consequence, officials of the town committee are always aware of the priorities of the *Nazim*. In fact, there was a general understanding among the officials based on their past experience and dealings that they had to take into account the kinship ties and social relationships of the *Nazim*.

4. Unwarranted intrusion of relationships in administration

In this section, I attempt to discuss the problems faced by officials in dealing with citizens’ complaints in securing access to water through formal channels. When the water supply system was initially designed in 1996, water was in abundance and met the daily requirements of the community. The increase in population since 1998 has contributed to the problems of access as experienced by the citizens of Nawansher. When I was walking through the hamlet of *Khalil Zai*, people gathered around me and narrated their problems in getting access to water. For instance, many residents felt that their complaints had not been dealt with by the town committee despite making several visits. A resident who was a teacher stated that, “I teach in the morning and when I return home, there is no water. The water staff is least bothered about my situation”. In the same hamlet,⁹² some residents informed

⁹² I visited this hamlet in particular since it continuously faced a shortage of water. In other hamlets, people had their own water pumps privately installed inside their homes. It seemed that they were less dependent on the official provision of water.

me that they had to walk for more than two hours to get water. These random and personal encounters with citizens showed that their complaints were either ignored or not effectively dealt with. This led me to examine the processes of treating complaints.

There is a complaint register which is kept in the office of the town committee. The formal process is that each complaint is allocated a number. For example, people will either call to register their complaint or visit the town committee in person. These complaints are supposed to be addressed by a simple rule, i.e. on a first-come-first-served basis, by a local administrator. The formal system of treating complaints follows a professionally driven system of service provision and does not consider relationships and the structural constraints of bureaucrats when dealing with citizens. In reality, however, the system was heavily politicised. In treating complaints, the administrator would receive phone calls from the *Nazim* and other political personalities such as union councillors,⁹³ telling him and the water supply staff, for example, to immediately repair a pipe which was a major concern for their relatives in terms of securing access to water. People could not exercise 'voice' (Hirschman 1970) because they were politically well connected. This means that people move out from an impartial, rational administrative system to a system which functions along lines of personal loyalty and association. On the other hand, certain people resorted to 'exit' option (Ibid.) by not participating in or relying on the formal system (see footnote 94).

The formal system was not workable in practice because political relationships and loyalties had permeated into the formal system and official practices. These relationships and personal loyalties are embedded in the society; however, they are invoked by certain personalities when they expect exceptional treatment. Therefore, the professionally devised system of treating complaints is circumvented by local political elites who attain powerful positions.

⁹³ Councillors "constitute the electoral college for the election of *Nazim* and deputy *Nazim*" (Khan 2000). Councillors are divided into different categories such as peasants, farmers etc.

Officials informed me that treating complaints in a systemic manner would have conveyed a message to political elites that their relatives were denied preferential treatment in favour of formal institutional practices. This would be considered by political leaders as a different form of interference. This kind of interference would have adverse consequences for the officials and citizens alike. As one informant put it, “if we follow formal administrative practices by treating complaints in an orderly fashion, the *Nazim* and councillors will complain to the chief officer about our performance in negative terms” (Pipe fitter). When official rules are followed, political elites develop an egoistic approach towards an official by resorting to ‘dirty politics’. Numerous false accusations would be levelled against the officer, *inter alia* that the officer is not performing official duties and has been spotted in the city during office hours. These accusations are communicated to senior officials such as the chief officer and the Tehsil Municipal Officer (TMO). To avoid such negative assessments, water supply staff are forced to be compliant. The only option is to extend preferential treatment to political elites, although this is not done willingly. But by doing this, they attract negative judgments from other members of society. The administrative practice and performance of these officials is therefore directly linked to the assessment of political relations.

5. Appropriation and intermediation

One day, I visited the office of the town committee to get some documents on the water supply scheme in Nawansher. After I arrived at the town committee, I went to the office of the officer who dealt with water connections, complaints, record keeping and inquiries. During our discussion, three people walked into the office. Among the three, one was an old man. Two persons sat next to me and the old person sat opposite me. The persons sitting on my right knew each other: they were talking to each other and it appeared that they had some official business in the office as I saw an application in the hands of one of them. I was not expecting that what would transpire afterwards would be a dispute between an old man and the other persons.

Dispute between an old man and two persons

The dispute involved five people. An old man and two other persons, one of whom was an applicant who had come to get a water connection, and the other who was accompanying the applicant. The other two persons involved were an officer and a pipe fitter. The old man and the other two persons belonged to the same community and lived on the same street in one of the colonies located close to the famous and the oldest mosque in Nawansher, known as the Iliyasi Mosque.

The old man had lodged a complaint a day earlier, complaining that he was not getting water as he used to because a lot of people had been granted water connections. During the conversation which took place between the old man and the other two persons, the old man constantly reiterated and reemphasised that the water staff (referring specifically to the pipe fitter) had laid an additional pipe which had been connected to the main pipe from which he was receiving water. There are now 12 new households in his street, and the residents of these households had been granted water connections via the additional pipe line. From the perspective of the old man, the supply of water has been reduced, because previously he and some other residents had been receiving water from the main 12-inch pipe. When the additional pipe was laid, other residents had taken connections from the same pipe.

The old man was furious at the staff of the town committee and suspected that the pipe fitter had taken a bribe in granting additional water connections to other residents. When he uttered those words to the pipe fitter, the pipe fitter got very annoyed and angry. In a high-pitched tone, he started yelling at the old man that he had accused him of taking a bribe. The pipe fitter asked the old man to narrate his problem and stop accusing him of something which he had not done. The applicant told the official that the old man had came to complain against him and others for providing water connections. The person accompanying the applicant said that the old man was pumping water illegally, and that other people in his street were also following the same practice.

It was quite apparent that people had been able to get water connections from the additional pipe. The additional pipe was laid to provide water to other residents who then either made legal or illegal water connections to it. When more connections were granted from the additional pipe, the water was distributed and the old man could not get the same amount of water he used to.

During the conflict between the old man and the person accompanying the applicant, two issues became evident. The first was the informal appropriation of water. Under the rules, no one could get direct access to water from the main pipe line. Instead each household received water from a distributive system which is supposed to ensure even distribution of water to each household. As narrated by an official, informal appropriation means that people want to get direct access to the main pipe so that they have more water pressure, without realising that other people would thereby be affected. The second was the granting of additional water connections to the residents of Nawansher by the town committee after following official procedure.⁹⁴ However, the real problem of not getting water was being aggravated because of informal appropriation.

Citizens used strategies crafted according to social connections to appropriate water. This had become an accepted norm in the community. The informal appropriation of water involves different strategies. There were people who appropriated water by installing water pumps over the main water supply line. The pump sucks the water and lifts it to the overhead tank constructed in a house. When water is released to a particular community, the households below the house which illegally appropriates water either receive less than their due share or do not get water at all, depending on how many people are illegally appropriating water in the street. This particular strategy became apparent to me when I was accompanied by water supply staff during a visit to

⁹⁴ The official procedure/requirement for getting a water connection involves filing an application form, proof of identity, documents which proves the applicant's ownership of property, and a connection fee.

a hamlet. As we passed through many houses, we came across a local resident who greeted us and reported, “we have not been getting water for the past few days and I am appropriating water informally”.

The officials in the town committee are informed about these incidents but no formal action is taken. A resident pointed out that someone had informed the chief officer by identifying a person who was appropriating water informally. Instead of taking legal action against the person, the chief officer simply visited the house and requested that the dweller remove the pump. The same resident then further asked, “why has the official not disconnected the water connection of the resident?” As recounted from my interactions held with TMA officials and citizens, the chief officer could not disconnect the water connection because the resident would approach the *Nazim* and other influential personalities and would quickly get his connection restored. The formal authority of the chief officer is undermined by social relationships and the personalised management system that dominates and often results in informal appropriation of water. Moreover, the town committee is well aware of these practices, and when someone in the community reports these incidents, they are usually ignored or dealt with by the *Nazim*.

The chief officer is aware that these people belong to a community which has links to the *Nazim*, and therefore these practices are tolerated and dealt with through local community customs and traditions. On the other hand, those who had family and personal ties with the *Nazim* would use their relationships to avoid sanctions. The informal appropriation of water is a socially and culturally driven practice dominated by patrimonial and personalised relationships. The appropriation of water using water pumps was not the only social practice which caused major problems to the community in getting uninterrupted access to water. There were other social practices which created problems for the town committee when they visited houses to get meter readings:

“When a person in a house finds out that a meter reader had come to record a reading, he/she would remove the magnet placed on the water meter which stops the meter. In other cases, people in

the house would remove their meter and when a meter reader visits at the end of the month, they would reinstall the meter”. (Meter reader)

Reverting back to the matter of dispute, the dispute also highlighted the role of intermediation in getting an additional water connection. During the conversation between the old man and the other two persons, a local councillor came into the room and told the old person to stop complaining. I was surprised to observe that the old man all of sudden became receptive. The old man became silent because he knew that he would lose the argument in the presence of the councillor. The councillor was an elected person from the same community, and because of his social position he was known to the members of the town committee.

In Nawansher, it is a customary practice that when a councillor accompanies someone, the members of the town committee extend preferential treatment to an applicant. The councillor in this case had close contacts with the applicant and told the officer to process the case of the applicant for an additional water connection. In the process of intermediation, the applicant was able to legalise an illegal water connection. The illegal water connection was validated when the tax collector of the town committee came into the room and saw the heated debate between the old man, the two persons and the pipe fitter. The tax collector commented:

“The applicant is trying to legalise what was illegal in the first place since the applicant had brought his water bill. He was justifying his connection from the pipe which was connected to the main pipe and from which the old man was receiving water. There is no need to get angry over something which was not done according to the procedure and which is now been legalised. You should be patient in getting another connection by filling an application form and other formalities” (Tax Collector)

The above account could be interpreted as the applicant having a legal water connection because he had brought the water bill. In fact, the applicant had

already been granted an additional water connection without proper paperwork. These are those connections which are granted without official approval, usually by paying a bribe to a pipe fitter. At night, the pipe fitter would make a new connection for the person who paid the bribe. Since the connection is granted without official approval, no water bill would be paid by the resident unless he is caught. In this process, if a member of the town committee is involved, he would demand a bribe, and an applicant would usually pay a higher bribe to legalise an illegal water connection. In the context of the case, it was quite obvious that the councillor had granted a favour in a situation when an illegal water connection was legalised through intermediation. Ironically, the dispute also confirmed the statement of the old man that many people had been granted illegal water connections by paying bribes to pipe fitters.

Corrupt practices are justified through different strategies involving justifications of one's own behaviour and counter-accusations against the accuser. As argued by Blundo and de Sardan (2006, p.86), corrupt practices are constructed along two axes. One is extended along the path of legalising an illegal practice, and the other is extended along the path of legitimising an illegitimate practice. Depending on the context and situation, corrupt or illicit practices are aligned more with "a negotiated classification of behaviours than [to] an ... inherent quality of behaviour" (Chibnall and Saunders 1977, p.139).

These negotiations inform us of how existing rules are negotiated between social actors towards a desired end. The aspect of negotiation is important. They are never clear-cut cases and the negotiations take place at a practical level such as in the implementation of the water supply project. The logic of negotiating a bribe could not be termed as a simple economic transaction. Rather, negotiation involves the negotiation of stable rules and their acceptance on all sides. They also occur at other levels, for instance when people are accused of having or considered to have legitimised an illegitimate demand. They also feed into the logic of negotiations. Importantly, everyone is involved in negotiations, including the *Nazim*. This inevitably involves manipulation of official rules, which imply gaining financial benefits.

6. The refuse case

The local NGO 'LokParya' initiated its project activities in the colonies⁹⁵ of new Nawansher for two primary reasons. The first reason was that these colonies had no secondary refuse collection points. The second reason was that the existing waste collectors in Nawansher were catering for the hamlets of old Nawansher. The NGO saw this as an opportunity to initiate project activities and to develop new Nawansher as a model town, and then to replicate it in old Nawansher. The NGO intervention faced several problems in making new Nawansher a model. The project was soon engulfed in bureaucratic procedures. The contractor of Lokparya was stopped by a TMA official in the new colony when he was constructing a secondary collection point. The contractor informed the team leader of LokParya that he could not build the collection point without the permission of the TMO.⁹⁶ The team leader was disappointed for two reasons. First, the *Nazim* had selected the construction site, and second a local resident at the time of construction stopped the contractor and argued that the site was in front of his property. The team leader informed the chief officer of the town committee that they were facing a problem in constructing the collection point. The chief officer told him that he had chosen the wrong site as it was private property, and that the site was also very close to the tube well and so might contaminate the water.

Identifying an appropriate site is complicated and the political interests of the *Nazim* play an important role. The *Nazim* wanted the NGO to work in the hamlets of old Nawansher because he knew that the existing resources were insufficient to manage the disposal of refuse. The *Nazim* distanced himself from the incident when the contractor was stopped by an official during the

⁹⁵ The term 'colony' must not be confused with the colonisation of an area. I have used this term to retain the original nomenclature of making reference to residents residing in new Nawansher.

⁹⁶ As already mentioned in chapter five, the officials of the town committee work under the jurisdiction of the Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA). The TMA is headed by an official known as the *Tehsil* Municipal Officer (TMO). Prior to the implementation of a project, the project is discussed with the TMO which then grants a formal approval on behalf of the TMA. If necessary, the TMO can inquire about any aspect of the project as and when it gets reported or notified.

construction of a secondary collection point.⁹⁷ The team leader of LokParya informed me that after the incident, he tried to contact the *Nazim* but did not get any response. The primary motive of the *Nazim* was that the NGO should invest and divert its resources towards old Nawansher because it was his political constituency and had close ties with the members of the town committee, and in particular with the sanitation staff.

The interaction of the chief officer with the team leader of LokParya also reveals the importance of the *Nazim*. The team leader was instructed by the chief officer⁹⁸ to initiate work in old Nawansher because the sanitation staff were primarily working there. In addition, they also had the advantage of having secondary collection points. The chief officer informed the team leader that they did not have wheelbarrows that the spades were broken, they needed new brooms, and they did not have enough fuel for the tractor which was currently parked. As I came to learn afterwards, the chief officer created a false impression that their equipment was damaged. Therefore, access to NGO resources by certain members of the town committee could not have been achieved without the support of the *Nazim*. The refuse intervention was seen by certain members of town committee as an opportunity to capture NGO resources by developing different relationships and strategies. The following incident was narrated to me by the team leader.

⁹⁷ It was the ex-*Nazim* who suggested to the NGO that it initiate project activities in new Nawansher.

⁹⁸ When I began research on the sanitation and water supply in October 2009, the chief officer of the town committee belonged to Nawansher. He was afterwards transferred and replaced by a chief officer who did not belong to the same locality.

Mutual Capture of NGO Resources

When the team leader contacted the chief officer to ask about the cost of repairing the trolley, the chief officer quoted a price of approximately Rs 45,000. The team leader told the chief officer that the International Union for Conservation of Natural Resources (IUCN) could review the cost. The next morning, when the team leader was examining a collection point, he received a phone call from a sanitation officer who wanted to meet him. The team leader asked the officer to meet him at the collection point. After a while, the sanitary inspector and three other people appeared. One of them was a citizen of Nawansher who manufactures water pumps. This person was known to the team leader and he was also a very close friend of the *Nazim*. The sanitary inspector had a file in his hand which calculated that the repair of the trolley could cost Rs 95,000. The team leader was shocked when he realised the price had doubled. He immediately called the chief officer and asked him about this unanticipated increase in the original quotation. The chief officer replied that the increase reflected tax costs.

Afterwards, the team leader informed the sanitary inspector that IUCN already paid tax. The inspector and the others all of a sudden realised that they had made a blunder. The inspector told the team leader that he would go back and amend the quotation. Before leaving, a copy of the quotation was retained by the team leader. The reason for retaining a copy was to check where the quotation came from. Afterwards, the team leader went to the vendor from whom the quotation was acquired. The team leader informed the vendor that he had investigated the matter of the false quotation, and would take legal action against the vendor. The team leader further added that the quotation would be checked by an IUCN representative. The vendor disclosed that the sanitation officer had asked him to provide three different quotations.

The issues of capture reveal how mutual accommodation and resistance are encountered in the provision of social services. As argued by Li (2005), schemes being implemented inevitably meet resistance, compromises and create new forms of knowledge based on the practices of various actors such as the officials and those who are affected by them. Moreover, different logics and interests influence key assumptions of an intervention which is thought to be in conformity with official practices.

7. Informal practices and social norms: the problem of incompatibility

Based on my interactions with local citizens, officials and observations, it became clear that the NGO intervention was based on inadequate knowledge about the existing management of solid waste, everyday routine activities and the social practices of sanitation staff. The project made little impact on institutional practices and accountability, two crucial objectives of the intervention. Here I will first discuss why the project did not succeed in improving the institutional practices. The project did not take into account the social practices of the sanitation staff. The sanitation staff were working privately in the houses of local councillors and did not strictly observe official timings. After 10 am, the sanitation staff used to work in the houses of the local councillor and the *Khans*.⁹⁹ Cleaning their houses, streets, gutters and removing waste from their houses were a source of additional income for the sanitation staff. This was more important to them than carrying out their formal duties.

Apart from financial gain, there is another reason why routine tasks are not carried out in an effective manner. When sanitation staff do not render a service to influential and known personalities, complaints directed at them are conveyed to senior officials in the TMA and to the Tehsil *Nazim*. The complaints are fabricated in order to acquire personal services. The senior officials in the TMA either telephonically or verbally inform the head of the sanitation staff, to ensure that sanitary workers obey the orders of political

⁹⁹ *Khans* are those people who are traditionally well-off due to their historical roots, social capital and inheritance of land from their forefathers.

personalities. Hence, political pressure on the sanitation staff is similar to the pressure on water supply staff. The non-compliance of orders coming from senior officers results in transfer from their posts usually because they are accused of poor performance. Similarly, the sanitation staff could not refuse to grant services to the *Nazim* or the councillors. The head of sanitation staff asserted that councillors are elected people and do not know anything about administration and how sanitation staff work. They are only concerned with their own interests and are obliged to look after their own. A sanitary worker narrated to me that they receive calls from influential and well-off people to do personal jobs. During focus group discussions with the sanitation staff held in August 2011, it was interesting to note that when the tenure of local government ended in March 2010, the sanitation staff seemed less compelled to offer personal services to elected representatives. This was due to the fact that elected representatives exercised indirect influence over state officials, i.e. using personal connections and contacts with senior officials to transfer an official from his/her post who refused to grant services.

In addition to the above, the formal practices of the town committee for refuse collection had several loopholes. The head of the sanitation staff informed me that they had 16 employees, and out of these, only 12 were performing duties. The rest of the employees were doing informal jobs such as running small businesses by taking advantage of their personal connections with the Tehsil *Nazim*. The senior official of the sanitation department told me that the employees carrying out informal jobs were the people of the Tehsil *Nazim*. As a consequence, the municipality and town committee were unable to put pressure on these employees. Moreover, certain female sanitary staff were getting a regular salary but were not reporting for duty. There were also frequent complaints by the sanitation staff that the petrol was insufficient to dispose waste on a daily basis. According to official records, the town committee was getting 36 litres of petrol. The actual consumption of petrol was always misreported. By co-operating with the head of the sanitation staff, the petrol was stolen by the driver and sold afterwards. As a result, solid waste used to accumulate because of the misappropriation of petrol.

In old Nawansher, the *Nazim* seldom discussed these issues because it would have meant confronting the social practices of sanitation staff and the personal services that he and the councillors accrued from them. The sanitation staff seldom visited the residents of new Nawansher. One resident said, “sometimes I have to go after them to take the waste from my street. When they come, I have to pay him or sometimes, give them food. The rest of the residents follow the same practice”. The residents of new Nawansher lacked the ability to take collective action because of their heterogeneous composition. For them, it was much easier to manage solid waste by paying the sanitation staff a certain amount of money or giving them food as incentives. Within the system, an informal way forward was invented because the residents of new Nawansher lacked trust in the provision of sanitation services. The informal institutional arrangements by the people indicate that there were no meaningful “voice” and “exit” options. Also, when people lack solidarity, they behave individually.

In improving the management of existing sanitation services, accountability was also an important feature in terms of imposing penalties on citizens to discourage the illegal dumping of waste. Under Local Government Ordinance 2001, the chief officer has the authority to impose penalties on those who spread dirt around. The chief officer was constrained to sanction local residents when they used to dump solid waste outside the designated places. Two logics prevailed in this instance. The first one pertains to when illegal dumping is not reported, and the other relates to when it is. In the first situation, illegal dumping was a recognised and accepted social norm. In the second situation, the official could not impose penalties because local residents would have resisted the enforcement. Both situations illustrate the political influence of the *Nazim* and the everyday management of sanitation and collection of waste. The reason for non-sanctioning was that citizens in old Nawansher were predominantly *Jadoons* who have family and kinship-based relationships with the *Nazim*. Moreover, the social structure of old Nawansher embodied ancestral solidarities illustrating a confrontation between official norms and prevailing traditional traits.

8. Conclusion

This chapter illustrated that despite being an independent institution with formal rules, the town committee has been unable to meet the expectations of local communities in acquiring urban services because of primordial loyalties and personal relationships. I have engaged with different access situations which are related to social and political interests and which significantly departed from meeting the expectations of citizens. The politics of access allows local politicians to become even more powerful actors by establishing full control over the official functioning of town committee and state officials. The lucid accounts of the *Nazim* in the operationalisation of the water supply project elucidated the fact that officials of the town committee were not just impotent, but caught between public and private interests. The *Nazim* was clearly committed to fulfilling the demands of his clients and addressing the interests of his own kin group.

The significance of social relationships and the intrusion of political personalities compounded the problems of local citizens seeking access to water. Through familial influence, officials were subjected to different kinds of pressures and they were unable to resist intimidating accusations. The conflict between the old man and the two persons highlighted how state and society operated through intermediation, bribes and mechanisms through which bribes are negotiated between officials and citizens. The conflict implicitly conveyed the fact that local citizens rely on local politicians for favours. In other cases public services are acquired through negotiation, illustrating how extra-legal practices become justified. The informal appropriation of water is widely practiced and could not have been stopped, because those involved were part of a community which relied on its personal relationships with the *Nazim*. The informal practices were justified either on the pretext of necessity or of depriving people of their basic rights to get access to water on the assumptions of equity and equality. The case study on water supply demonstrated that access was instead negotiated and managed by the *Nazim* in line with his social and political ambitions.

The case study on refuse showed the gap between the conceptions of problems and their solutions. By influencing and subverting the authority of the state, the issue of capture reveals how mutual accommodation and resistance are encountered. External intervention was unable to change the social habits of residents in dumping waste because the attempt to transform them had deep social and political implications.


Chapter Seven:

Clientelism and Administrative Practice beyond the Local

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I narrate the case of education and focus upon the actual implementation of education policy by the district education department. In so doing, I attempt to describe how the administration really works, at different levels, by exploring the concept of clientelism and its manifestation in different contexts. The reason for engaging with clientelism is to highlight the diversity, subtleties and experiences of clientelistic practices. I further attempt to demonstrate that clientelism needs to be examined in terms of its modalities, and not just as an explanation for a generalised dysfunctional bureaucracy; and I advance arguments intended to explain the ineffective performance of public officials. In the literature, authors (Clapham, 1982; Scott, 1972; Legg and Lemarchand, 1972) frequently use the concept of clientelism, but do not conduct empirical analyses of the realities they refer to. The arguments of these authors are weak in important ways. They do not account for how clientelistic practices influence officially sanctioned tasks, nor the official norms of state bureaucracy under which they are supposed to perform official duties. Moreover, they do not explore the types of clientelistic exchanges which take place between civil servants and the users of the state. In this chapter, I pay special attention to the examination and understanding of clientelistic exchanges within and across different structures and domains. Throughout this chapter, I will refer to diverse social actors, deconstructing meanings and analysing different sets of relationships.

Figure 4. Organogram of District Education Department



2. Actual functioning of administration

In dealing with administration, there are two governance domains to consider: the headquarters domain and the field domain. In contrast to the official functioning of the administration (see organogram), the examination of the actual functioning of the administration reveals informal practices, obligations and expectations. In the field, the head-teacher and teachers informally interact with local community and politicians. In the headquarters, the formal functioning of administration is also inconsistent with the actual functioning. The inconsistency is related to diverse sets of informal practices linked to clientelistic relationships. Similarly, in different situations, the administration in the field affects the official functioning of the headquarters implying deviations from official norms, challenging official decisions, and an acknowledgement of how expected official behaviour gets compromised. Before discussing the actual administration in two interrelated governance domains, it is essential to briefly engage with the official norms under which state bureaucracy performs its everyday functions and routine tasks.

Official norms are those norms which bind the actions and decisions of state officials to predetermined rules, regulations, job descriptions and other responsibilities formally enshrined in the rules of conduct (service rules, appointment rules, official laws, sanctioning, posting and transfer rules¹⁰⁰) of state officials and other official responsibilities and administrative practices. The actual functioning of the administration reflects the routine and everyday behaviour of civil bureaucracy and administrative practices. The organisational charts and rules of business do not provide us with a clear understanding of the everyday functioning of administration. They do not account for the actual practices of the civil servants. Moreover, written documents, reports and official observations give only a partial insight. Although there are relatively clear state regulations, organisational structures, rules and procedures devised on Western models, they are rarely followed in letter or spirit by state

¹⁰⁰ These different rules are laid out by the state to regularise and set the duties and rights of state officials. All officials must adhere to these rules and any change(s) in these rules must be formally sanctioned by the provincial and federal government.

officials and service users (Olivier de Sardan 2008). In terms of actual behaviour, the actions and decisions of public officials in both domains, depending on the context and situation, are not in line with the official norms and administrative practices of the state bureaucracy. As argued by Olivier de Sardan (2008, p.4) “a significance divergence is observed between official norms that govern these institutions and the actual behaviour of their employees”.

The actual functioning of administration is also related to the examination of different sets of relationships, which in certain cases are horizontal and in others are more vertical in nature. Horizontal relationships are related to family and kinship ties. Over a long period of time, families develop bonds of affinity and associations based on their family lineage, language, and cultural norms and traditions. Horizontal relationships can be imbued with moral obligations, and generally comprise personal relationships derived from the recognition of family or kinship ties within and across immediate and extended families. This inevitably creates pressures on political elites and state officials placed in powerful positions as it requires them to look after the personal interests of their ‘family members’. Vertical relationships are those which operate on the principles of patron–client relations. These relationships are diffuse and impersonal.

State officials develop social and political relationships based on patron–client understandings in bureaucratic institutions and between state officials and citizens. These relationships have little to do with official job responsibilities, appointments, assignments and documents which regulate the official behaviour of state officials. Moreover, the decentralisation reforms have created a well-established system from top to bottom and have thus strengthened pre-existing forms of clientelism and also created new ones. In the post-decentralisation context, horizontal and vertical relationships have merged. For instance, an individual is given a public office in order for him/her to grant personal favours to a member of the family, such as access to state resources.

3. Clientelism

In this section I define 'clientelism', which manifests itself in different ways such as extending favours based on loyalty and family ties, adopting illegal means in earnings, and cheating the system by neglecting what an official has been officially recruited for. Clientelism is institutionalised at the provincial and district level. The senior officials of the district education department either have political associations, close contacts with political figures in the province, or are known to the politicians by having the same family background. When a political party comes into power, local politicians post their favoured officials and teachers in the district. The use of family connections is one of the most important means for securing senior positions in the district. Other qualifications and abilities such as the importance of education and competencies do matter, but they are given less consideration. In Abbottabad district, a local politician of the *Abbasi* tribe posted a senior official to the district education department. In the department, the official is known for having family connections and looks after the interests of the local politician, such as extending preferential treatment to teachers who have political connections with the political leader. Similarly, when I was trying to contact an Assistant District Officer (ADO) through his colleague, I was informed that the official in question was related to a local politician, and that he habitually wakes up at 10 am and comes late to the office. The official, I was told, have been less concerned about his official duties. The value of family connections lies in the fact that they are exploited by senior officials to work in the district,¹⁰¹ and this grants them status and protection.

In the case of junior officials such as teachers, a senior female official informed me that none of them take official responsibilities seriously. In some cases, teachers pass exams either through bribes or seeking help from someone inside the system to get the certificate that allows them to become a teacher. Moreover, they treat professional training as a formality instead of seeing it as a vital skill. When they acquire the requisite qualification and

¹⁰¹ The provincial government can post any officer (EDO, DEO and DDEO) in the district, which means he/she does not have to be a native.

mandatory training, they use family relationships to abuse the system. In one school, five teachers were working in the same school because they were close relatives of two local politicians and the *Nazim* of the district. The teachers were not attending school, but were regularly receiving the monthly salary from the department. An understanding of family connections is therefore central to understanding clientelism. In the literature, clientelism is defined as an exchange relationship between actors based on asymmetric power and involves material favours in return for political support (Legg and Lemarchand, 1972; Scott, 1972). This definition becomes problematic when clientelism is organised around horizontal relationships used for placing family members in official positions in return for their loyalty and mutuality. The basic principles of these relationships are not monetary, but are based on moral sentiments and responsibilities. The political figures and state officials placed in powerful positions are under obligation to look after the personal interests of their family members. Family relationships are therefore used for maximising and strengthening bonds of affinity and expectations.

Familial relationship is not the only channel through which one can acquire either employment or preferential treatment in the district education department. In the local community, particularly in rural areas of the district, there are people who act as brokers between people and politicians. A broker has deep roots in the local community which enables him to perform several functions. For instance, a broker may put an official in touch with a politician and play an active role in gathering support among the local community to vote for a political leader. This route enables officials to establish personal connections used for acquiring a recommendation from the politician in order to get a preferred post or to get himself/herself transferred from a remote area to an urban area. The Assistant District Officers (ADOs) informed me that the offices of senior officials such as the Executive District Officer (EDO) and District Education Officer (DEO) are full of politicians connected to brokers. The local politicians do not visit senior officials in the organisation, instead their front men or touts visit the officials in the organisation responsible for the posting and transfer of teachers.

The aforementioned situation became clear to me one day when I drove to the district education department to meet an official. We decided to hold our meeting in the office of a senior official which was located a short distance from the headquarters of district education. On the same day, I was also meeting other officials of the same rank. When we were driving out of the main office, a car passed us. As we crossed paths, the official accompanying me smiled at the person who was driving the car. I asked the official whether he was one of those officials whom we were meeting or someone else. The official replied, “that man in the car is a ‘broker’ who carries a list of clerks, school guards and local teachers. He is going to present the list to the head of the district education department and take their appointment and posting and transfer letters from the official”. There are a number of people who are known as ‘brokers’ and they are distinct from teachers. The ‘brokers’ are essentially political henchman. Political leaders in the district acquire benefits from brokers¹⁰² and in return brokers distribute promised services. This route also creates an environment of mutual moral obligations and clientelistic exchanges between patrons and clients.

In the district education department, senior officials such as the Executive District Officer (EDO), the District Education Officer (DEO) and the District Officer (DO) often feel compelled to perform their administrative duties in a manipulative and clientelistic manner. The following case is a good illustration.

In 1996 a ban was imposed by the then government on the recruitment of teachers in the district. Despite the ban, teachers were still appointed because the ministry of education issued contracts on a fixed-term basis¹⁰³ to fill vacant

¹⁰² The broker in return gains several benefits from the politician, such as money. A broker also mediates between a teacher (who is personally known to him) and his superior in case of extra-legal practices, i.e. appropriation of state resources for personal gains. This information is based on the experiences of the officials.

¹⁰³ Two types of recruitment are made in the public sector. One is the regular appointment made through public service commission, and the other is contractual appointment. The difference between the two is that regular appointments are permanent appointments with fringe benefits of an annual increment and pension at the end of 25 years’ service. The contractual appointments are temporary appointments without benefits and for a fixed term, after which the employee is relieved from his/her service. The contractual appointments are regularised by the provincial education ministry over a period of time.

posts¹⁰⁴. Normally these bans are imposed to avoid political interference, but in reality they are imposed in order to appoint clients (voters) on a contractual basis. The Chief Minister, who is the Chief Executive of the Province, imposes a ban on appointment but normally comes under pressure from party colleagues and Members of Provincial Assemblies (MPAs) to lift the ban so that politicians can appoint their clients to different vacancies. The clients meet the private interests of their patrons through electoral support in return for getting official favours. This further implies that official rules oriented at maintaining recruitment based on official policy is seen by political leaders and their clients as constraining the advancement of their particular interests. Those interests can only be met if they manage to exercise political control over state structures. The following citation captures how political leaders and state officials advance their personal agendas.

“The minister gave a list of twenty teachers to be appointed on a contractual basis. To that list, the district education department added another ten names. The district education department knows that additional names would not be rejected by the provincial government since the department was recruiting twenty teachers on the recommendation of the minister”. (Mentor teacher)

In this manner, clientelistic networks are created and reproduced. More recently, the decentralisation reforms initiated in 2001 have opened up different channels/routes for clientelism and the formation of clientelistic networks. Under Local Government Ordinance 2001, the power to appoint primary teachers is delegated to the District Government (DG). The purpose of this delegation was to streamline different procedures involved in the appointment of teachers. For instance, prior to decentralisation the appointment of teachers was usually referred to the Provincial Government for approval. This caused delays in appointments. After decentralisation, political elites are directly involved in district administration, as they can easily influence the officials of the Education Department because the majority of

¹⁰⁴ The vacant posts could not be filled through regular appointments unless the ban was lifted.

those officials have secured their postings through political influence and recommendations by political leaders. As a consequence, decentralisation has increased the opportunities for public representatives (MPAs) to appoint their clients and loyal followers.

District education organisation is also represented by networks consisting of bureaucrats. Through these networks, local politicians acquire electoral support which strengthens the bureaucrats and the political stature of politicians in their respective constituencies. The networks consist of members of the Primary Teacher Union (PTU). The PTU serves as a political platform for local politicians canvassing support when they run for elections. In certain instances, the PTU is used by officials to promote their private interests. In this process, official norms and decisions by senior officials get undermined. I illustrate this by citing a case of misappropriation of state recourses, highlighting the intrusion of the PTU in administration.

In accordance with official norms, a female Deputy District Officer (DDO) in an urban girls' primary school inspected the utilisation of funds reserved for the Parent Teacher Commission (PTC). During inspection, the officer found gross misappropriation in the utilisation of PTC funds. According to the bank statement, the total fund was Rs 359,000. The school's head teacher informed the officer that she had spent the entire sum on repairing a bathroom, painting the classrooms, and constructing a path from the main gate of the school to the stairs of the school building. The officer inspected the quantum of work through a team which consisted of a head clerk (dealing with finance), the Assistant District Officer (ADO) for Planning and Development, and a clerk who was working directly under the ADO. After three days, they presented a report to the female officer which indicated that the work would not have cost more than Rs. 50,000. The senior female officer summoned the head teacher and showed her the findings of the report. The female officer asked the head teacher about the remaining sum. The head teacher insisted that she had spent the entire amount on the work she did in the school. Upon further investigation, the female officer found that the receipts for the work done were in fact false. When the case was further probed, the head teacher disclosed

that she had given the contract of constructing the path to her unemployed brother. The female officer informed the head teacher that the misappropriated amount would be recovered from her by paying Rs 5,000 every month from her salary. The head teacher tried to put pressure on the official through various channels, i.e. contacting her family members and other officials in the department. The officer was firm and did not change her decision. Afterwards, the head teacher pressurised the officer to reconsider her decision through the PTU. When the officer refused to do so, the members of PTU went to the local politicians. Those politicians went to the Education Minister and, without conducting an impartial inquiry, the senior officer was re-posted away from the district.

4. The system of patronage

In district administration, an inclusive patronage system is formed between local teachers (based in schools) and senior officials (based in the headquarters). The inclusive system of patronage operates by incorporating these officials into the administration. The inclusive system has certain characteristics. Unlike an exclusive system of patronage in which only a few members are permitted into the inner circle, the inclusive system consists of a variety of interlocking pyramids, since competition between patrons and the distribution of benefits among lower-level clients are marginal. Therefore, lower-level officials attempt to develop close contacts with different patrons in order to maximise their chances of accruing highly competitive benefits (Nelson 1996, p.45). Teachers and lower-level officials such as school guards and clerks have direct linkages with local politicians and they extract different types of benefits from those politicians in return for their votes and loyalty.

This patronage system operates according to tribal connections, or other forms of close relationship. A symbiotic relationship emerges between politicians who propagate their own position, and their people. There are three major tribes in the Abbottabad district, namely *Jadoons*, *Sardars*, and *Abbasi*. The political structure and the formation of clients in the patronage system enable patrons and clients to advance their mutual interests. However, this

patronage-based system is even more complex. Clients such as senior officials in the headquarters have patron–client relationships outside their own immediate tribe. By definition, patron–client relationships are developed in a vertical structure dominated by patrons and with clients placed at the bottom. Patron–client relationships within these structures become complex since ongoing competition between different patrons re-configure these structures.

In district headquarters, patron–client relationships are established among people who do not belong to the same tribe. Rather, senior officials in headquarters require several patron–client linkages. Senior officials in the headquarters secure interpersonal relationships with political leaders beyond their own tribe, which leads to the formation of multiplex relationships. The reason for securing the allegiance of other political leaders is to increase the chances of a senior official being appointed to a particular post. For instance, an official writes an application to a local politician so that he may be appointed to the post of ADO. Acquiring a recommendation from one politician is not sufficient, because senior posts are limited and there is always stiff competition in securing them. Therefore, if an official is able to get an ‘informal endorsement’ or ‘political recommendation’ from more than one politician, it is a huge advantage. During focus group discussion with male ADOs, one official said, “This political channel of appointment is the first disease in the organisation”. In the headquarters, senior officials promote their superiority and privileged status by adopting this informally recognised process of developing clientelistic relationships.

4.1 Favouritism: positioning of clients and impunity

In the exchange of favours, which may be financial as well as political, the bureaucracy engages in preferential treatment with those who have access to higher authorities. On the other hand, patron–client relationships are exploited by clients in different ways to extract various types of favours. Favouritism manifests itself in different forms. The local political elites manipulate constituencies by appointing teachers who have supported or fetched votes for them during election campaigns. In line with official recruitment policy,

teachers are initially appointed in their own union councils which mostly fall in the rural areas of the district. Senior officials then receive verbal or written instructions from local politicians to re-transfer their clients from a rural union council to an urban union council. This is how political leaders manipulate constituencies and extend preferential treatment to their clients. For instance, without the recommendation of local politicians, teachers cannot be transferred from schools. In some cases, teachers become so powerful that they cannot be sanctioned and held accountable for their non-performance. The higher officials know these teachers are 'well connected' and do not check their performance. If at times they are checked, they impose penalties in the form of freezing remunerations or recommending re-postings. These administrative actions are withdrawn because of political connections. The teachers simply approach the minister and local MPA of their community who then bail them out. Moreover, clients use their political connections to avoid working in rural areas, which entail extra living costs and also require them to leave their family settled in the main city of Abbottabad. This has made a significant contribution to the lower standard of education in government schools, specifically in rural areas.

Politicians and senior officials in the district fulfil their mutual interests as they tend to engage in favours through clientelistic and personal relationships. In district headquarters, a female ADO informed me about an anomaly related to additional teachers. When the officer checked the register, she found that against two posts, three teachers had been deputed. In this particular case, two teachers got themselves transferred from rural schools by using their political connections. The transfer was verbally conveyed to a senior official. The verbal transfer was not officially conveyed to the ADO.¹⁰⁵ When the ADO investigated the verbal transfer, she received a call from the Executive District Officer (EDO) "to let them teach as the matter would be discussed with the officer at a later stage" (ADO). In this case, the official rules and policy were neglected because the EDO knew that political contacts had been used. The

¹⁰⁵ In order to get transferred, a teacher ought to follow official rules. The teacher must present an application to the ADO, who then goes through the case and forwards it with his/her remarks to a senior official for appropriate action.

politician's interest was not resisted by the senior official, who avoided the risk of possible replacement in his post. Similarly, the ADO did not take action as she wanted to stay away from political intrusion in administration. Interestingly, the EDO used his position to favour the third teacher.

During fieldwork, I was offered a unique opportunity to read an inquiry report which was a classified document. Reading the report, I was shocked to learn that a school which had not been damaged in the earthquake of 8th October 2005 had been knocked down, and that the teacher had been absent from duty since then. The community informed the inquiry officer that there were 95 girls in the school. The report stated that the absent teacher was regularly getting her salary from the department. Moreover, the ADO who was in charge of that circle had reported the matter to the senior officials but no action had been taken. The inquiry officer told me that the teacher had contacts in the main office and she suspected that the teacher enjoyed informal/personal relations with senior officials. In this case, favouritism was facilitated by personal relationships. The positioning of bureaucrats and treating them as clients gives rise to favouritism and to a culture of impunity. Impunity is directly related to clienettelism, as imposing sanctions is resisted because of loyalty. Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006), writing from a different perspective, argue that sanctioning is seen as a threat to the entire system represented by networks. This is why "impunity is the rule and sanctioning the exception" (2006, p.94). In general, the extension of favouritism by local patrons to their clients in different forms and the professional negligence of officials are accepted as long as there are no threats of sanctioning and accountability.

5. Interface with teachers

In this section, I discuss what was happening in the field from local perspectives, based on my interactions with teachers in both urban and rural schools. I began by observing accounts, language and perceptions. Actors are endowed with knowledge and experience which is constantly shaped by what they encounter on a daily basis. During visits to schools, I noticed that certain teachers were trapped in an environment from which escape was not only

difficult, but which resulted in negative impacts on their actual behaviour. On the other hand, there were teachers who used political contacts to obtain preferential treatment. Teachers who lacked political connections faced a lot of difficulties. Their primary concern was “political interference” in their official duties. In the same vein, certain teachers used terms such as ‘political connections’ and ‘politics’ to convey their dissatisfaction and concerns about administrative performance in schools. It must be noted that these concerns were evident in all the schools that I visited in rural areas.¹⁰⁶ Here I attempt to narrate the consequences of ‘political interference’ in terms of its impact on the motivation of teachers and the quality of education.

During a visit to a boys’ school situated in the rural union council of Kakul,¹⁰⁷ the teachers made frequent reference, either in impersonal or personal terms, to “political connections”. The head teacher was quite frank in stating that “there is a lot of political interference in the Education Department. Politics must be taken out from this department”. When I asked him to elaborate on what he had told me, the head teacher explained that when the education department appointed teachers in their respective Union Council (UC), those who have political connections get transferred from rural UCs to an urban UC. As a result, the school in the rural UC loses quality teachers.

He went on to explain the case of his brother, who was transferred from his UC to a far-flung UC to which he had to commute daily. The head teacher said that his brother is an honest person but the department is making him ‘morally corrupt’ because he is unable to reach the school on time. Most of his time is spent travelling difficult terrain. His brother has told him that he wants to work with dedication, but that under current circumstances he is unable to do so. He has been unjustly transferred because a local politician wanted to place

¹⁰⁶ The impact of ‘political interference’ in urban schools was less significant for certain reasons. First, in urban schools, there were more children due to the adequate strength of teachers and better educational facilities such as teaching aids, desks and chairs. Second, urban schools were frequently visited by district officials. As a result, teacher absenteeism and teaching practices were frequently monitored.

¹⁰⁷ I was curious to know what counted as the “political interference” that had been the topic of discussion in a number of prior school visits.

someone else in his old position. Upon hearing this story, another teacher said: “*Jis Ki Lathi Us Ki Behance*”, meaning “might is power”. Teachers in rural areas use political connections and those who lack them suffer the most. The brother of the head teacher became less dedicated, and since he had no political contacts he had to wait for a change in government to get his position back.

One day I travelled with a female ADO and a head teacher to visit a community model school for girls. This school was located in a village called Sumwala, in the UC Mojohan which falls in the tehsil of Hawalian. When we reached Hawalian, we took a left turn towards Sumwala. This road was narrow and also quite steep. After driving for a short while, we reached a point where I had to park the car because of hilly terrain. I walked to the school built on a small hill. When we reached the school, we were received by the head teacher and the school guard. After getting inside the school, I was introduced to other teachers. This school had six classrooms. I went to each class and interacted briefly with students. Five classrooms had furniture and proper chairs. In one classroom, I noticed that the playgroup children¹⁰⁸ were sitting on the floor. I asked the head teacher why these children were sitting on the floor in the veranda. She told me that “we do not have an additional room for them. This is the only place for them”. The head teacher further stated that “there are only three teachers in this school. We have six classes and this school is supposed to have six teachers. We have 250 registered students and 40-50 unregistered students. Unregistered students belong to the play group. It is extremely difficult for us to teach six classes”. When I was taken to class 4, a teacher in that class said, “I am taking two classes at the same time and it is very difficult for me to concentrate”.

After visiting all the classes, I sat in a veranda outside the office of the head teacher contemplating the inadequate capacity of teachers. Meanwhile, the head teacher appeared and sat beside me. I asked the head teacher whether

¹⁰⁸ Children in play group are below the age of 5. They have been admitted to school to get them used to the school environment and to develop the habit of attending school on a regular basis.

the model school¹⁰⁹ meets the expectation of community, i.e. whether the school has the right facilities for the children and has the required number of teachers. The head teacher replied:

“This school has eleven sanctioned posts.¹¹⁰ Now they have only four teachers. Out of eleven posts, seven posts are vacant. One teacher is on maternity leave and there is no replacement teacher. We also have mobility problems as we have to walk from other villages. I try to reach school on time but it is difficult for a female to commute from a long distance. In this UC,¹¹¹ there are ten to fifteen schools and all of them are closed. Initially, teachers are appointed to the schools but because of political connections, they get themselves transferred as soon as possible”. (Head teacher)

The teachers teaching several classes were demoralised when requests to send additional teachers are treated unfavourably. On the other hand, teachers also made reference to certain teachers having close ties with “clout” in the headquarters. The “clout” consisted of senior officials above the rank of ADO. The senior hierarchy was extremely powerful in making decisions and their official authority cannot be challenged by junior officials. Junior officials were constrained to initiate action against a teacher or even a school guard. They receive phone calls or are informed verbally by senior officials to treat cases against official norms. According to an ADO, “we have no option but to obey the orders of senior officials. This is not only a difference in power relations but also misuse of power by the senior officials to put pressure on lower officials resulting in circumvention of official rules and responsibilities”.

¹⁰⁹ Community model schools are built with USAID funding in rural and urban areas. As per policy, a model school is supposed to have 6 teachers, i.e. one teacher per class.

¹¹⁰ In each school, there are sanctioned posts against which teachers are appointed/posted. Sanctioned posts are regular/permanent gazetted posts under the appointment rules of the government. People appointed to these posts get annual increments and also a pension after retirement. Sanctioned posts cannot be left vacant unless someone retires or gets transferred. In the case of a transfer, the education department is supposed to send a teacher to fill the vacant post.

¹¹¹ A union council comprises a group of villages of approximately equal size.

The intrusion of clientelistic practices into official norms is political as well as administrative, and initiated either directly or indirectly by the political elites. The direct route relates to the local politician contacting the junior official and the indirect route relates to the local politician contacting the most senior official, i.e. the Executive District Officer (EDO). In the case of the indirect route, the EDO instructs the ADO to take decisions which subvert his/her official authority in treatment of cases.

Clientelistic practices in administration directly contribute to poor education. The children in schools faced deplorable conditions. In schools I visited, children were sitting on the floor and were without uniforms. Some of them had developed health problems because of inadequate facilities in the classrooms. Since most of the female schools were closed in the rural areas, the girls used to walk a long distance to a neighbouring school early in the morning. I also observed children cleaning the school courtyard. Moreover, during school hours, the head teacher would nominate someone in a class to teach the rest of the children. A teacher narrated to me during a visit to a school that she saw a teacher literally abusing a child. She strongly disapproved of the teacher's inappropriate behaviour and its impact on the rest of the kids. My informant informed me that teachers were unconcerned about child dropout and low enrolment rates. She further revealed that the primary interest of the teacher is to get a job. She is little concerned about the children's education in the present system. What matters is that "the teacher should be going to the school and must keep her superior happy" (head teacher). The head teacher alluded to personal relationships of local teachers with their superiors. These relationships were closely related to acts of reciprocity. For instance, a head teacher would be asked by his superior (the ADO) to collect information from different schools, which is normally the responsibility of the ADO. In return, the head teacher would get personal favours either in the form of approval for promotion, nomination for training or getting salary in advance.

From the preceding discussion, it can be argued that senior officials had developed relationships of reciprocity with certain teachers and that they were

rewarded because of reciprocal obligations. The reciprocal obligations are rooted in patron–client relationships. This means that even at the micro-level, patron–client relationships are pervasive.

5.1 Interpersonal relationships

In certain rural and urban schools, interpersonal relationships developed between the head teacher and the rest of the staff. These relationships were based on mutual respect, empathy and trust. Due to interpersonal relationships, discrepancies in official responsibilities do not get reported. The mentor teachers carrying out supervision of schools and the rest of the teachers had been colleagues. As such, the dynamics of interaction was different between the mentors and the rest of the teachers. As “externals” with different social status, the mentor teachers had to be treated carefully because they had close contacts with political leaders and senior officials.

Mentor teachers were supposed to perform certain functions, such as ensuring the proper maintenance of the school register.¹¹² For several reasons, it is rare that these functions are strictly performed. First, mentor teachers avoided reporting teacher absenteeism because it would trigger adverse consequences, such as freezing of the teacher’s salary. In one school, a mentor teacher found that the number of children in the class did not match the figure recorded in the register. After asking about this, she was informed that in order to “save their neck” the teacher had entered fictitious names. Taking formal action against the teacher involved an official inquiry leading to possible transfer from the school and not getting the annual increment. Second, when a teacher needed sick leave, it had to go through several bureaucratic procedures,¹¹³ so instead teachers preferred to make an

¹¹² There are two registers in the school. One register is kept for children and the other for teachers. The children register shows name of the child, his/her class, presence and absence, and total attendance during the reporting month. The other register shows information on teachers’ attendance, and the total attendance at the end of the month. All this information must be properly fed into both registers by the head teacher.

¹¹³ The application had to first be endorsed by the head teacher and then by Assistant District Officer (ADO). The same application also required the approval of senior officials such as DDEO and DO. This meant waiting for an approval from different officials.

informal arrangement with the head teacher. The teacher would attend the school for a few days and then take a few days off. As a teacher narrated, “the department is not going to pay me for the days I am sick”.¹¹⁴ Similarly, in one school, the teacher who was on leave did not have her application stamped by the head teacher. The head teacher granted the teacher leave without fulfilling official requirements. These interpersonal relationships demonstrated the gap between formal responsibilities and what was happening in practice.

5.2 Perceptions and confessions: the social cost of integrity

In addition to interpersonal relationships, the state actors highlighted challenges related to the social environment in rural areas. The teachers mentioned problems in the present education system. They spoke about the absence of checks and balances, rewards and punishments, in the following terms:

“All teachers are not treated equally. Only the blue-eyed who have political connections and fetch votes for MNAs and MPAs are rewarded. I am “powerless”. I can’t even ask my school guard to do something. If I tell a school teacher that he is not coming on time, I create a hassle for myself. The ADO will ask me to put in writing a complaint against the teacher and if I do so, there is serious possibility that the rest of the teachers will connive against me by fabricating false stories and I will be penalised instead of the teacher. There is a lot of political interference in this department and we are all frustrated with the current system. The ADOs are also politically appointed. They hardly care about us and the performance of schools. If I talk about the problems in my school, I only expose my own inefficiency. I am trying to informally manage

¹¹⁴ Medical bills were not paid on time, and in certain cases the finance officer in the headquarters was not very receptive to these claims as he suspected that these claims were not genuine. This may be true in those cases where a teacher acquires a fake certificate from a local doctor to process false claims. In other cases, the finance officer would be holding out in the hope of some “incentive” (financial) before processing the claim.

the administration in the school by keeping cordial relationships with everyone”. (Head teacher)

During a visit to a boys’ primary school, a local teacher volunteered to take me to a school in UC Banda Pir Khan. We had to drive through a narrow valley surrounded by lush green mountains. While driving, I wondered how people of the valley managed to get to the main city and whether schools in this part of Abbottabad were visited by the district education department. After driving for almost two hours, we reached the school, situated in a village known as Tarnawai. The school was built on the land of the head teacher, who was a local and lived in the same village. When we entered the school, I saw children playing outside and most of them were sitting on the steps of the school which had two rooms. There were two teachers in the school who warmly welcomed us and were particularly pleased to see me. I instantly knew that these schools had not been visited by outsiders. It was a co-education school¹¹⁵ which had six classes and there were three teachers, including the head. I told the teachers about my research and my interest in access to quality education and the factors which impede this. I explained that during previous visits to boys’ and girls’ schools, I had been told that parents who could afford to, sent their children to private schools. It seems that there is lack of trust among the general public about the quality of education in public schools. The teachers agreed with my observations. However, the teachers had other insights and perceptions. The head teacher noted:

“The environment [referring to the quality of education] is better in urban areas as compared to rural areas. The literacy rate in rural areas is low and the parents of school children are mostly illiterate. They do not pay attention to the education of their children. The children have no books and we provide them copies from the Parent Teacher Council (PTC) funds”. (Head teacher)

¹¹⁵ Girls were also admitted to this school because the education department did not have a girls’ school in the village.

Another teacher stated that the salary of a government teacher is not enough to meet daily expenses. I told him that a government teacher earns more than a teacher of a private school.¹¹⁶ Therefore, salary cannot be the sole reason for the poor quality of education. After hearing my response, the teacher uttered these words:

“There are no checks and balances and accountability in public schools. Our teaching methodology is evaluated without taking into account the capability of a teacher. Teachers are not getting the post according to their qualification. I have a Master’s degree and am serving in grade 9. Whilst there are teachers with lower qualifications serving in grade 12”.¹¹⁷ (Teacher)

I asked the teachers why there was no “accountability” in their profession. The volunteered teacher replied:

“Even if the teacher is present in the school, he does not pay attention to his profession. We receive our salary whether we teach or not. In fact, we get a salary for sitting outside in the sun. We would be happy if someone in the department visits us and inquires¹¹⁸ about our performance”. (Teacher)

These perceptions and confessions indicate a clientelistic system which undermines decision making and challenges the authority of officials who feel “powerless”. They further imply that officials exploit clientelistic relationships to secure monetary benefits. The experiences and the language of state officials affirm the lack of accountability and illiteracy as key factors impeding the quality of education.

¹¹⁶ I gathered this information from the principal who was running a private school in Nawansher.

¹¹⁷ The gradation system means that officials serving on higher grades get more salary and annual increments.

¹¹⁸ The schools located in far-flung areas were rarely visited by officials because of terrain, lack of transport and budgetary constraints.

6. State–citizen interfaces

In this section I draw upon my interactions and discussions as held in different villages with head teachers and citizens who were members of the Parent Teacher Commission (PTC). As I began to attend PTC meetings, I observed that members were not regularly attending meetings. In all the six meetings held with committee members and the head teacher, I found that members of the PTC did not know about their role and responsibilities. The community members were called to these meetings to simply legitimise the claim that the PTC was functioning, and exercise voice and accountability over lower-ranked bureaucrats. In the majority of cases, PTC meetings were held between the chairman of the PTC and the head teacher of the school. Instead of electing chairpersons, the common practice was that the head teachers in male and female schools nominated the chairman of the PTC. The chairman of the PTC was either an influential person or someone who was easily accessible. James Manor offers insights into committees such as the PTC. Manor (2004, p.197) asserts that the nominated citizen is under an obligation to the public nominating official, and this process of personalised selection weakens the capacity of other members, often the non-poor, to raise their concerns and interests.

During discussions with citizens in rural areas, I observed that the process of selecting a PTC chairman revealed a different reality. In rural areas, the majority of the parents were illiterate. Hence, they felt that they were not in a position to discuss the performance of their children. The situation in the urban areas appeared slightly better because of the literacy rates. Moreover, the functioning and the constitution of PTC revealed the social practices of the head teacher. The social practices of the head teacher in the utilisation of PTC resources reveal the level of interaction between the head teacher and the nominated chairman. As explained by a senior official, “the head teacher selects a chairman who is ready to sign cheques without asking too many questions”. In one meeting, the head teacher revealed that “the chairman is a very respected and honest person, and he is the one who interacts with us and attends our meetings”. According to a senior official, “a teacher captured

the chairman of the PTC by rewarding him with a certain share from PTC funds. When the ADO probed the misappropriation of funds, the chairman said that he had been asked to sign the cheques". In certain cases, the chairman is a *chokidar* (school guard). To spend PTC funds, it is more convenient for the secretary (head teacher) to get the signature of the school guard who is a permanent employee in the school.

During focus-group discussions held in an urban boys' school known as Thanda Chok in UC Nawansher, the chairman of the PTC told me that he had discussed with the head teacher "about the late coming of teachers in the school and about the fact that no one paid attention to him". I asked the chairman what would happen if he lodged a complaint against a teacher who belongs to the same community. He said "I do inform the head teacher that such and such teacher is not coming on time and he must report the matter to higher authorities. I am helpless as no action is then taken". After hearing these assertions, a young person stated that "the teachers are from our own community. If the chairman lodges a complaint against a teacher, that teacher will visit the chairman's house. The chairman will receive him warmly because he has a soft spot for him. As a consequence, it is very unlikely that the matter of the teachers' absence will get reported". The chairman had held his position for the past ten years and admitted that he had had many interactions with the head teacher. The chairman further revealed to me that the rest of the members had informed him that they would "put their thumb prints on any bill that requires their consent". The local community had absolute trust in the chairman, and as such they did not feel any need to attend meetings. The head teacher had been interacting with the chairman, because the teacher belonged to the same community and thus was known to the chairman.

In a meeting held with community members in a rural school in the village of Dotar, I experienced a different reality. This school had only two rooms and the children were sitting outside because of insufficient space in the school. There was no water, no electricity and the school building had been damaged. There were three teachers teaching six classes. I asked the community members about teachers' punctuality. The majority of the members said that

the teachers were punctual because the children of other villages also come to the school.¹¹⁹ I observed that the chairman and one more member were more vocal about lacking facilities in the school and the inadequate ratio of teachers, i.e. 1:30. During our conversation, I asked the rest of the participants whether they had attempted to resolve the issues in the PTC meetings. There was complete silence, which confirmed what I had been hearing in previous meetings about ineffective PTCs. When I asked the Chairman how the expenditures of the PTC account are monitored, audited and decided upon, I received an unanticipated and innocent reply:

“The PTC has a joint account and in order to withdraw money from the account, I and the head teacher sign the cheques. I am told that the amount is spent on stationery, copies and office registers. I have just signed cheques but I do not know whether those items have been purchased or not. I have not even seen the actual bills. We do not know what we are supposed to do. The head teacher should have informed us about the role of PTCs. I am also not aware of the actual amount allocated to this school”. (Chairman PTC)

This statement highlights the routine social practices of the head teacher who deliberately withholds information and does not require approval to utilise state resources. The above also explains that state officials propagate their own interests by managing administration in a non-transparent manner which in turn gives rise to mistrust among citizens. Moreover, PTC meetings were not held in a formal way because the head teacher and other teachers did not directly report to the community. Therefore, in practice ‘accountability’ and ‘voice’—two major aims of the PTC—were ineffective, even if the PTC members had been assertive and questioned the local teachers about the quality of education in schools.

¹¹⁹ This village had three schools and one of them was under construction. The second school had two teachers and it was built far from the village. It seemed that this school was more accessible for children.

7. Accountability in clientelistic structures

This section deals with accountability¹²⁰ within the framework of patron–client relations. In doing so, I introduce the institutional framework developed by Hirschman (1970), who argues that social actors express their preferences and concerns through a number of mechanisms when participating in public policies. These mechanisms are:

(a) Voice

In public sector organisations, the ‘voice’ mechanism enables citizens to raise their concerns when faced with a degree of unhappiness about the quality of social services and other problems associated with their delivery. According to Hirschman (1970, p.30), service users attempt to change existing practices and policies to escape from an objectionable state of affairs. This is achieved either individually or through collective action. In both situations, citizens appeal to higher authorities either directly or indirectly with the intention to induce a change. Voice is used as a mechanism of feedback as well as to identify institutional deficiencies in the provision of service. Voice exemplifies discontentment and the inability of the poor and disadvantaged segments in the society to enforce their demands on the state.

(b) Exit

The second mechanism through which citizens show their discontent about the quality of a service is ‘exit’, which means that they seek alternative services. The option of exit is usually taken by citizens when the voice option is unable to have a positive impact on service delivery. As Hirschman argues

¹²⁰ Through different mechanisms of accountability, the general interest of the politicians and the state bureaucracy are aligned with the interests of the public. Accountability means answerability and enforcement (Ackerman 2004). According to Schedler (1999, p.14), answerability means “the obligation of public officials to inform about and to explain what they are doing” and enforcement means “the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on power holders who have violated their public duties”. These mechanisms of accountability prevent, in principle, corruption or rent-seeking in the provision of public services. In addition, the public knows how institutions perform and how state policies are implemented. The public is also able to monitor institutional performance which closes the gaps between principals and agents.

(1970, p.37), citizens will delay an exit option if they are convinced about the effectiveness of voice. In the case where citizens are faced with circumstances in which the voice option is least effective or desirable, they may switch to an alternative service, thus exercising exit.

(c) Loyalty

The third mechanism is 'loyalty'. According to Hirschman (1970, p.78), a person remains loyal to an organisation whether the organisation is performing well or not. He further argues that a person becomes loyal to an organisation when the option of exit is too costly, and the voice option requires inventing new ways of introducing changes into an existing state of affairs, i.e. improving organisational effectiveness. In situations where both voice and exit are least-considered options, people stay loyal to an organisation because the organisation serves their interests well enough.

Having briefly described the concepts of exit, voice and loyalty, I now describe and analyse three relevant cases.

(i) The story of a female teacher

Sharing her teaching experience of twenty-five years, one particular female school teacher's story is informative. The teacher came from Nawansher. She taught in a primary school for seven years in Tehsil Hawalian, which is approximately 20 km from her hometown. She used to commute daily to the school where she taught. Since teachers are normally transferred after 2-3 years, I was curious to know why she served in the same school for so long. She replied that her husband is also a civil servant and that he had told her that she had to remain dedicated and work with honesty even if posted in rough and inaccessible areas. To her that meant not only getting to the school on time but also sacrificing her own health. She informed me that extensive travelling had caused her backache. Despite suffering from backache, she continued to work with the same vigour.

She had also served in 1998 in one of the most difficult terrains in a rural village in Abbottabad district called Damtour.¹²¹ She used to walk up and down the hill for an hour and half from the village of Damtour to the school, which was situated behind a mountain. She served in that school for two years. She used to get home late at night because there were only two jeeps used by the public to commute from her town to Damtour. One jeep used to bring milk from Damtour and she had to sit on the milk containers at the back of the jeep in order to get home, late at night. The teacher further mentioned that female teachers in the school where she was serving used to come to the school on alternative days because it was extremely difficult for females to walk such a long distance. She had also been transferred to other rough terrains where she had worked for many years. When I asked her about the official policy pertaining to transfer of teachers, she replied, “it’s all about political connections”.

The teacher was unable to make effective use of her agency¹²² because her husband had told her to stay out of politics. In the case of an appeal for transfer, it would not have been considered by higher authorities as they were least concerned about the social circumstances and the difficulties faced by teachers. Rather, senior officials dealt with those cases which involved political and personalised favours.

This case highlights that the female teacher did not compromise her professional competence and tried to remain neutral. She knew that she was serving in a system in which professional conduct, posting and transfer were associated with clientelistic relationships. Despite possessing knowledge about local teachers’ practices and associations, the female teacher was caught in a deeply entrenched patronage system over which she had no control or influence. Senior officials operated under the patronage of powerful political leaders which subverted the possibility of inculcating a culture of

¹²¹ A rural union council located on the border of Nawansher.

¹²² Agency is attributed to what social actors do, the social process, and the everyday experiences which enable the people to use their capacity to cope with extreme circumstances (Long 1992, p.23). Social actors use their agency to create room for manoeuvre using different means such as social and political relationships and practices.

official rules and policy. In reality, clientelistic relationships determined the real “rules of the game”, as political leaders controlled the management of administration.

(ii) Disgruntled citizens of PhalKot

This case pertains to a meeting with unhappy citizens in a school situated in a far-flung rural union council called PhalKot. This meeting was unforgettable, as it entailed a forty-minute drive from the main city of Abbottabad, and a walk that lasted for more than an hour. Walking was quite tiring, because the path leading to the school was steep. Accompanied by a local teacher, we had to break our journey twice before reaching the school, which was built on a small hillock. There were three teachers in the school and the head teacher had gone to Mecca to perform *Hajj*.¹²³ After visiting the classrooms, I sat in the office of the head teacher with the three teachers. During our conversation, a school teacher informed me that he had invited the PTC members and few other local residents. After a short while, I saw elderly people (male), perhaps in their sixties, coming to the office of the head teacher. I introduced¹²⁴ myself and briefly talked about the objective of visiting them.

In this meeting, I came to understand from the PTC chairman of the Government Girls’ Public School (GGPS) Upper PhalKot,¹²⁵ that despite reporting 3-4 times to the education department about a female teacher who

¹²³ *Hajj* means pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. It is obligatory for every Muslim to perform *Hajj* at least once in his/her lifetime.

¹²⁴ My introduction was very simple as I knew the PTC guidelines would not make much sense to them. Instead, I drew their attention to the common problems that were observed by me in other schools, such as few teachers and children going to private schools, and the reasons behind them. I further told them that that I was more interested in knowing whether they were happy with the quality of education in the schools in their villages. The purpose behind this approach was to get their views and perceptions in general, and more specifically on the role of PTC members. One person said “an angel has visited them who would listen to their problems”. They thought that I would inform the education department and so resolve their concerns.

¹²⁵ The school in which this meeting was held was a government boys’ school. In UC PhalKot, there are 7 primary schools. Out of these 7, 4 are boys’ schools and 3 are girls’ schools. PhalKot consists of two areas, i.e. Upper and Lower PhalKot. The primary school for girls in upper PhalKot was located even higher than the boy’s school in lower PhalKot.

visited the school once a week, the department had not paid any attention to the complaint. The chairman informed me that he and other residents of the community had also collectively reported the irregularity of the teacher, but no one in the education department had shown willingness to pay attention. After making repeated appeals, their school was visited by male and female ADOs. The officials told the PTC to appoint teachers locally. Since then, the local community had appointed two female teachers to the school who were paid Rs 25 daily. I asked the chairman how local people could afford to pay the salary of the new teachers. The chairman asserted:

“We are poor but quite concerned about the future of our children. Those who can afford pay the salary of the teachers, and those who cannot afford do not pay”. (Chairman PTC, Upper PhalKot)

The citizens of PhalKot seemed extremely unhappy, even furious, with the existing state of affairs, especially the indifferent behaviour of the education department. In this particular case, the citizens tried to raise their concerns through voice. The option of voice was, however, least effective because they belonged to the tribe of Awan and no one from their constituency was politically important. As such, there was a greater policy distance between them and political elites. They could only verbally convey their dissatisfaction over the performance of the institution by exercising voice. However, since voice was least effective, the citizens opted for an exit option which entailed costs. By exiting from the system, the citizens not only further isolated themselves from the department, but also now have to sustain a privately managed service provision.

(iii) The case of patron–client brokerage

A joint inquiry¹²⁶ conducted in a school by two officers is related to the misappropriation of funds reserved for orphans. When the officers investigated the case, they found that a school teacher had withdrawn money from the fund by declaring a boy who was not an orphan. The teacher was found guilty

¹²⁶ Taking into account the sensitive nature of the case, the inquiry officers were reluctant to disclose the date of inquiry and the name of the school.

and the inquiry officers were able to recover the appropriated amount from the teacher. After recovering the money, the investigating officers officially recommended the transfer of the teacher to another school. The education department acted on the proposal and the teacher was transferred to another school which was located in a far-flung area. After a week, the perpetrator visited the investigating officers and handed them the cancellation order of his transfer. When the officers asked the teacher about the cancellation of the transfer order, the teacher replied that the Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA) had called the higher authorities and informed them that the teacher who had been transferred was one of their men and belonged to their constituency. I was informed by the officials that the case relates to certain teachers who act as brokers.

This particular case reveals how brokers perform functions such as canvassing and mobilising political support for the MPA in his constituency.¹²⁷ The general practice of election campaigning is predominantly based upon personnel connections. The teachers in the district are actively engaged to secure wide support for politicians by using their contacts in the local community. The effectiveness of the broker depends on his existing relationships and ability to obtain votes for the politician. As narrated to me by an official, the teachers are also appointed as presiding officers in the general elections where they provide help to candidates contesting elections, even allowing casting votes on fake identity cards. Moreover, the teacher has status and he is also respected in the community. Similarly, the profession of a teacher enables him/her to socially interact with the community. Through social interactions, local teachers use students and parents and others in the community to capture votes for their preferred candidate. This is how they develop relations with influential people of the area. Moreover, and unfortunately, a public school serves as a political platform for local teachers. Political elites of the community usually visit local schools for different functions arranged by the students. A politically active local teacher can easily

¹²⁷ Since I was not conducting research during an election campaign, the information disclosed to me is based on the experiences, discussions and general observations of the officials.

convince the elites of a community to vote for a preferred politician. The teachers are voters of local MPAs and actively participate in their elections. As such, MPAs are under obligation to reciprocate their loyalty acquired through votes. Conceptually, patron–client brokerage is based on personal loyalties, mutually binding expectations and responsibilities. The mechanism of loyalty therefore contributes to un-official practices and its formal institutionalisation in the administration.

8. Conclusion

This chapter examined the actual functioning of administration. I have discussed the prevalence of widespread clientelism, its penetration across state institutions in diverse socio-political contexts, and its influence over the official behaviour of state officials and service-delivery processes. The actual functioning of administration shows how the structures of state have been occupied by patrons and clients, each seeking mutual benefit. It further reveals that the actual behaviour of state bureaucracy is a product of complex interactions between officials, citizens and political elites. Tribal and family-based associations at the district and provincial levels penetrate state structures in the form of networks.

Clientelistic practices and relationships overshadow official norms, sanctions and other officially assigned responsibilities. As a result, personal preferences, rule-avoidance and personalised forms of transactions dominate over official norms and expected forms of administrative practices. Therefore the official functioning of the administration is distorted due to the extension of favours. Teachers have shown their dissatisfaction with the current system of education. Their views reveal that in order to survive, political connections are necessary. Those who lack political connections are seldom rewarded for their professional conduct. The interrelationships of teachers make manifest the ways of performing administration informally. The interactions of head teachers with PTCs highlight how un-official practices are legitimised as well as revealing the explanations which are associated with them. These aspects are important in understanding state–society relationships which are pervasive and all embracing, and which are powerful in terms of distribution of resources and entitlement claims.

This chapter further analysed accountability through the concepts of exit, voice and loyalty. Based on the analysis of three cases, I argued that accountability in patron–client relationships is different as it depends on the nature and structure of relationships of state officials and service users with political leaders.

Summary and Conclusion

1. Introduction

This thesis attempts to address two central research objectives. The first concerns the everyday practices of state officials in the delivery of social services, and the second the examination of social norms and their intrusion into official norms. In empirical chapter seven, I set out the formal hierarchical structure of the district education department. While this structure remains publicly intact as the vehicle for the formal functioning of district education, the actual functioning of district education (see appendix eight) highlights the everyday functioning of district education. The analysis and contextualisation of the actual practices of state officials enables us to acquire a deeper understanding of the actual functioning of the district education system. This can be applied to the other case studies. The case of water supply and refuse management reveals that the actual practices are influenced by various forms of social norms which contribute to the shaping of everyday governance. In this thesis, through an analysis of why the actual practices of state officials are not in conformity with their expected official behaviour, I am thus critically examining the wider problems of governance in the state of Pakistan. I have endeavoured to show that in Pakistan there is an unrealistic understanding of the problems of governance. The first objective is achieved by undertaking empirical analysis to understand the actual behaviour and unofficial practices of state officials in different social and institutional contexts. The second objective is achieved by demonstrating how administration is actually performed within the state on a quotidian basis. In this concluding chapter, these objectives are discussed using primary data and a review of literature under the following headings: problems of subtractivist approaches, distinct but interpenetrating spheres, broader conclusions, and implications for change.

2. Problems of subtractivist approaches

In the mainstream development discourse and from the point of view of positivists¹²⁸, the problems of governance in Pakistan are evaluated, judged and debated with respect to subtractivist approaches. I use the 'subtractivist' approaches as a critique by taking ideal-type bureaucratic behaviour as the normative point of comparative reference. These approaches conform to a model of formal governance which is too normative. The notion of 'good governance' is based on the features of modern Western rational states and governments. The formal good governance model relates to technical expertise, requisite competencies, effective public sector institutions and a vibrant civil society. The good governance discourse has very little to say concerning how the state interacts with society, and what happens at the interface between the service providers and service users. The official norms, organisational charts and job descriptions do not make sense when there is a gap between the rhetoric and reality. The officials deviate from official norms, and their behaviour is best understood within the context of clientelistic and other forms of relationships, through which they seek to gain certain benefits such as appointments, to appropriate state resources for personal gains, and to secure access to state services.

Subtractive approaches also imply the universal application of an ideological framework across states, without examining pre- and post-colonial history, and thus neglecting facts about how administration was carried out in the Indian sub-continent in earlier periods. The subjugation of the local communities and the introduction of the modern bureaucratic rule in the sub-continent, which were previously non-existent, alienated the local population from the rulers. When the British occupied India, they were confronted with a huge alien population of heterogeneous groups spread over a vast land mass which had to be properly administered. The main objective of the colonial rulers was to prevent rebellion and keep their hold over the local population. To meet this challenge, the British sought the help of local Rajas and big

¹²⁸ Positivism is an epistemology but not an insightful one in such contexts as these.

landlords, granting them special powers, such as total administrative control over the population in their areas, in return for allegiance to the British crown.

According to Alavi, the post-independence state was dominated by three property classes and a civilian-military oligarchy. These continuously undermined efforts to build a strong civil society and corresponding political institutions. The military and civilian regimes in the post-colonial state created a system of political patronage which led to the politicisation of state bureaucracy. In the state of Pakistan, political parties and their adherents have shaped the political culture through patron–client relations. The penetration of party politics into administrative structures created extensive opportunities for “patronage-based politics practiced by democratic and military governments” who relied on networks and *biradari* to remain in power. As a consequence, they failed to meet the needs and expectations of the people (Lodhi 2011, p.50). In addition to the above, state bureaucracy not only enjoyed considerable power over the community but also developed close ties with ruling parties to capture lucrative positions. The invariable use of political contacts with politicians negated the criteria for appointments, promotions and performance. As a result, the actual practices of the state officials became inconsistent and indeed incommensurate with their expected official behaviour.

Another significant limitation of the subtractivist approach is that it does not take into account the notion of the clash of rationalities. The Western notion of bureaucratic rationality is based on the Western-inspired model of rational states which lays emphasis on rule-based decision making. Applied to the case of Pakistan, this notion is also normative, and does not provide a nuanced understanding of the way in which structures are not static but in fact fluid and dynamic. Devine (1998, p.257) refers to Wood’s notion of parallel rationalities, which he uses as a term to describe cases characterised by the competing rationalities of different actors, each presenting their own logic and explanations of actions, constraints and decisions. Power emerges from the clash of rationalities. This inevitably gives rise to conflict between the

conceptions which underlie development interventions and those who pursue their particular interests. This means that we are examining the perspectives of officials dealing with conflicts of interests through a variety of social and administrative strategies. Thus, it can be argued that a particular strategy entails the capacity of the state officials to deal with contradictory interests. It is through the notion of competing rationalities that we are able to better understand how social actors in a particular milieu attempt to manage conflicts, identify their limitations, and justify their unofficial practices.

3. Distinct but interpenetrating spheres

What emerges from this research is that while state and society are usually treated as two distinct spheres, in fact they are interpenetrating. The state sphere consists of official rules and regulations “making up the state” (Willott 2009). The private sphere represents informal social norms. It is the private sphere which accurately captures the official business of the state. In the private sphere, there are people and groups who pursue their independent interest in opposition to the independent functioning of the state (Clapham 1982). How state institutions perform in reality, how official authority is subverted, and how people struggle for rights and entitlements are embedded in the private sphere. This has been more succinctly conceptualised by Ekeh (1975) in the notion of two republics: the “civil” and the “primordial republic”. Authors such as Wood, Oliver de Sardan, and Blundo draw on their own research to show the contestant interpenetration of the private sphere into the public sphere. In this thesis, I argue that the problems of governance in Pakistan are less researched with reference to the interpenetration of the private sphere into the public sphere. As argued by Gretchen and Steven (2004, p.727), “in contrast to official norms, which are communicated, written and widely accepted as official”, informal social norms enable us to get a better understanding of how they affect the expected official behaviour of the state officials. Reflecting on how official business is performed in the state of Pakistan, I have observed that informal social norms such as clientelism, kinship ties and social relationships penetrate into the public sphere which contributes to a realistic understanding of the functioning of public

bureaucracies in the everyday state. As discussed across the three cases, officials have to deal with conflictive demands coming from citizens and politicians. In contrast to strictly operating according to official norms, civil servants are confronted by informal social norms. The ensuing difficulty faced by officials in the provision of public and collective services is to maintain a clear separation between public and private realms. The officials are being confronted by situations involving asymmetric power relationships, political interests and pressures from multiple sources which constitute the “real” functioning of public administration. At the heart of this discussion, a crucial point needs to be mentioned. The notion of governance refers to how public and collective services are being provided. This requires an appreciation of the complex processes concerning social interactions, the professional culture of civil servants, and the conversations that take place between state officials and citizens. The formal governance model adopts a highly normative and judgemental approach and does not deal with this complexity.

The key elements of governance are analysed by others primarily at an abstract level. In this thesis, I am offering a micro-level insight. The models of public administration in relation to public sector institutional performance remain inadequate. Public performance is actually much more complex. It requires an examination of the routine practices of state bureaucracy, informal social norms, and their wider implications for citizens’ needs and preferences. For Pakistan, my research fills this void by documenting and analysing the multifaceted nature and the micro-dynamics of actual governance. This is achieved through the notion of political clientelism, which is perhaps the biggest contribution of this research.

4. Broader conclusions

The three case studies present a complex institutional landscape consisting of different social actors in diverse social and political milieu. They are arenas for encounters between bureaucrats and citizens in which the state bureaucracy adheres to two sets of norms: official and social. Official norms are based on the idea of a rational human behaviour which emanates from formal

institutional rules, policy and processes. Social norms are associated with clientelism, social relationships and moral attachments. In this thesis, I have argued that social norms grossly undermine the expected official behaviour of public officials. The experiences of the state officials in steering administration reveals a system of reciprocal exchanges, affinities, and acts and decisions at odds with legal-bureaucratic rationality. What officials were supposed to do, and what was happening in reality represented the professional culture of the civil servants. On the other hand, the narratives of certain officials expressing a desire to perform in accordance with official norms clearly meant that those officials made reference to operating according to organisational norms and institutional practices. This dichotomy relates to the co-existence of official and social norms. The significance of social norms cannot be ignored, as they continuously intrude into official norms. Thus, in providing basic services, the civil servants experience a different reality which is inconsistent with their professional practices and standardised procedures. The description and the analysis of the routine functioning of administration across three case studies enabled me to understand social norms and how they contribute to unofficial practices.

The case of primary education reveals an institution which operates significantly through clientelistic relationships. The actual functioning of district education shows features such as the pervasiveness of clientelistic practices, discrepancy between formally assigned tasks and actual undertaking of tasks, culture of impunity and a widespread exchange of favours. Other important elements include: personalised transactions between official and citizens in capturing state resources, exploitation of community relationships in responsibility avoidance, and adhering to unofficial practices embedded in interpersonal and patron–client politics. Moreover, administration in the district education department was functioning on a system of patronage and loyalties. As a consequence, citizens' concerns were ignored and they faced extreme difficulties in articulating their interests. This led to the negation of official rules and maintaining impartiality in public dealings. Citizens were also not familiar with official rules and laws. Moreover, due to a “long route to accountability”,

there was a natural dependency on technical-bureaucratic knowledge and the ways in which officials treated citizens' complaints.

The case of water supply presents a different reality which is embedded in social relationships and kinship connections. They encourage social expectations and obligations to immediate family and others expressed through concentric circles of moral attachment (see appendix nine). Access to water supply strongly points to the interest of the *Nazim* in ensuring access for his immediate family by deploying emotional bonds and validating actions using moral arguments. During an informal encounter with the *Nazim*, I learnt that people in Nawansher meet the *Nazim* at his house on daily basis. These frequent interactions reveal the context of social expectations and political obligations. The *Nazim* informed me that people, women and minors of his *biradari* narrate their problems to him. He further stated that people of his community are without hope, and they have no expectations from the state agencies. The everyday problems that people face could not be ignored, and it was his responsibility to resolve them. In this process, the *Nazim* mediates between the state and society in effect providing a "short route to accountability".

The waste management project underscores the lack of adequate knowledge by non-state entities about the prevailing social relationships embedded in the local moral economy. Non-state entities attempt to justify their interventions on different presumptions and conceptions. The external intervention illuminates the necessity of understanding dissimilar interests and deep-seated solidarities among people. The project demonstrates that any development intervention imposed from outside meets with strategies of resistance and accommodation, behind which there are political and economic considerations. These projects do not meet their objectives because they are side-tracked by state and non-state actors through different means and decision-making processes. The outside intervention enhanced my existing knowledge about the customary practices of the sanitation workers, and how an outside intervention gets caught in bureaucratic circuits and local politics.

5. Research implications

An important conclusion of this thesis is that it is necessary in particular to deal with the problem of how to improve the management practices of state officials. This entails introducing reforms aimed at bridging the gap between policy and practice. There are numerous evaluations and studies on Pakistan's dysfunctional public sector performance which indicate that there are management inadequacies, problems of competencies in human resources, and incapacities of state officials to implement policies and development projects. The current situation in the country is replete with donor capacity-building programmes, reforms in civil service and decentralisation of service delivery. The problems with these solutions and taxonomies are that they constantly engage with technical and quick-fix solutions to improve human behaviour.

The most admired strategy advocated by the government to improving management practices in the country relates to civil service reforms which are based on ideal-type administration. In considering the question of reforms, there is no 'magic bullet' to improve public sector performance in Pakistan. In my view, one has to start by examining how informal social norms can be researched and through what methods. This leads to the consideration of some options and implementation strategies.

Participatory Action Learning (PAL) and Action Research (AR) are two possible available options to change human behaviour and to improve management practices. I will not go into the details of PAL and AR here since the objective is not to discuss these methods. However, a very brief introduction to these methods is essential. The attributes of PAL are that it empowers the stakeholders to be able to assert what they have been doing, acknowledging the significance of knowledge and people's realities, and learning through "hands-on" practice (Mukherjee 2003, p.32). Action Research brings together knowledge and experience of diverse audiences for self-reflection, and developing future courses of actions for improving practices (Brian 2001). Both methods are based on psychological and sociological inquiries that aim at knowing things and understanding them through face-to-

face interactions. The overarching goal of these options is to create a common understanding among political leaders, state officials and citizens, to self-evaluate their own performance and practices based on what I have discussed and documented in the empirical chapters (i.e. six and seven). This is undoubtedly easier said than done. From the researcher's point of view, this may be an optimistic endeavour; whereas from the officials and citizens' perspective, it will be a difficult task. From my perspective, the task can be achieved through optimism and developing modalities, and building relationships of trust and constant engagement. The question is how we can implement these methods in a society like Pakistan. In Pakistan, bureaucracy is often discouraged by a 'workshops' mentality and training. These workshops are focussed upon official norms, without diagnosing the actual problem, which is to change unofficial behaviour.

In the first phase, PAL and AR can be implemented through the process of "vertical slicing".¹²⁹ Vertical slicing is a process of dissecting vertically the target audience, from occupational groups such as senior and junior bureaucrats down to the level of citizens in local villages. It also includes those people who are clients rather than citizens. The application of an untested idea of vertical slicing as a diagnostic tool is favoured, as it offers a better prospect for understanding and taking ownership of the key problem identified in this thesis, i.e. that state and society are not distinct but permeable. The reason why I favour vertical slicing is that, in some sense, it reflects on my ethnographic work. Through the process of PAL and AR, this means to engage with the problem in an applied way. I am essentially telling the readers about an alternative approach to the usual idea of putting pressure on the state through civil society, and thus implicitly understanding them as distinct.

Prior to implementing PAL or AR, a broad consensus among different stakeholders will be developed at different levels. The first level is the federal level where policies are crafted. The target audience of this level comprises political leaders, the secretaries, joint secretaries and the newly appointed civil

¹²⁹ The term "vertical slicing" is not commonly used; it has been invented by Wood, who is currently doing experimental work with the World Bank in Bangladesh.

servants. Politicians and senior officials play a pivotal role in policy making. They are directly involved with donors in the implementation of projects such as Poverty Reduction Strategy initiatives. The implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategies is centralised at the federal level since it is there that resources, goals and targets are determined. The federal level also directly implements projects in the districts. Such projects do not take into account how citizens navigate their way to acquire access to public and collective services.

As shown in the case of primary education, lack of information on state policies and bureaucratic processes restrict people in holding officials and elected leaders accountable for their actions. This research would be most beneficial to the senior officials at the federal level as they need to be aware of when policies do not achieve their intended results. This approach requires personal effort and getting formal approval from senior officials. When they are convinced concerning the viability and the benefits of these methods, the process can be initiated across other levels of public sector institutions.

Civil Service Academies in Pakistan, namely the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) and the Peshawar Academy for Rural Development (PARDA), are the two main institutions where senior and mid-level officers are trained on public administration and good governance. These institutions have been established to train civil servants of the future, as well as those who are waiting to be promoted having already served in different ministries, *inter alia* education, health, social policy etc. There is a discrepancy between what is being taught and what is subsequently practiced. Most of the courses are designed around disciplines such as democracy, decentralisation, public sector management techniques, etc. Therefore there is a dire need to change the mind sets of these officials in evaluating their own perceptions and behaviour. By targeting provincial institutions, there will be a recognition of the issues discussed in this research, and this therefore will become the basis for triangulation and justification in introducing PAL and AR. This process will lead to a broad understanding of the gaps between policy and practices, and how they can be evaluated at federal and provincial level.

The next level is the district, where policy goals and development interventions are implemented by the front line managers. In a district level workshop, front line managers and the staff working below these officers will be grouped according to their official status and respective sectors. The objective of this workshop will be to encourage the officials to reflect upon their own practices and behaviour through a process of interactions. The workshop will provide an opportunity to share with them how I have been able to collect and analyse unofficial practices in different contexts and situations. Diagnosing problems by these officials themselves will be an innovative approach to developing possible solutions to improving their own behaviour and management practices. This will be achieved through constant engagement and long-term involvement for continuous monitoring of their practices. The workshop will enable the participants to locate issues of permeability and accountability within their own professional cultures. The most important objective of this workshop will be to tackle the problem of the “long route to accountability”. This route is a critical factor in achieving policy targets, and to reflect upon official dealings with neglected and disadvantaged citizens, particularly in rural areas.

The same process will be replicated at the sub-district level, where junior officials and technical staff are constantly interacting with citizens and communities. The chances of success of reforms at the sub-district level, which is the meso level, are greater. The primary reason for this is because citizens are in direct contact with local politicians and thus there is a “short route to accountability”. This research shows that the short route to accountability creates pressure on locally elected politicians to improvise, and take deliberative action to resolve issues faced by the citizens. Whereas the local politician favours his own people, the same politician and the local staff can work together after creating a sense of ownership of responsibility and accountability between citizens and officials. The short route to accountability suggests that PAL and AR will be more sustainable and will produce quick results, since local citizens are aware of the social norms and the practices of local officials, and how citizens’ complaints have been addressed. As discussed in chapter six, the external intervention did not succeed in achieving

its intended goals, because the intervention was designed and implemented without acknowledging the significance of personal relationships and administrative practices. Therefore, reforms can be initiated at the sub-district level by informing the local staff of their own behaviour and how agency is constructed. By bringing the *Nazim* (the elected leader) into this entire process, it will lead to developing mutually agreed solutions to local problems, and make people aware of their rights and entitlements.

The final level of introducing PAL and AR is at the community/citizens level, which is the micro level. My empirical findings suggest that there are disadvantaged and poor segments in the society whose interests are neglected when policies are crafted and projects are designed. Through PAL and AR, the first step will be to know about the community problems, how state officials deal with the concerns of local citizens, and about the ways in which the public sector operates in particular. The diversity of classes and tribes can therefore be better understood when local citizens are empowered through voice, complemented with specific and targeted legal reforms and interventions. Through this research, I learnt that local citizens can be mobilised to improve local services by empowering them through knowledge, access to state decisions, and information on state priorities and policies. The purpose of PAL and AR at the citizens' level is to collect basic statistics and information pertaining to deficiencies in the implementation of social services. The gathering of information from citizens can reveal major shortcomings in the three case studies that I have examined, and the gaps between targets and considerable difficulties involved in their achievement.

After describing the first phase of diagnosis, the second phase entails seeing different levels in relation to each other. The second phase will put those levels into a dialogue with each other. This means, for example, that a politician would be brought to the micro level to engage in a series of dialogue with the service users. These dialogues would then lead to a preliminary analysis and then to embarking upon a realistic strategy in the distribution of state resources and rethinking of policy commitments. Similarly, the state holders at micro level would be put in contact with the meso level to attain a

better understanding of the pressures and constraints on the state officials in performing routine tasks. In a series of workshops, these dialogues would have to be facilitated and sustained over a period of time. Hopefully, through participatory action processes, stakeholders at different levels would identify problems faced in the conceptualisation and implementation of policy.

The methods of PAL have been used by researchers working with NGOs in Pakistan, but they have not been used in the manner that I have outlined: which is to share what I have done in the field, to deploy these research findings, and conduct triangulation at different levels. The implication of this research would not just be beneficial to the government, but can also be extremely useful to donors, particularly the World Bank and the Department for International Development (DFID). Both organisations are already investing huge amount of resources in Pakistan in attempting to improve public sector performance.

6. Recommendation for further research

I have concentrated on three different case studies in a specific district of a province in Pakistan. There are three other provinces where different languages are spoken, and the governments in these provinces operate in different social and political contexts. If my analysis of the problems of governance through political clientelism is correct, this research may be conducted in other provinces. However, I would recommend that a study on a particular sector such as health, education or agriculture be undertaken, focusing upon policy and analysing in more depth how policy can be reconceptualised at the level of conception and implementation using anthropological and ethnographical methods. Ethnography enables the researcher to acquire knowledge of social and institutional practices. In traditional societies, cultural practices and informal norms intuitively constitute meanings which are often expressed through practices and actions. Unlike other methods, ethnography can create linkages between the macro and micro-level practices through a prolonged ethnography of the bureaucratic processes of service provision.

In recent times, Oliver de Sardan (2005, p.63) has emphasised the importance and heuristic advantages of anthropology in relation to social change and development which is 'actor oriented'. The first gives pre-eminence to the logic, actions and strategies at the disposal of social actors which determine different rationalities, conceptions and, thus, behaviour. The second heuristic advantage is associated with an anthropological approach termed 'methodological individualism', which does not presuppose singular rationalities and logic but rather broadens the research canvas to gaze at several aspects of the rationalities and constraints under which people perform under various norms. The anthropology of development and social change can be used to obtain detailed knowledge of bureaucratic processes, informal social norms and rationalities in justifying actions or constraints which can lead to the development of other analytical concepts. The two biggest problems in Pakistan are education and health, and thus they are critical sectors for further research.

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Appendix 1

Focus Group Discussions

(Refuse Management)

Introduction:

Welcome the group members, introduction of self and brief on the PhD research topic. The purpose of the focus group discussion and how the discussion would benefit my research. How long the discussion would last and what would be discussed in the group. How ethical issues would be handled. The sharing of information would be restricted to the research and would not be disclosed to outsiders. Names would not be disclosed and complete anonymity of the participants would be ensured.

Opening questions:

1. Brief introduction of the sanitation staff and ask each member about their official responsibilities.
2. Briefly describe what are the key three problems in refuse management.
3. What in your view were the reasons for the IUCN solid waste project to improve the existing management of refuse in old and new Nawansher.

Sharing of research findings:

1. The project did not improve sanitation practices and management of solid waste in Nawansher.
2. Resistance from the community to cooperate in the project.
3. No accountability and sanctioning of local citizens in dumping waste in the streets and open plots.
4. The official tasks, job description and responsibilities do not match with the actual practices.

5. General Questions:

1. Describe what kinds of pressures you face when performing official responsibilities.
2. What incentives do you get to perform to official tasks and what is your opinion on these incentives.
3. Describe how your official responsibilities are sidelined by official directives, informal relationships, compliance with orders of senior officials and other non-official personalities.
4. Describe how political connections/approaches and acts of mediation by senior officials or non-officials affects your formal responsibilities.

Ending Questions:

1. How power differences and relationships influence treatment of cases, decision making, accountability and sanctioning.
2. Describe the kinds of relationships that you face which affect official responsibilities.
3. The sanitation staff is often sent on 'fatigue'. What is 'fatigue' and describe what the sanitation staff does when they visit house/people and sites after office hours.
4. Does the group agree with the findings or would like to add something to the findings which would help me to revisit them?

Appendix 2

Primary Education

ADOs (Male and Female)

Introduction:

Welcome the group members, introduction of self and brief on the PhD research topic. The purpose of the focus group discussion and how the discussion would benefit my research. How long the discussion would last and what would be discussed in the group. How ethical issues would be handled. The sharing of information would be restricted to the research and would not be disclosed to outsiders. Names would not be disclosed and complete anonymity of the participants would be ensured.

Opening questions:

1. Brief introduction of the group members and ask each member about their official responsibilities.
2. Briefly describe what are the key issues and problems in achieving the goals and targets of primary education in your respective circle.

Sharing of research findings:

3. Political personalities intrude in the official provision of primary education.
4. Political appointments, social relationships, kinship ties, moral obligation, tribal and political interests over and above the formal state.
5. State bureaucracy keeps its prestige and position and makes administrative adjustments to avoid political inconvenience.
6. The official behaviour is intruded upon by social norms and distorts expected official behaviour

7. Formal institutional processes are sidelined by unofficial practices and therefore formal accountability of public officials and of elected leaders cannot be assumed.
8. In the absence of formal accountability, the state official captures and misappropriates state resources in cooperation with community and non-state actors. Thus, they affect institutional performance and implementation of policy.

General Questions:

5. Describe what kind of pressures you face when performing official responsibilities.
6. What incentives do you get in performing official tasks and what is your opinion on these incentives.
7. Describe how your official responsibilities are sidelined by official directives, informal relationships, compliance with orders of senior officials and other non-official personalities.
8. How do political connections/approaches and acts of mediation by senior officials or non-officials affect your formal responsibilities?

Ending Questions:

5. How power differences and relationships influence treatment of cases, decision making, accountability and sanctioning.
6. Describe the kinds of relationships which in your view affect official responsibilities
7. Describe a situation, examples or cases in order to understand your views on politics and administration. Do you treat them as separate or is politics part of administration and official practices?
8. Does the group agree with the findings or would it like to add something to the findings which would help me to revisit them?

Appendix 3

Water Supply

Technical, managerial and non-technical staff

Introduction:

Welcome the group members, introduction of self and brief on the PhD research topic. The purpose of the focus group discussion and how the discussion would benefit my research. How long the discussion would last and what would be discussed in the group. How ethical issues would be handled. The sharing of information would be restricted to the research and would not be disclosed to outsiders. Names would not be disclosed and complete anonymity of the participants would be ensured.

Opening questions:

1. Brief introduction of the group members and ask each member about their official responsibilities.
2. Briefly describe what key issues and problems you face to ensure access to water supply.

Sharing of research findings:

3. Subversion of formal authority of the officials by the *Nazim* in access situations and when close relatives and friends approach the *Nazim* for personal favours.
4. Informal appropriation of water using different social practices.
5. Exclusion of certain communities from access and the conflict between the excluded communities caused by the loop system.
6. Adverse performance appraisal in case of non-compliance with *Nazim* priorities.

7. Illegal water connections by certain individuals and lack of formal accountability of the pump operators
8. Political and factional dynamics in the provision of water supply.

General Questions:

9. Describe what kind of pressures you face when performing official responsibilities.
10. Describe why citizens' complaints are not treated equally, and how some residents are able to get access to water supply more easily than others.
11. Describe how official responsibilities are sidelined by social relationships, local customs and kinship ties.
12. How do acts of mediation by the *Nazim* and local political personalities affect your formal responsibilities.

Ending Questions:

9. How power differences and relationships influence treatment of cases, decision making, accountability and sanctioning.
10. Describe the kinds of relationships which in your view affect official responsibilities.
11. Describe a situation, examples or cases to understand your views on politics and administration. Do you treat them separate or is politics part of administration and official practices?
12. Does the group agree with the findings or would like to add something to the findings which would help me to revisit them?

Appendix 4

Informal Interview with the *Nazim* of Nawansher

1. Describe your views on formal and informal accountability.
2. How does informal accountability work in practice? Explain with incidents.
3. What are the expectations of the community from you as a *Nazim*?
4. How are these expectations met in situations of access to water supply, and in dispute resolutions over access to water?
5. Describe your views on social solidarity and social relationships within your community and the domination of Jadoons in Nawansher.
6. What kinds of social and political pressures are created by the local community on you, and how do these create circumstances to manage access and resolve disputes across different classes or community members?

Appendix 5

Education Sector Reforms

Universal Primary Education (UPE)

District Abbottabad

(Officials of the District Education Department)

1. What are the main streams in ESRs?
2. In which stream is there interaction of the education department and public/community.
3. What are the mechanisms of interactions of school teachers with members of PTCs?
4. Briefly describe your role in UPE and how long have you been working in the department?
5. What is the current enrolment and dropout rate in your district?
6. What are the key issues associated with enrolment rates, dropouts and quality education, especially in rural areas?
7. In your view, what are the key obstacles in your department for improving the enrolment rate, preventing drop outs and providing quality education in the district?
8. Are you aware of ESRs (2001-02-2005-06)? If yes: These reforms lay emphasis on EFA goals, what are your views on achieving the goals of UPE in the district?
9. National Plan of Action is a major initiative of the government to reach the disadvantaged population groups in rural and urban areas; to promote community participation and ownership of basic education, and to improve the relevance and quality of basic education learning achievements. What are your views on these objectives?
10. What is the process of monitoring and evaluation of primary education targets/progress in the district?

Appendix 6

Education Sector Reforms

Universal Primary Education (UPE)

District Abbottabad

(Primary school teachers)

1. What are the issues in access to quality education in schools?
2. What are the views of the teachers on their teaching practices, and especially teaching in hilly areas?
3. What are the primary reasons of having fewer teachers in rural schools?
4. The reasons of teachers absenteeism, union-based recruitment of teachers in schools are the biggest objectives according to the ESR document. How do you view these objectives in terms of their implementation in schools?
5. Dropout and quality of education in terms of learning abilities and missing facilities are seldom discussed in the official meetings. What are the reasons?
6. The education department has identified mentor teachers. Who are these teachers and what are their key responsibilities in each circle?
7. In many schools, teachers have been posted in the same schools for more than three years. Why is the official policy not followed in practice?
8. What are the reasons for having more teachers in urban schools and not in rural schools?
9. What is the mechanism of holding meetings with PTC members? When are they held and what is discussed in these meetings?


Appendix 7

Domestic Water Supply, Nawansher

1. How the town committee is managing the current water supply system in UC (No. of staff, shifts, timings).
2. How they insure accessibility of water in the UC—What is the zoning system?
3. Why certain hamlets do not get regular water and others do.
4. What are the political dynamics in the distribution of water supply in the old and new Nawansher?
5. How the water distribution system is being managed by the town committee.
6. What are the problems in the management of the water supply?
7. How people register their water complaints in the town committee and how they get resolved and by whom?
8. Which hamlets are getting water and from which source?
9. What is the zoning system and what criteria were devised when the system was introduced?
10. Do the people in old and new Nawansher know about the zoning system? If not, what are the reasons behind this?
11. What is the difference between an illegal water connection and a legal water connection, and what is the formal process of getting a water connection?

Appendix 8

Actual Functioning of District Education



Appendix 9

Concentric Circles

